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ABSTRACT 
 Since the late 1990s, there has been a rapid expansion of welfare – including 
education, social security, and health care – in China. But this expansion has not been 
evenly distributed; some cities have expanded welfare very rapidly while other cities 
have lagged far behind. Why do we see this variation? To answer this question, we need 
to begin by exploring the reasons why an authoritarian regime would expand welfare at 
all; after all, the government is not responding to voters. To understand both the 
motivations and variations of welfare expansion, this dissertation focuses on business-
government relations, particularly (1) the role of big business, (2) the effect of 
bureaucratic structures, using development zones as a case study, and (3) the resources 
municipal politicians bring with them to their positions. This dissertation makes two 
major contributions. First, departing from the traditional state-centered approach in the 
study of authoritarian governance, it offers an alternative approach that focuses on the 
“demand” side of welfare provision by examining the role of big business. In countries 
	 viii 
without formal democratic institutions, firms’ influence on social policy is more 
capability based: large firms are more influential. Second, this project examines the 
bureaucratic structure of development zones and finds that they have a unique 
administrative structure (including higher political ranking, central government support 
and supervision, and more professional personnel), which enables the zone government 
to be more responsive to the needs of business, resulting in a better welfare provision. 
The dissertation also offers an explanation to distinct social policy priorities (i.e. human 
capital vs. social security) across cities by tracing how mayors’ work experience and 
political connections shape their decisions on cities’ growth strategies, which in turn 
contributes to differences in social policy outcomes.  
 Empirically, this dissertation employs both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Quantitatively, it involved the construction of an original panel dataset with economic, 
political, and demographical information on all 336 Chinese cities from 2001 to 2012. 
Qualitatively, it offers in-depth case studies on several cities based on primary sources in 
Chinese language, including local gazetteers (difangzhi), yearbooks, newspapers, and 
published as well as unpublished internal government documents. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Redistributive Autocracy: Big Business and Government’s Provision of Welfare in 
Urban China 
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Abstract 
Why would an authoritarian government without formal democratic institutions 
provide and promote social welfare to its citizens? China has witnessed a rapid increase 
of government’s welfare expenditure since the late 1990s and municipal governments 
have taken a major role in delivering welfare and public services. This chapter seeks to 
understand both the motivations and variations of government’s provision on social 
welfare in Chinese municipalities. This chapter conducts the first systematic study on the 
role of big business in this process. Departing from the traditional state-centered 
approach in studying authoritarian governance, this chapter offers an alternative approach 
that focuses on the “demand” side of social welfare provision and illustrates a “bottom up” 
mechanism in explaining welfare expansion in China. In particular, this chapter explores 
the influence of large firms in promoting social welfare and tries to understand how 
government officials respond to needs of business. This chapter finds that both size of 
firm and type of firm matters. The theory is tested based on both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. 
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1.1 Introduction 
China has witnessed a rapid increase of welfare expenditure since the late 1990s. 
For example, the average public expenditure on education across Chinese cities counted 
as less than 1 percent of each city’s GDP in 2001, but this number rose to nearly 5 
percent in 2012.1 In other words, government’s expenditure on education increased 5 
times within 12 years, which is a rapid expansion, albeit from a low starting point. In 
addition, comparing with central government, local government takes major 
responsibility in the provision of social welfare.2 For example, in 2014, total social 
welfare expenditure made by local government was 4.7 trillion yuan, while the central 
government only spent 0.2 trillion yuan on social security, education, and health care 
combined. Moreover, such a rapid expansion of social welfare has not been evenly 
distributed. In 2012, for example, the social expenditure per capita of the highest 
spending city (17,421.42 yuan) is 15.6 times higher than the lowest spending city 
(1,113.815 yuan).3 This chapter as well as the whole dissertation seeks to explain this 
rapid but unevenly distributed expansion of welfare in the case of China. Theoretically, 
why would an authoritarian government – for example, China – without formal 
																																																								
1 Data is calculated from author’s own dataset, which is collected from various statistical yearbooks in 
Chinese such as Chinese City Statistical Yearbook and Chinese Regional Economic Statistical Yearbook, 
which have city-level statistics.  
2 Here local government refers to all levels of governments that are under the leadership of the central 
government of China. In Chinese political system, there are five levels of government: 1) central, 2) 
provincial, 3) municipal, 4) county, and 5) town/township. For analytical convenience, this chapter uses 
local government to represent non-central governments. It is worth noting that the unit of analysis of this 
chapter is Chinese cities, and thus, the use of word “local government” in this chapter mainly refers to 
municipal government in particular.  
3 Author’s data. 
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democratic institutions promote social welfare to its citizens? What are the motivations of 
the government to do this given the fact that the government is not elected, not 
responding to voters? Empirically, how can we understand the huge sub-national 
variation of welfare provision in China? In particular, why do some cities in China 
provide better social welfare to its citizens than others do? 
Conventional wisdom on authoritarian politics takes a state-centered approach,4 
and they conclude that welfare expansion are a result of either the concern of legitimacy5 
or the needs of nation-building.6 However, we have little knowledge on the role of 
business in the expansion of social welfare in an authoritarian setting. In other words, a 
gap in the existing literature is that most studies follow the state-centered “top-down” 
approach, while ignoring a potential “bottom-up” mechanism in explaining welfare 
expansion in authoritarian countries. To fill this gap, instead of studying the “supply” 
side of social welfare, I explore the “demand” side of welfare provision. As shown below, 
this “demand” comes predominantly from business interests, particularly big business. To 
																																																								
4 See for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing The State 
Back In (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
5 Ian Holliday and Paul Wilding, Welfare Capitalism in East Asia: Social Policy in the Tiger Economies 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).; Jennifer Pan, “Buying Inertia: Preempting Social Disorder With 
Selective Welfare Provision in Urban China.” (Harvard University, 2015).; Xian Huang, “Four Worlds of 
Welfare: Understanding Subnational Variation in Chinese Social Health Insurance,” The China Quarterly 
222 (2015): 449–74.; Isabela Mares and Matthew E Carnes, “Social Policy in Developing Countries,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 12, no. 1 (2009): 93–113.; Susan Carol Stokes, Thad Dunning, and 
Marcelo Nazareno, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).; Philip H. Brown, Alan De Brauw, and Yang Du, “Understanding 
Variation in the Design of China’s New Co-Operative Medical System,” The China Quarterly 198 (2009): 
304–29.; Jane Duckett, “Challenging the Economic Reform Paradigm: Policy and Politics in the Early 
1980s’ Collapse of the Rural Co-Operative Medical System,” The China Quarterly 205 (2011): 80–95. 
6 Holliday and Wilding, Welfare Capitalism in East Asia.; Roger Goodman, “The East Asian Welfare 
States: Peripatetic Learning, Adaptive Change, and Nation-Building,” in Welfare States in Transition: 
National Adaptations in Global Economies, ed. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 
1996), 192–224, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446216941. 
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my best knowledge, this dissertation offers the first systematic study to examine how big 
business influences social policies in a non-democratic regime such as China. 
Understanding both the motivations and variations of social welfare provision in 
subnational China are important for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, 
what accounts for the motivations of politicians in authoritarian countries to provide 
social welfare to the society? Without formal democratic institutions, how do societal 
forces hold non-elected political officials accountable? Put it more generally, would an 
alternative mechanism or “functional equivalents” that protect and promote individual’s 
social rights exist in authoritarian countries? Empirically, most theories in the literature 
of welfare state are generated from empirical evidence based on advanced industrialized 
European countries.7 Insufficient attention has been paid to social policies in developing 
countries.8 Are theories generated from the European cases applicable to emerging 
market economies such as China? In addition, exploring the case of China may also shed 
light on our understanding of the resilient authoritarian regime as well as the discussion 
of China’s democratization.9  
																																																								
7 There is a large literature on European welfare state, see for example, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).; Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).; Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank, The Political Construction of Business 
Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).; Lucio 
Baccaro and Jonas Pontusson, “Rethinking Comparative Political Economy: The Growth Model 
Perspective,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 175–207. 
8 Mares and Carnes, “Social Policy in Developing Countries.” 
9 In the field of Chinese politics, democratization or authoritarian resilience is arguably the most important 
and widely discussed theme for decades, see for example, Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Oakland, 
CA: University of California Press, 1986).; Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: 
Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1994).; 
Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao. (Leiden: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).; Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China, 4th ed. (Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).; Bruce J Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s 
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Generally speaking, this chapter argues that large firms10 (both domestic and 
foreign invested) act as a determining factor in promoting the social welfare of a city in 
China. In the process of welfare expansion, large firms act as a “pioneer” (i.e. leading 
force) in lobbying the government to improve social welfare as well as public services in 
a city. Large firms matter in this process first because large firms have a great interest in 
social policies.11 For example, some large firms (such as Huawei, Intel, or Mitsubishi) 
want to invest in a place with abundant skilled labor which is essential to the production 
of firms. Second, large firms have the capabilities to influence social policies because 
large firms are essential to a city’s economic development, issue of employment, and 
government’s fiscal revenue. From the perspective of a mayor, he/she has incentives to 
respond to a large firm because the city relies more on large firms to generate wealth and 
maintain sustainable growth of the city. Welfare development is also part of a politician’s 
political achievements (zhengji).12 Thus, municipal politicians are also in favor of 
creating an environment that is friendly to investment of large firms, resulting in making 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Strategy for Survival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
10 In this chapter, I use the term “large firm” to refer to both large Chinese domestic firms and large foreign 
invested multinational corporations. For the purpose of concision, the paper use “large firm” to represent all 
types of large firms (state-owned, private, foreign invested). In terms of the definition of large firm, 
National Bureau of Statistics of China published specific criteria to categorize large, medium, and small 
firms. Criteria include a firm’s sales revenue, number of employee, and total assets. Different standards 
apply to firms of different sectors. For example, a large industry firm is defined as a firm that has over 
2,000 employees, 300 million yuan of sales revenue, and 400 million yuan of total asset. For details, see 
National Statistics Bureau. “guanyu huafen dazhongxiao qiye de biaozhun (Rules of Categorizing Large, 
Medium, and Small Firms),” Document No. 17, May 19, 2003. 
11 In studies on European welfare states, many studies have demonstrated that firms do have an interest in 
social welfare policies, see for example, Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare 
State Development (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
12 On discussing how welfare development advances a municipal politician’s political career, see Cai Zuo, 
“Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China,” The China Quarterly 224 (2015): 
955–84. 
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public policies that improve public services, human capital and the general living 
environment of a city.  
 
 1.2 Welfare Expansion in China 
In general, China’s expansion of social welfare started in late 1990s. For example, 
Figure 1.2.1 shows the population covered by two major welfare programs in urban 
China, the Urban Employee Basic Pension (UEBP) program and the Urban Employee 
Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) program. As we can see from Figure 1.2.1 below, the 
coverage of these two programs had little increase between 1995 and 1998. However, 
starting from the year of 1999, both of the two programs dramatically expanded the 
coverage of urban population. For example, population covered by UEBMI was only 
20,653,000 in the year of 1999 but this number boosted up to 37,869,000 in the year of 
2000, with an 83.4% of growth.  
 
Figure 1.2.1: Coverage of Urban Social Security Programs (1995 – 2015) 
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As coverage expanded, so did the total amount of money spent on social welfare. 
Figure 1.2.2 below shows an aggregate social welfare expenditure of all levels of 
governments in China. From 2007 to 2014, public expenditure on education, health care, 
and social security are all in an increasing trend. For example, government’s expenditure 
on education in 2007 was 712 billion yuan and this number tripled (2,304 billion yuan) 
within only 7 years.  
 
Figure 1.2.2: Public Expenditure of Social Welfare in China (2007 – 2014) 
 
Another interesting point of the welfare expansion is the “central-local divide”. 
Central government plays a smaller role in the funding process of welfare expansion. The 
“smaller role” refers that most of the welfare expenditure is contributed by local 
government. As shown in Figure 1.2.3 below, from 2007 to 2014, local government’s 
social welfare expenditure is on average 20.96 times higher than central government’s 
		
9 
financial commitment on social welfare. The central government’s funding only counts 
for an average of 4.58% of the total welfare expenditure, while local governments 
provide more than 95% of the funding. In addition, as we can see from Figure 1.2.3, 
central government’s expenditure on education, social security, and health care had 
limited increase. By contrast, local government’s social expenditure on all these 
categories increased dramatically. It is local government that takes major responsibility in 
the expansion of social welfare and thus, analyzing the motivations of local government 
would provide us a better and more accurate understanding of social welfare expansion in 
China. 
 
Figure 1.2.3: The Central-Local Division of Welfare Expenditure (2007 – 2014) 
 
More interesting and important, China’s welfare expansion displays a remarkable 
unequal distribution pattern across regions. From Figure 1.2.4 below we can see that the 
regional variation on government’s social welfare expenditure is huge. Provinces located 
		
10 
on the east coast (e.g. Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangdong) and along the Yangtze River (e.g. 
Sichuan and Hunan) spend more on social welfare than provinces in the West and the 
Middle. From the data I have collected, between 2001 and 2012, the average 
government’s expenditure on social welfare across cities is 7.84% of a given city’s GDP, 
but the variance is 36.03, which means a huge variation across cities. The upper 10% 
cities spend on average 15% of their GDP on social welfare, while the bottom 10% cities 
only spend 3% of their GDP on social welfare. Thus, it is essential of this chapter to 
understand the determinants of the variation on social spending across Chinese cities.  
 
Figure 1.2.4: Subnational Variation in China’s Social Welfare Expenditure 
 
1.3 Literature Review on Social Welfare in Non-democracies 
  Existing literature on welfare in non-democracies follows the traditional approach 
of the authoritarian politics literature that has a state-centered approach. When thinking 
about an authoritarian regime, legitimacy is always a big concern. Holiday and Wilding 
provide a systematic study on East Asian countries and argue that a key incentive for 
authoritarian states to provide social welfare is to counter social unrest in the process of 
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economic development.13 In addition, welfare benefits are viewed as an important tool to 
co-opt political and economic elites as well as mitigating both intra-elite and elite-public 
conflicts.14 Several studies show that autocrats rely less on repression and more on co-
optation when pressure of regime liberalization increases15 or security apparatus becomes 
a potential threat to autocrats themselves.16 Co-optation increases the likelihood of 
survival of autocrats and co-optation usually is achieved through the spoil system or 
redistribution programs such as housing, wages, and pensions.17 Existing literature on 
authoritarianism provides us a rich knowledge on the role of state but it is incomplete; we 
still know little about the impact of societal forces (particularly business) on welfare 
provision in non-democratic countries.   
In the welfare state literature on European advanced industrialized countries, 
traditional power resource theory assumes that business has little interest in establishing 																																																								
13 Ian Holliday and Paul Wilding, Welfare Capitalism in East Asia: Social Policy in the Tiger Economies 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
14 Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).; Isabela Mares and Matthew E Carnes, “Social Policy in 
Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Political Science 12, no. 1 (2009): 93–113.; Susan Carol Stokes, 
Thad Dunning, and Marcelo Nazareno, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive 
Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013).; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic 
of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003).; Stephen Haber, “Authoritarian Government,” 
in Handbook of Political Economy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 693–707.; Jennifer 
Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).; 
Ruth Kricheli and Yair Livne, “Mass Revolutions vs Elite Coups” (Annual Meeting of American Political 
Science Association, Toronto, 2009). 
15 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” 
Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (November 1, 2007): 1279–1301. 
16 Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli, “Political Order and One-Party Rule,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 13 (June 2010): 123–43.; Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship (Cambridge, 
UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
17 Beatriz Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule,” Comparative 
Political Studies 41 (April 1, 2008): 715–41.; Valerie Jane Bunce, “The Succession Connection: Policy 
Cycles and Political Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” American Political Science Review 
74, no. 4 (1980): 966–77.; Robert H Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of 
Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).; Ruth Berins Collier, Regimes in 
Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945-1975 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982). 
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welfare state.18 However, in recent years, there has been discussions on the role of 
business in the social policy making process and how firms’ preferences shape social 
welfare programs.19 For example, Swenson’s research demonstrates the important role of 
employers in promoting centralized industrial relations in Denmark and Sweden. He 
examines the wage bargaining systems in these two countries and finds that export-
dependent firms and labor unions worked together in establishing such system.20 In a 
similar way, Thelen studies German firms’ preferences and argues that the failure to 
establish a centralized wage bargaining system is mainly because of the unwillingness of 
German employers.21 Mares studies the development of welfare state in France and 
Germany in late 19th century and finds that business actively supported welfare state. In 
particular, she finds that firm size and level of skills matter; large firms with skilled labor 
tend to support private social programs while small firms with low skilled labor prefer 
public social insurance.22 In the case of the United States, Martin studies how firms’ 
preference shapes health care reform. She argues that both firm-level characteristics (e.g. 
size, sectors, level of skills, etc.) and institutional factors (e.g. relationship with national 																																																								
18 Walter Korpi, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden (London; 
Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). 
19 See for example, Cathie Jo Martin, “Nature or Nurture? Sources of Firm Preference for National Health 
Reform,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 898–913.; Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben 
Iversen, and David Soskice, “Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the 
Welfare State,” in Varieties of Capitalism : The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, ed. 
Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 145–83. 
20 Peter Swenson, “Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-
Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden,” World Politics 43, no. 
4 (1991): 513–44. 
21 Kathleen Thelen, “Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Dismantle the German Model,” 
in Unions, Employers, and Central Banks : Macroeconomic Coordination and Institutional Change in 
Social Market Economies, ed. Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskice (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 138–72. 
22 Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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capital, participated groups, etc.) determine firms’ preferences in social policies.23 Martin 
and Swank’s recent book further explores how different type of employers’ associations 
shape member firms’ preferences on social policies differently. For example, in Denmark, 
the peak associations not only facilitate discussion of shared concerns among firms but 
also bind firms to certain policy outcomes. On the contrary, the sectoral coordinated 
associations in Germany make firms’ preferences more diverse.24 In a word, this 
literature shows that firms’ preference does matter in the process of social policymaking. 
However, we do not have a clear idea whether these findings generated from advanced 
industrialized democracies can be applied to emerging market economies with no or 
weak democratic institutions. Thus, an important contribution of this chapter is to explore 
potential effects of business on welfare provision in the case of China. 
In the field of China studies, the expansion of social welfare is a relatively new 
topic and thus understudied. There have been several studies documenting welfare 
reforms in China. One of the important reforms accompanying marketization is the 
reform on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with a distinct feature of transforming SOEs 
to a market actor.25 The SOE reform also leads to a social welfare reform, as the SOE 
reform breaks down the socialist “iron rice bowl” (lifetime employment) and the work-
																																																								
23 Cathie Jo Martin, “Nature or Nurture? Sources of Firm Preference for National Health Reform,” 
American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 898–913.; Cathie Jo Martin, Stuck in Neutral Business 
and the Politics of Human Capital Investment Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
24 Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank, The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, 
Growth, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
25 Edward S Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry (Cambridge, UK; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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unit (danwei) based system of social welfare.26 Such collapse of the work-unit system led 
to a “Great Laid-off” in the late 1990s and a great wave of social protests in urban 
China.27 In addition, some studies point out problem with China’s welfare system, such 
as an urban-rural divide28 and a coastal-inland divide.29 Although these studies provide us 
fruitful knowledge on features of the Chinese welfare system, they are more of 
descriptive research rather than causal analysis.  
An emerging literature on Chinese social welfare tries to answer the question of 
“why.” Inspired by the authoritarian legitimacy literature, Pan studies the Minimum 
Livelihood Guarantee (dibao) program of China by conducting survey experiments in 
Chinese communities and finds that local bureaucrats favor to use the dibao program as a 
means to prevent those poorest people protesting on streets.30 Similarly, based on a 
provincial-level comparison, Huang finds that the population covered by the health 
insurance program in a province is positively associated with the level of social risk of 
that province.31 If a province has a serious problem of social risk (e.g. thousands of 																																																								
26 Edward X Gu, “Dismantling the Chinese Mini-Welfare State?: Marketization and the Politics of 
Institutional Transformation, 1979–1999,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, no. 1 (March 2001): 
91–111.; Edward Gu and Jianjun Zhang, “Health Care Regime Change in Urban China: Unmanaged 
Marketization and Reluctant Privatization,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 1 (2006): 49–71. 
27 Mark W. Frazier, “China’s Pension Reform and Its Discontents,” The China Journal 51 (2004): 97–114, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3182148.; William Hurst and Kevin J. O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners,” 
The China Quarterly 170 (2002): 345–60.; Yongshun Cai, “The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in 
the Reform Period,” The China Quarterly 170 (2002): 327–44.; William Hurst, The Chinese Worker after 
Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
28 Xiaobo Zhang and Ravi Kanbur, “Spatial Inequality in Education and Health Care in China,” China 
Economic Review 16, no. 2 (2005): 189–204.; Wanchuan Lin, Gordon G. Liu, and Gang Chen, “The Urban 
Resident Basic Medical Insurance: A Landmark Reform towards Universal Coverage in China,” Health 
Economics 18, no. S2 (2009): S83–96. 
29 Win Lin Chou and Zijun Wang, “Regional Inequality in China’s Health Care Expenditures,” Health 
Economics 18 Suppl 2 (July 2009): S137-146. 
30 Jennifer Pan, “Buying Inertia: Preempting Social Disorder With Selective Welfare Provision in Urban 
China.” (Harvard University, 2015). 
31 Xian Huang, “Four Worlds of Welfare: Understanding Subnational Variation in Chinese Social Health 
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people protesting on streets), provincial government tends to be more willing to expand 
the population covered by basic health insurance. In addition to the legitimacy hypothesis, 
the promotion of political officials is demonstrated as another important factor in 
explaining government officials’ incentives in welfare provision. For example, Zuo 
examines the institution of cadre management system in China and finds that different 
local cadre evaluation systems shape officials’ preferences on social welfare differently. 
Specifically, Zuo identifies that China’s cadre evaluation systems have either an 
economic development orientation or a welfare focus. She finds that politicians of 
provinces with a welfare mandate have greater incentives to improve social welfare than 
political officials who work in provinces with an economic development concentration.32 
In a similar vein, several studies contend that local politicians’ political trajectories and 
promotion prospects shape their behaviors in social spending.33  
As we can see from this emerging literature, most studies follow the traditional 
state-centered approach developed in study of authoritarianism to explain the expansion 
of social welfare in China. However, we are not clear about the contribution of societal 
forces (particularly business) in this process. In other words, the existing literature 
focuses more on the “supply” side of welfare, while it pays little attention to the “demand” 
side of welfare. Thus, to fill this gap, instead of following the traditional “top-down” 
approach to study the welfare expansion in China, this chapter offers an alternative 																																																																																																																																																																					
Insurance,” The China Quarterly 222 (2015): 449–74. 
32 Cai Zuo, “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China,” The China Quarterly 
224 (2015): 955–84. 
33 Tai-wei Liu, “The Politics of Social Spending in China: The Role of Career Incentives” (University of 
California, San Diego, 2011).; Xiaobo Lü and Mingxin Liu, “Public Goods with Private Benefits: 
Understanding Local Governments’ Incentives in Education Provision in China” (Annual Meeting of 
American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2013). 
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approach that examines the role of business and seeks to find a “bottom-up” mechanism 
in explaining the motivations and variations of social welfare expansion in China. 
 
1.4 Theoretical Argument 
China is an authoritarian country without formal democratic institutions. In theory, 
politicians of authoritarian regimes have much less incentive to improve citizens’ social 
well-being than their counterparts do in democracies. However, since the market reform 
and opening in 1978, there is no doubt that the main goal of the Chinese government is to 
develop its economy. Under such situation, I argue that the authoritarian elites of China 
have preferences similar to those of elected politicians in democratic states, namely 
fostering economic development and raising people’s living standards. Government 
cannot achieve this goal without the help of business which acts as a prominent actor in 
this process. Taxes collected from firms are also a major source of government’s fiscal 
revenue, especially in the context of China where personal income tax only consists on 
average 3% of a municipal government’s fiscal revenue.34 Moreover, the development of 
firms creates job opportunities and mitigates unemployment problem, which helps to 
calm down potential social anger and ultimately promotes social stability. Therefore, I 
argue that politicians in authoritarian countries also pay attention to employers’ needs just 
as their democratic counterparts do, because business acts as a necessary partner to the 
government in achieving development goals and improving the regime legitimacy. Local 
governments also face competition between areas to attract investment. Thus, politicians 
																																																								
34 Calculated from author’s data. 
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in authoritarian countries are also willing to establish an environment that benefits the 
development of firms in their territories. Firm power, thus, determines the capabilities of 
firms to lobby the government and to further influence public policies. In the light of this 
argument, a large firm tends to have more firm power and thus have more influence in 
public policies than a small firm does, mainly because a large firm 1) contributes more to 
economic growth; 2) pays more taxes to government; and 3) creates more jobs. 
Furthermore, I argue that in an authoritarian regime, the influence of business on public 
policy is mostly based on capabilities, due to the lack of formal democratic institutions 
that channels opinions of firms to government. In other words, small and medium-size 
firms are less likely to have the same capabilities as large firms do in influencing public 
policies. Take Alibaba Group as an example. Alibaba is one of the largest Chinese e-
commerce companies that provides variety kinds of sales services via Internet (e.g. b2c, 
c2c, b2b, etc.). Alibaba has two large offices in city of Hangzhou, one is in Binjiang 
District (the headquarter) and the other is in Yuhang District. In December 2013, 
Hangzhou Municipal Government announced that it signed a “strategic cooperative” 
(zhanlue hezuo) contract with Alibaba that will facilitate the development of Alibaba in 
every aspect including providing better public services, promoting human capital of 
Hangzhou, improving the “soft” environment of Hangzhou, and building 5 industrial 
parks. The main reason for Alibaba’s ability to influence policy successfully is its 
importance to Hangzhou’s economy. In the year of 2014, Alibaba paid 10.9 billion yuan 
taxes in total, with 4.38 billion yuan taxes to Yuhang District.35 In addition to the huge 
																																																								
35 “Ruguo Ali yu Beijing xianglian, Hangzhou shifou hui gandao shiluo (Would Hangzhou Feel Grievance 
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amount of tax contribution to Hangzhou, Alibaba hires more than 30,000 employees in 
total. Moreover, through Alibaba’s web platforms such as Taobao and T-mall, 9.62 
million job opportunities are created indirectly.36 Such a giant firm has a much greater 
capacity to influence public policies than do small and medium-sized firms. A 
government official of Hangzhou vividly described the relationship between Hangzhou 
municipal government and Alibaba as “common destiny” (mingyun gongtongti) and the 
support from Hangzhou municipal government to Alibaba Group as “all 360 degree 
dimensions” (360du quanfangwei), which not only includes favorable tax policies but 
more important the improvement of social welfare and quality of public services of 
Hangzhou.37 
A unique feature of large foreign invested firm is that when they invest in China, 
these multinational corporations not only bring in advanced technology and capital but 
also import ideas of human- or social rights and expect similar standard of public services 
as they have in their native countries. An American firm, for example, would naturally 
judge the quality of public service by American standard and pay more attention to 
overall living standard.38 Multinational corporations are concerned about not only 
																																																																																																																																																																					
if Alibaba ‘Falls in Love’ with Beijing)?” Caijing Guojia Zhoukan (Economy & Nation Weekly), October 
13, 2014. 
36 “jiubai liushi erwan ren yikao hulianwangdian gongzuo (9.62 Million People Work on Internet-Shops),” 
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), March 28, 2014. 
37 “Hangzhoushi yu Alibaba Jituan Zhaokai Zhanlue Hezuo Disici Lianxi Huiyi (Hangzhou Municipal 
Government Held the Fourth Strategic Meeting with Alibaba Group),” Hangzhou Ribao (Hangzhou Daily), 
December 16, 2016. 
38 For example, before Intel invested in Dalian, it conducted comprehensive business survey; they even 
collected information on how many American style bars and gyms the city of Dalian has. For a detailed 
discussion, see Yanhui Wang, “Wo yu Yingteer Xiangmu de Riri Yeye (My Day and Nights with Intel),” in 
National People’s Political Consulative Conference (eds), Shisige Yanhai Chengshi Kaifang Jishi—Dalian 
Juan (Documentaries of Fourtheen Coastal Cities’ Openning: Dalian), (Beijing: China Wenshi Press, 2015). 
The US Chamber of Commerce also publishes guidance for American firms invested in China and the US 
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favorable tax policies but also the “soft” environment of the city before they make 
investment decisions. For example, Intel (an American multinational corporation and a 
world leading semiconductor manufacturer) decided to invest USD 2.5 billion to establish 
a 300nm wafer fabrication factory (the Fab 68) in the city of Dalian in March 2006 and 
started building the Fab 68 in May 2007. This new factory “produces leading-edge 65nm 
chipsets for laptop computers, high-performance desktop PCs and powerful servers.”39 
Opened in 2010, Fab 68 is Intel’s first wafer fabrication in China as well as in Asia. 
Before making the investment decision, Intel sent teams to several other cities in China 
(including Shanghai, Qingdao, Wuxi, Chengdu, and Xi’an) for investment assessment. In 
nearly every occasion of negotiation with different governments, Intel expressed a strong 
preference for finding a place that has or will have public services similar to those in the 
United States. The key for Dalian’s success is largely due to the municipal government’s 
commitment to agree to the requirements of Intel on public services as well as the general 
welfare of the city, which includes building a new K-12 school based on American 
standard (with government’s investment of USD 30 million, and the school is accredited 
by Western Association of Schools and Colleges), a new AAA grade (sanjia, the top 
criteria of hospital ranking in China) hospital operated by the China Medical University, 
a new public library, and a world-class theater (the best theater in Northeast China). It is 
worth noting that all these facilities are open to the public, which improves the living 																																																																																																																																																																					
Chamber of Commerce is also an important actor in helping American firms lobbying the Chinese 
government in various affairs including public services. See for example, Scott Kennedy, “Transnational 
Political Alliances: An Exploration With Evidence From China,” Business & Society 46, no. 2 (2007): 174–
200.; Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying in China. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
39 For a brief introduction on Intel’s Fab 68 in Dalian, see: 
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/jobs/locations/china/sites/dalian.html 
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environment and welfare standard of Dalian residents. In addition, after those large 
foreign firms invest in a city, they continue to express preferences for promoting 
education, health care, and welfare of labors in the city. Foreign firms in fact act as a 
“transmission belt” conveying employees’ opinions to the government through various 
channels. Government officials tend to respond to needs of foreign firms for several 
reasons. First, foreign firms usually are better-known firms that could contribute more to 
local politicians’ political achievements (discussed in details below). Second, foreign 
firms usually have more resources (e.g. connections with upper level government) in 
lobbying local social policies in their favor. Therefore, multinational corporations have 
both the preference and capabilities in improving social welfare of a city. 
From the perspective of politicians, meeting the needs of business helps them (the 
politicians) to advance their political careers. Cadres in authoritarian China are appointed 
by upper level governments rather than elected by the public. In order to get promoted, 
cadres have to meet different policy targets set by upper level governments, in which 
economic development is one of the most important factors in evaluating a cadre’s 
performance.40 Specifically, economic development refers to three major objectives: 
GDP growth, fiscal revenue, and employment. A cadre has a better chance of promotion 
if he/she manages to achieve a stable and high rate of GDP growth or a high level of 
																																																								
40 Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a 
Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly 173 (2003): 35–52.; Susan Whiting, “The Cadre Evaluation 
System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule,” in Holding China Together : Diversity and 
National Integration in the Post-Deng Era (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 101–19.; 
Cai Zuo, “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China,” The China Quarterly 
224 (2015): 955–84. 
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fiscal revenue under his/her political rein.41 Moreover, in the context of China, local 
politicians have a strong incentive to attract investments from large firms in their political 
territories. This is not only because large firms contribute more to tax, jobs, and GDP 
growth. More important, a large firm is used by local politicians as a “model” to 
demonstrate their political competence and political achievements to upper level 
politicians. In the Chinese political system, political inspection (shicha) happens 
frequently. Upper level politicians favor to “going down” for political inspections to 
either demonstrate that they work hard or find rent-seeking opportunities. A large firm 
serves as one of the ideal places for political inspections for both local politicians and 
upper level political officials. From the view of upper level politicians, large firms 
represent the “engine” of economic development and thus visiting a large firm displays 
politicians’ deepest care of economic development of a locality. In local politicians’ point 
of view, large firms can be used as convincing examples to demonstrate their capabilities 
in managing the economy. They could also incorporate the success of a “model” firm as 
their personal political achievements. Therefore, local politicians have a strong incentive 
to respond to large firms’ needs, which opens the gate for large firms in lobbying the 
government and shaping public policies related to development of firms. In terms of 
social policies, large firms prefer to invest in an environment that has abundant skilled 
labors and/or provides better social protection to employees. Such preferences result in 																																																								
41 Ye Chen, Hongbin Li, and Li-An Zhou, “Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of 
Provincial Leaders in China,” Economics Letters 88, no. 3 (2005): 421–25.; Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, 
“Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” 
Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 9 (2005): 1743–62.; Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxin 
Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members 
in China,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 01 (2012): 166–87. 
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large firms lobbying the government to increase public spending on education (especially 
vocational training or tertiary education) and/or to cover more on employees’ social 
security such as pension and health insurance.  
 
Based on the theory discussed above, this chapter hypothesizes that:  
 
H1: Cities with more large firms have better social welfare provision than cities with 
fewer or no large firms.  
 
H2: Cities exposed to more foreign influence have better welfare provision than cities 
with less foreign influence. 
 
1.5 Empirical Design 
1.5.1 Data and Measurement 
To test my hypotheses, I constructed an original panel dataset on all Chinese 
municipalities with time period from 2001 to 2012. Data is collected through various 
Chinese statistical yearbooks as well as local annals and local gazetteers. My dataset has 
information on city government’s total fiscal expenditure as well as public expenditure on 
education and social security. It also includes data on a city’s socio-economic and 
demographic status such as fiscal revenue, population, unemployment, etc. 
To measure firm power, I use the logarithm of large firms’ industrial output 
(LGFOPT), and to measure foreign influence, I use the logarithm of foreign direct 
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investment (FDI). To test my hypotheses, I use the lagged form of the two independent 
variables (LGFOPTi, t-1; FDIi, t-1) as policymaking process usually takes one or two years 
and thus I assume that a city’s social expenditure at yeart is likely to be affected by firms 
in yeart-1. My dependent variable here is government’s social welfare expenditure 
(WELFAREi,t), measured by cityi’s public spending on education and social security as 
percentage of its GDP in yeart.  
In addition, according to existing literature, several other factors also affect 
welfare provision and I add these variables as controls in my statistical analysis. First, 
legitimacy is one of the determinants of government’s provision on social welfare in 
authoritarian countries. Existing literature uses level of social risk as an indicator of the 
concern of legitimacy.42 In the context of China, welfare reform is accompanied with 
general market reform and particularly state-owned enterprise reform. In the late 1990s 
(from 1998-2000), Premier Zhu launched a “Great Laid-off” campaign, aiming to release 
the burden of state-own enterprises. But at the same time, tens of millions of state-owned 
enterprise employees were laid-off and became a huge burden for local government.43 
This chapter uses a city’s burden (BURDEN) to measure social risk. A city’s burden 
refers to the percentage of population who are unemployed, retired, and under working 
age but needs education and health care.44 Second, urbanization is another factor that may 
																																																								
42 Jennifer Pan, “Buying Inertia: Preempting Social Disorder With Selective Welfare Provision in Urban 
China.” (Harvard University, 2015).; Xian Huang, “Four Worlds of Welfare: Understanding Subnational 
Variation in Chinese Social Health Insurance,” The China Quarterly 222 (2015): 449–74. 
43 William Hurst, The Chinese Worker after Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
44 In studies on OECD welfare states, unemployment is a widely used variable. For example, see Evelyne 
Huber and John D Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global 
Markets (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001). However, in studies of welfare states in 
developing countries, unemployment schemes are either nonexistent or poorly developed. For example, in 
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influence social welfare expenditure in a city.45 According to National Statistics Bureau, 
in the year of 2013, there were over 26 million migrant workers moving from rural China 
to urban China.46 When facing the huge number of migrants, a city government may 
either increase the budget of social welfare (e.g. more schools and hospitals) or increase 
the budget of public security (e.g. police). This chapter uses population density to 
measure urbanization (URBAN). Third, a city’s social expenditure is also affected by its 
fiscal resource or state capacity.47 A city with abundant fiscal resource is likely to spend 
more on social welfare. I use the logarithm of fiscal revenue (REVENUE) to measure a 
city’s fiscal resource. 
 
1.5.2 Model 
To test my hypotheses, I use panel fixed effects models with clustered standard 
error. A fixed effects model accounts for time-invariant confounders and aggregate level 
shocks such as institution and culture. In addition, as mentioned above and discussed in 																																																																																																																																																																					
Latin American studies, “unemployment data are not generally available to be used in TCSC analysis.” See 
Alex Segura-Ubiergo, The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America: Globalization, 
Democracy, and Development (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). In the case of China, 
what we do know is how many people are employed, and thus this study uses a city’s burden rather than 
unemployment rate. 
45 Bruce J Dickson et al., “Public Goods and Regime Support in Urban China,” The China Quarterly 228 
(2016): 859–80.; Bruce J Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for 
Survival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
46 See Guojia Tongji Ju (National Statistics Bureau). “Quanguo Nongmingong Jiance Diaocha Baobao 
(Report on Chinese Rural Migrants),” May 12, 2014. Here the migrants are still considered as rural 
residents because of the household Certificate System, or the so-called Hukou system, which was 
introduced in 1958 that identifies two main categories of household: urban and rural. The Hukou system 
does not offer full citizenship to rural people who live in urban areas. For example, rural residents who 
migrant and work in urban areas are not eligible to be enrolled in urban health insurance. 
47 Bruce J Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016).Xian Huang, “Four Worlds of Welfare: Understanding Subnational 
Variation in Chinese Social Health Insurance,” The China Quarterly 222 (2015): 449–74.; Bruce J Dickson 
et al., “Public Goods and Regime Support in Urban China,” The China Quarterly 228 (2016): 859–80. 
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the theory section, because welfare expenditure at yeart is usually the outcome of firms’ 
lobbying at yeart-1, I use one-year lagged form of independent variables in my models. 
The full model that I use in the statistical analysis can be written as:  
 
WELFAREi,t = β0 + β1LGFOPTi,t-1 + β2FDIi,t-1 + β3BURDENi,t + β4URBANi,t + 
β5REVENUEi,t + ci + vi,t 
 
where WELFAREi,t refers to city i’s public expenditure on social welfare as percentage of 
city i’s GDP in yeart; LGFOPTi, t-1 is the output of large firms in city i in year t-1; FDIi,t-1 
represents the amount of foreign direct investment of city i in year t-1; BURDEN, 
URBAN, and REVENUE are control variables as explained above; ci refers to city fixed 
effect to control for a city’s special characteristics (such as institutions and culture) that 
do not vary with time;48 and vi,t is the error term of the model. 
Existing studies also suggest that a city or a country’s social welfare expenditure 
at yeart is also likely to be affected by the welfare expenditure at yeart-1,49 and thus, I also 
																																																								
48 For empirical examples of research using city fixed effect in studying China’s social welfare, see: Cai 
Zuo, “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China,” The China Quarterly 224 
(2015): 955–84.; Xian Huang, “Four Worlds of Welfare: Understanding Subnational Variation in Chinese 
Social Health Insurance,” The China Quarterly 222 (2015): 449–74.; Xiaobo Lü and Mingxin Liu, “Public 
Goods with Private Benefits: Understanding Local Governments’ Incentives in Education Provision in 
China” (Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2013). 
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and Duane Swank, The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).; Alex Segura-Ubiergo, The Political Economy of the 
Welfare State in Latin America: Globalization, Democracy, and Development (New York, NY: Cambridge 
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estimate my full model with a lagged dependent variable. Moreover, a lagged dependent 
variable accounts for autocorrelation dynamics in the dependent variable.50  
In addition, I test the effect of firm power on education expenditure and social 
security expenditure respectively. Such disaggregation of social welfare allows me to 
explore more interesting effects of firm power on different kinds of social welfare 
provision of a city. 
 
1.6 Results 
Table 1.6.1 shows the effects of firm power on social welfare provision. Model 1 
reports the results of large firm on social welfare in a city. Model 2 shows the effect of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Model 3 takes both of these two variables into 
consideration. Model 4 adds all the control variables. Model 5 includes control variables 
and one-year lagged dependent variable. City fixed effects and robust standard errors are 
applied to every model. Overall, the regression results support my main theoretical 
predictions. Cities with more firm power have better social welfare provision than cities 
with less firm power. Specifically, from Model 5 we know that all else being equal, for 
every 100% increase in large firms’ industrial output in yeart-1, it is likely to have a 1.803 
increase in social welfare at yeart. Given that the average of social welfare expenditure as 
percentage of GDP is 5.01, a 1.803 increase is a significant effect. Similarly, FDI also has 
a positive effect on government’s social spending. In particular, for each given city, every 
100% increase in FDI is likely to result in a 0.305 increase of social welfare.  																																																								
50 Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, “What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section 
Data,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): 634–47. 
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The effect of control variables on social welfare expenditure is basically in 
accordance with findings in the existing literature on China’s social welfare provision. 
Specifically, as a city gets richer and richer, the city government is more willing to 
improve social welfare within its domain, such as improving the standard of education, 
the quality of hospitals, or the social security of its residents. In addition to economic 
controls, social risk also shows a positive relationship with social welfare spending. If a 
city has a larger population that is either retired or unemployed, it is more likely to see 
the municipal government to increase social welfare spending in order to prevent social 
protests that threatens regime legitimacy. 
 
Table 1.6.1 Determinants of Social Welfare Expenditure in Urban China 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 WELFARE WELFARE WELFARE WELFARE WELFARE 
L.Large Firm 1.656***  1.301*** 0.713*** 1.803*** 
 (0.0866)  (0.0797) (0.218) (0.491) 
L.FDI  0.834*** 0.258*** 0.233** 0.305*** 
  (0.0717) (0.0895) (0.0938) (0.115) 
Burden    0.0162*** 0.00995** 
    (0.00422) (0.00447) 
Urbanization    4.726 12.69*** 
    (6.353) (4.389) 
Fiscal Revenue    0.789*** -0.938 
    (0.280) (0.645) 
City FE     YES     YES     YES     YES     YES 
Lagged DV     YES 
Robust Std. Err.     YES      YES      YES     YES YES 
Constant -4.860*** -2.778*** -5.784*** -5.618*** -8.003*** 
 (0.503) (0.628) (0.599) (0.799) (1.316) 
N 2909 2977 2666 2604 1895 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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In addition, I test the effect of firm power on education and social security 
separately. From Table 1.6.2, I find that the effect of firm power on either education or 
social security is consistent with results shown in Table 1.6.1. When a city has more large 
firms or attracts more foreign direct investments, it is likely to see that the level of 
education and the protection on labors are both improved.  
 
Table 1.6.2 Determinants of Education and Social Security Expenditure Respectively 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 EDUCATION EDUCATION SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
L.Large Firm 0.395*** 0.294** 0.649*** 1.531*** 
 (0.0901) (0.126) (0.154) (0.351) 
L.FDI 0.115*** 0.110** 0.119* 0.172** 
 (0.0330) (0.0444) (0.0652) (0.0700) 
Burden 0.00268 0.00301 0.0117*** 0.00536 
 (0.00221) (0.00350) (0.00350) (0.00348) 
Urbanization 1.275 8.002*** 1.459 6.971*** 
 (2.165) (2.799) (5.019) (2.186) 
Fiscal Rev 0.281*** 0.0791 0.304 -0.806* 
 (0.108) (0.133) (0.208) (0.442) 
City FE        YES           YES       YES            YES 
Lagged DV  YES  YES 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
YES YES YES YES 
_cons -1.904*** -1.601*** -4.955*** -6.961*** 
 (0.299) (0.368) (0.597) (1.046) 
N 2888 2413 2605 1898 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Moreover, I also conduct several robustness checks and list them in the 
appendices. In particular, Appendix 1 checks the robustness by using alternative 
dependent variables (i.e. welfare expenditure per capita, and welfare expenditure as 
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percentage of total fiscal resources). Appendix 2 shows the robustness by using 
alternative independent variables, and Appendix 3 displays results of models without 
lagged independent variables. Overall, the results in the three appendices are in 
accordance with main findings in Table 1.6.1 and Table 1.6.2, which means that the main 
findings are robust. 
 
1.7 Qualitative Evidence from Fieldwork Research 
From the quantitative evidence, we can see that large firms are critical to the 
improvement of social welfare in a city. This section uses qualitative evidence to 
illustrate the underlying mechanisms – how firms promote social welfare in a city and 
how local politicians respond to the needs of business. My qualitative evidence is based 
on my fieldwork and original data collected from local gazetteers, government documents, 
and development reports, etc. To have a better coverage of the welfare situation in China, 
I selected different regions of China to conduct fieldwork. For example, Liaoning 
Province is selected to represent Northeast part of China, which has the longest industrial 
development history since early 20th century with lots of large state-owned enterprises, 
but on the other hand, some cities (such as Dalian) in Liaoning also experienced high 
degree of foreign direct investment. Thus it would be more interesting to see the 
combination effect. Zhejiang Province is selected to represent East China that has many 
well-known private firms. Guangdong is included for foreign firms and Hebei is a 
representative province of little influence from foreign investment. Some other 
metropolitans such as Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai are also taken into consideration. 
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The below section offers a case study on Toshiba which invested in city of Dalian and it 
seeks to illustrate how this multinational corporation lobbied the government regarding 
social welfare and how the government responded. Following that, I lay out several 
venues of lobbying for firms, such as employers’ associations and government agencies. I 
find that the voluntarily participated model of employers’ associations is less effective 
than the channel of lobbying through functional departments within the government.   
 
1.7.1 The Case of Toshiba Dalian 
Toshiba is a Japanese multinational conglomerate founded in 1875 and 
headquartered in Tokyo, Japan. In city of Dalian, China, Toshiba has two large factories; 
one is for LCD television manufacturing, and the other one produces medical equipment 
such as X-ray and CT. In early 2000s, the factory for medical equipment faced a shortage 
of skilled labors in automation. Toshiba began to talk to the government on various 
occasions in order to solve such problem. The Japanese senior manager of Toshiba 
expressed a strong desire to improve the human capital of the whole city. In addition, 
both the Japanese and the Chinese senior managers at Toshiba Dalian agreed that it 
would cause them a big loss if they move to other places because Toshiba has invested 
over 200 million US Dollars in Dalian. After a year of negotiation with various 
departments as well as the mayor directly, the municipal government decided to fund a 
new Center of Numerical Control in Dalian Development Zone Secondary Technical 
School. The new center also served as a “practical training camp” (shixun jidi) to meet 
specific skills requirements of different firms, including Toshiba. A key to Toshiba’s 
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success is that Toshiba is a multinational corporation with great reputation and one of the 
largest taxpayers to the city. More important, both district-level and municipal-level 
politicians use Toshiba Dalian as a model firm to demonstrate their political 
achievements in accelerating economic development. In year of 2009, Toshiba Dalian 
initiated another proposal, hoping the municipal government would increase the social 
security expenditures in the city. This time Toshiba Dalian formed an alliance with 
several other large firms (such as Guangyang Technology, Cannon, Mabuchi Motor, and 
Nidec, etc.) to negotiate with the municipal government to increase the social security 
coverage of their employees. In China’s social security system, employers and employees 
pay for the social security (e.g. pension, health insurance) together. Prior to 2013, firms 
in Dalian were required to pay 20% of employee’s salary as pension each month. In 
addition to pension, similar payment methods apply to employer’s payment of 
employee’s health insurance, birth insurance, unemployment insurance, work-injury 
insurance, and housing insurance. In Dalian, the total rate for all the social security and 
housing insurance counts as high as 50% of an employee’s monthly salary, which puts a 
huge burden on a firm’s cost of labor.51 After several years of negotiation, in year 2013, 
Chen Zhenggao, Governor of Liaoning, tasked the municipal government to lower the 
social security rate of all firms in Dalian. For example, pension rate was reduced from 20% 
to 16%, leading to a huge increase of government expenditure in social security.52 In year 																																																								
51 Pension 20%, health insurance 8%, birth insurance 0.8%, unemployment insurance 2%, work-injury 
insurance 1.2%, and housing insurance 18%, with a total of 50%. See Dalian Waiqi Fazhan yu Fangxiang 
Baogao (Report on the Development and Future Directions of Dalian Foreign Firms), Dalian Foreign 
Enterprises Association (eds.), 2015.  
52 Office of Liaoning Provincial Government, “guanyu dalian waizi qiye yin fudan guozhong er chuxian 
guanting caiyuan langchao de qingkuang fanying (Situations of Dalian Forieng Firms’ Burden and 
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of 2014, the municipal government of Dalian increased 2.6 billion yuan of public 
expenditure on social security.53 
 
1.7.2 Venues of Lobbying 
Several venues and channels are available for firms to lobby the government to 
improve social welfare in a city of China. First, employers’ associations such as 
Enterprise Associations and Foreign Enterprise Associations can serve as an important 
channel for large firms to convey their policy preferences and proposals to the 
government. In the case of Toshiba Dalian mentioned above, an important reason for its 
successful influence on social security policy was because of the help of Foreign 
Enterprise Association. Each individual firm might face potential retaliation or “revenge” 
from the government if a firm proposes something that is not in the interest of the 
government. Enterprise associations, therefore, serve as a “cover” for firms as it would be 
harder for the government to locate the proposal-maker (or the “trouble maker” in the 
view of the government). In addition, policy proposals submitted through enterprise 
associations would be viewed as a “common” problem of the city but not an individual 
problem of a single firm, and thus government would be more willing to make policies to 
solve the “common” problem. However, this channel has some limitations. First, the 
participation in employers’ association is voluntarily. Firms have a high degree of 
freedom in deciding whether and when to join or to leave. Enterprise Associations, for 																																																																																																																																																																					
Closing),” December 6, 2013.  
53 Zhang Xing, “wuxiang shebao youhui zhengce rang qiye shaojiao 26 yiyuan (Five Measures to Make 
Firms Pay 2.6 Billion Less on Social Security),” Bandao Chenbao (The Peninsula Morning Brief, April 26, 
2015. Bandao Chenbao is one of the largest local newspapers in city of Dalian. 
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example, have no formal power to regulate the participation of each firm. Such voluntary 
mechanism makes employers’ associations harder to coordinate interests among different 
firms, and nearly impossible to have a clear and consistent policy position in the long run. 
Second, enterprise associations do not have much formal political power when bargaining 
with the government. Bureaus in a municipal government do not have any obligations to 
listen or report to enterprise associations and thus makes the lobbying activity of 
enterprises associations more of issue based and capability based. For example, if an 
issue proposed by the enterprise associations matches the government’s plan, it is more 
likely to be accepted.  
In addition to employers’ associations, another major channel for firms to 
influence public policy is through government agencies. Typically, Mayor’s Office acts 
as the hub of a municipal government. A very influential giant firm such as Alibaba in 
Hangzhou or Tencent in Shenzhen can directly negotiate with mayor’s office or mayors 
themselves. For most other large firms, a normal process to convey their policy 
preferences is through government agencies. Each city has tens of departments under the 
leadership of municipal government (shizhengfu). These departments can be basically 
characterized into two categories: general departments and functional departments. 
General departments, such as department of finance, department/commission of 
development and reform (fagaiwei or fagaiju), and department/commission of economy 
and information (jingxinwei or jinxinju), are in charge of collecting information from 
functional departments, making development plans, deciding big projects and funding 
allocations, and more important, coordinating conflicts of interests among various 
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functional departments. When thinking about social policies, functional departments 
usually refer to education department, health department, and human resource and social 
security department. These functional departments are responsible for technical things 
and collecting information from firms. One of the main jobs for bureaucrats in the 
department of human resource and social security is to “go down to firms” (xia qiye) to 
“do fieldwork” (diaoyan) which refers to collect information including the difficulties of 
firms, the needs of firms regarding human capital, and the working conditions of 
employees. Various forms of fieldwork are conducted by technical bureaucrats such as 
surveys and in-person interviews. In addition, firms also submit their reports with most 
concerned problems to these technical bureaucrats. After “doing fieldwork” in firms, 
these bureaucrats write reports and send them to general departments, seeking to solve 
problems that they discovered in their fieldwork. At this stage, it is the job of general 
departments to coordinate all requests from various departments. Bureaucrats in general 
departments then write reports to mayor’s office, analyzing policy priorities as well as 
funding allocations. Then the department of finance allocates funding to each of the 
projects approved by mayor’s office. It is worth noting that mayor’s priority does not 
always match general departments’ reports and suggestions. In cities with a frequent 
rotation of mayors, large firms tend to invest more on the relationship with technical 
bureaucrats, while in cities with less frequent rotation of mayors, large firms prefer to 
establish and strengthen its relationship with mayor’s office directly. 
 
		
35 
1.8 Conclusion 
The expansion of social welfare in China is an important question both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically speaking, why an authoritarian regime 
provides and promotes welfare and public services to its citizens? Without any formal 
democratic institutions, what are underlying incentives of politicians to improve the 
social wellbeing of citizens? Empirically, most studies on welfare state focus on 
European countries but we know less about welfare provision in developing countries. 
Examining the case of China offers a great opportunity to test existing theories and 
generate new findings, which can also enrich our knowledge of welfare state cross-
nationally. Yet our understanding of the welfare provision in China is still preliminary. 
Most studies follow the traditional state-centered approach of authoritarian politics but do 
not pay enough attention to the “demand” side of welfare expansion. To fill this gap, this 
chapter offers an alternative approach that examines the role of business in the process of 
welfare expansion. Specifically, this chapter finds that big business acts as a determining 
factor in explaining the motivations and variations of social welfare expansion in Chinese 
cities. The main findings of this chapter also shed light on the puzzling resilience of 
China’s authoritarian regime. 
Although China is an authoritarian country with no formal democratic institutions, 
government officials still pay attention to firms’ needs, as firms are a prominent actor in 
the development of economy. Thus, firm power determines the capability of firms to 
influence the government in the policymaking process. In the context of China, 
comparing with a small firm, a large firm contributes much more to local employment, 
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government’s fiscal revenue, and GDP growth, and thus, large firms act as a much more 
influential actor in the process of policymaking. In terms of social policies, large firms 
prefer to invest and live in an environment with good condition of human capital, public 
services, and stable source of skilled labor. Thus, these large firms who are also key 
taxpayers to a city have both the preference and capability in promoting the overall 
welfare standard of a city.  
Several channels are available for large firms to negotiate with the government 
and influence public policies. First, employers’ associations such as Enterprise 
Associations and Foreign Enterprise Associations provide a platform for collective 
bargaining. Firms favor this channel because each individual firm does not need to take 
full responsibility of bargaining with the government and is less afraid of potential 
punishment from the government if a firm proposes some policies that are not in 
government’s favor. However, a major weakness of this channel is that employers’ 
association has less formal power in influencing policies and the participation of firms is 
voluntarily. Second, firms channel their opinions on policies related with social welfare 
through various departments in the government. In Chinese cities, a municipal 
government has several departments that can be generally divided as either general 
departments or functional departments. General departments are responsible for 
collecting information from functional departments to make development plans and 
decide funding allocations. Functional department, thus, are in charge of submitting 
reports to general departments. In the context of China, doing “fieldwork” is a common 
way for bureaucrats in general departments to write reports. These bureaucrats usually go 
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to firms to collect opinions on important policies and development plans. Firms also 
consider this channel as important that they establish regular and frequent contact with 
key officials in functional departments. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Development Zones in China: Bureaucratic Institutions and Public Services 
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Abstract 
What are bureaucratic institutions of a development zone in China? How does a 
development zone bureaucracy differ from a typical district bureaucracy? What are 
implications of development zone bureaucracy on public services and social welfare in 
China? To answer these questions, this chapter employs a natural experiment design to 
compare two district-level bureaucracies – the Dalian Development Zone and the Jinzhou 
District. These two districts are neighbors in which one district – the Dalian Development 
Zone – received the treatment (i.e. the policy of established development zone 
exogenously imposed by the central government) and the other district did not. This 
chapter finds that the zone bureaucracy indeed differs from a typical district bureaucracy 
in three ways: (1) political ranking, (2) central connection, and (3) personnel. These 
differences lead the development zone bureaucracy to (1) have less bureaucratism and (2) 
be more responsive to business, which results in a better outcome of public services and 
social welfare. Empirical evidence is based on primary sources in Chinese including local 
gazetteers (difangzhi), yearbooks, and internal government documents. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Various types of economic zones54 are designed as a policy instrument to foster 
economic growth and there have been over 3,500 zones registered in more than 130 
countries worldwide.55 In the United States, enterprise zones were popular in the 1980s, 
and enterprise zones were established to revitalize less developed communities through 
tax reduction policies.56 Most enterprise zones in the United States function purely as a 
reflection of neoliberal economic policy. In the case of China, however, the national 
Economic & Technological Development Zones (ETDZs, also known as kaifaqu, 
development zone) not only serves as an instrument to attract investment but also 
functions as a level of government that has both economic and social responsibilities. A 
Chinese development zone government governs a territory with several street-
governments (jiedao, a sub-district level of government) and a number of 
towns/townships (xiangzhen). Within that territory, a development zone government is 
responsible for the welfare and well-being of its residents, including building schools, 
hospitals, public gardens, as well as providing pension and public services to zone 																																																								
54 There are different types of economic zones worldwide, including free trade zones, export processing 
zones, enterprise zones, free ports, single factory export processing zones, specialized zones, etc. In the 
literature, studies usually use the term “economic zones” or “special economic zones” to generally refer to 
different type of zones. See Gokhan Akinci and James Crittle, “Special Economic Zone : Performance, 
Lessons Learned, and Implication for Zone Development” (The World Bank, April 1, 2008).; “If Africa 
Builds Nests, Will the Birds Come? Comparative Study on Special Economic Zones in Africa and China,” 
Working Paper Series (UNDP, June 2015). In this paper, I particularly study China’s national-level 
Economic & Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) and this paper uses the term “development zones 
(kaifaqu)” to refer to ETDZs.  
55 Jean-Pierre Singa Boyenge, “ILO Database on Export Processing Zones Revised,” Working Paper 
WP.251 (International Labour Office, April 2007).; Douglas Zhihua Zeng, “How Do Special Economic 
Zones and Industrial Clusters Drive China’s  Rapid Development?,” Policy Research Working Paper (The 
World Bank, 2011). A recent study by The Economist in 2015 updated this number to 4,300 zones 
worldwide. See “Special Economic Zones: Not so Special,” The Economist, April 3, 2015. 
56 Leslie E. Papke, “What Do We Know about Enterprise Zones?,” Working Paper (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, January 1993), https://doi.org/10.3386/w4251. 
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residents. The existing literature mainly compares economic zones with different 
favorable policies and discusses the effectiveness of economic zones in boosting 
economic growth57, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)58, creating jobs59, and 
facilitating technology innovation.60 Although existing studies provide us rich knowledge 
on the role of development zones in economic development, we know less about the 
governance of development zones. Do development zones and non-development zones 
have different political bureaucracies? If yes, what is the administrative structure of a 
development zone government? How does that protect and permit zones to be different? 
More broadly, how do political innovations (e.g. enterprise zones in the U.S. and 
development zones in China) work differently in democratic and authoritarian regimes?  
																																																								
57 David Neumark and Helen Simpson, “Place-Based Policies,” in Handbook of Regional and Urban 
Economics, ed. Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson, and William C. Strange, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science, 2015).; Anthony Briant, Miren Lafourcade, and Benoît Schmutz, “Can Tax Breaks Beat 
Geography? Lessons from the French Enterprise Zone Experience,” American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy 7, no. 2 (2015): 88–124.; Simon Alder, Lin Shao, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, “Economic 
Reforms and Industrial Policy in a Panel of Chinese Cities,” Journal of Economic Growth 21, no. 4 (2016): 
305–49.; Thomas Farole, “Second Best? Investment Climate and Performance in Africa’s Special 
Economic Zones” (The World Bank, 2010).; Thomas Farole and Gokhan Akinci, “Special Economic 
Zones : Progress, Emerging Challenges, and Future Directions” (The World Bank, 2011). 
58 Eswar Prasad and Shang-Jin Wei, “The Chinese Approach to Capital Inflows: Patterns and Possible 
Explanations,” in Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices and 
Consequences, ed. Sebastian Edwards (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 421–80, 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0158.; Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, “Introduction to ‘China’s 
Growing Role in World Trade,’” in China’s Growing Role in World Trade, ed. Robert C. Feenstra and 
Shang-Jin Wei (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 1–31.; Michael Engman, Osamu Onodera, 
and Enrico Pinali, “Export Processing Zones: Past and Future Role in Trade and Development,” OECD 
Trade Policy Working Paper No. 53 (OECD, 2007). 
59 David Neumark and Jed Kolko, “Do Enterprise Zones Create Jobs? Evidence from California’s 
Enterprise Zone Program,” Journal of Urban Economics 68, no. 1 (2010): 1–19.; Dorsati Madani, “A 
Review of the Role and Impact of Export Processing Zones,” Working Paper Series No. 2238 (The World 
Bank, 1999). 
60 Aradhna Aggarwal, Impact of Special Economic Zones on Employment, Poverty, and Human 
Development (New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2007).; 
Gokhan Akinci and James Crittle, “Special Economic Zone : Performance, Lessons Learned, and 
Implication for Zone Development” (The World Bank, April 1, 2008). 
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In terms of public services, do development zones promote public services and 
welfare provision? Chapter One finds that large firms on average have significant effect 
in pushing governments to promote welfare provision across cities in China. Based on 
that, are there any political institutions (i.e. administrative structure of development zone) 
that are inherently more responsive to business which in turn leads to better welfare 
provision? If yes, what are the possible mechanisms?  
Different from prior work that examines tax policies of development zones, this 
chapter seeks to study the administrative structure of development zones and aims to 
explore how the bureaucratic institution of development zones leads to better public 
services. In particular, this chapter seeks to understand: (1) the administrative structure of 
a development zone government, (2) the differences between a development zone 
bureaucracy and a traditional/typical county or district bureaucracy, and (3) possible 
mechanisms that lead development zones to better welfare and public service provision. 
In general, this chapter argues that the administrative structure of development 
zones indeed differs from a typical county/district bureaucracy. The unique 
administrative structure of a development zone protects and permits zones to be different 
and prevents zones from becoming inefficient. First and foremost, the administrative 
committee (guanweihui), the executive body of a development zone, has higher political 
ranking, being headed by a bureau-level (ju) official, than does a typical district or county 
government, which are headed by a department-level (chu) official. Such higher political 
ranking enables the zone government to have greater autonomy in economic and social 
policymaking and to face less political intervention from a municipal bureau, which has 
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the same ranking with the administrative committee. Second, the State Council’s Office 
of Special Economic Zones (tequban), a ministerial-level agency directly led by a Vice 
Premier, provides central protection and inspection for development zones, which enables 
development zones to pursue innovative policies. The tequban was established and led by 
Vice Premier Gu Mu in early 1980s. The relationship between the tequban and 
development zones is guidance (zhidao). In other words, development zones have 
professional relationship (yewu guanxi) with the tequban. A professional relationship is 
less binding than a “leadership” relationship (lingdao guanxi), but still provides support 
and protection from other bureaucratic intervention. The major responsibility of the 
tequban is to study and to make key policies for national development zones. More 
important, this central government organization imposes regular inspections and checks 
on development zones that prevent zones from being inefficient. Third, the zone 
government is fulfilled with younger, better educated, and more professional bureaucrats. 
It is worth noting that most of the bureaucrats in a zone government have a degree of 
college level or above. Given the fact that college degrees were very rare in early 1980s, 
this shows the attention focused on the zones. According to the third national population 
census conducted in 1982, only 0.67% of Chinese population above age of 6 were either 
in college or held a college degree, and 34.74% of Chinese were still illiterate.61 These 
bureaucrats with college degrees were indeed elites of the society and tended to be more 
capable, more open-minded, and less bureaucratic.  
																																																								
61 Data calculated from The 1982 Census of China (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1995). There are about 
6 million people who are in college study or have already held a college degree in the year of 1982. The 
total population above the age of 6 was 889.8 million.  
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The guanweihui bureaucracy is small but efficient. “Small” here means that the 
guanweihui bureaucracy is simplified and streamlined with far fewer regulations 
governing economic activities, compared with a typical Leninist bureaucracy in a 
Chinese city. The small size of the guanweihui bureaucracy tends to be more efficient 
because it reduces bureaucratism.62 China is a socialist Leninist state (especially prior to 
market reform in 1978); the state/party apparatus reached into every corner of the 
society,63 and the socialist planned economy emphasized on the role of state in economic 
activities.64 Thus in the context of post-Mao China, the central government always tried 
to reduce the size of government and prevent the government from over-interfering in 
microeconomic activities, rather than thinking of ways to expand bureaucracy as the 
bureaucracy has been too large.65 “Efficient” here refers to be more responsive to societal 
																																																								
62 Existing literature does not reach a consensus on the size of government and efficiency of government. 
Empirical results are also mixed. Some argue that small government is good; some argue that large 
government is more efficient; some argue that there is no correlation with size of government and 
efficiency. See Yogi Rahmayanti and Theara Horn, “Expenditure Efficiency and the Optimal Size of 
Government in Developing Countries,” Global Economy and Finance Journal 4, no. 2 (2011): 46–59.; 
Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).; 
Kenneth Newton, “Is Small Really So Beautiful? Is Big Really So Ugly? Size, Effectiveness, and 
Democracy in Local Government,” Political Studies 30, no. 2 (1982): 190–206.; Edward C Page and 
Arthur F Midwinter, Remote Bureaucracy or Administrative Efficiency? Scotland’s New Local Government 
System (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1979).; Charles Stuart 
Page and E. E Canaway, Administrative Costs of Local Authorities (Edinburgh: H.M.S.O., 1969).; Rati 
Ram, “Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence from Cross-
Section and Time-Series Data,” The American Economic Review 76, no. 1 (1986): 191–203.  
63 The state is able to control the society through its nomenklatura, the cadre management system. See 
Melanie Manion, “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and 
Removal of Party and State Leaders,” The China Quarterly 102 (1985): 203–33.; John P. Burns, 
“Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China 
Quarterly 138 (1994): 458–91. 
64 Michael Ellman, Socialist Planning., 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).; János 
Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1992). 
65Ying He, “Zhongguo Zhengfu Jigou Gaige 30 Nian Huigu Yu Fansi (Review of Chinese Government 
Thirty-Years’ Reform),” Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli (China Administration Management) 12 (2009): 21–
27.; Wenzhao Li and Shoulong Mao, “Zhongguo Zhengfu Gaige: Jiben Luoji Yu Fazhan Qushi (Chinese 
Government Reform: Basic Logic and Trend),” Guanli Shijie (Management World) 8 (2010): 44–58.; 
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needs, responding more quickly to these needs, and responding with better results. 
Efficiency can be measured by two indicators: (1) if the government responds or not, and 
(2) time taken by the government to respond. The small size of the guanweihui 
bureaucracy is more efficient due to its unique administrative structure that discussed 
above.  
Development zones lead to better public services and welfare provision through 
two potential mechanisms. First, the bureaucratic institution of development zones leads 
to less bureaucratism that results in higher standard of public services (e.g. less 
corruption, faster service). Second, the bureaucratic institution of development zones 
leads to more responsiveness of societal needs (i.e. business and citizen) that leads to 
better quality of public services and better welfare provision (e.g. more vocational 
schools, better hospitals).  
Empirically, to illustrate my argument, this chapter employs a natural experiment 
design66 – comparing the Dalian Development Zone, the first development zone in China, 
with its neighboring district, the Jinzhou District. First, the development zone is a place-
based policy arrangement with a clear boundary and favorable policies that are granted 																																																																																																																																																																					
Zhiyong Lan, “Understanding China’s Administration Reform,” Public Administration Quarterly 24, no. 4 
(2000): 437–68.; Tom Christensen, Dong Lisheng, and Martin Painter, “Administrative Reform in China’s 
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only within that territory. Second, the central government’s decision to establish the 
development zone in 1984 provided an exogenous boost to local residents’ development 
within the development zone territory. In other words, the development zone and the 
zone residents did not self-select into behaviors that result in, for example, faster 
development. My empirical analysis draws upon first hand sources in Chinese, including 
yearbooks, local gazetteers (difangzhi), business reports, and internal government 
documents (neibu wenjian).67 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Existing literature on public services and welfare largely focus on the role of 
democratic institutions. Countries with formal democratic institutions and decentralized 
administration tend to have better quality of public services because citizens have power 
and channels to hold officials accountable.68 Among democracies, different electoral 
institutions69, party ideologies70, and power allocation between central and local 																																																								
67 Major yearbooks and gazetteers include Dalian Development Zone Yearbook (1984-1997), Dalian 
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governments71 have been examined to explain the variations of welfare and public 
services. In addition to formal democratic institutions, studies on civil society and social 
capital argue that civil societal groups enhance performance of government in 
democracies.72 For example, Boix and Posner lay out a general theory of social capital 
and argue that social capital promotes government efficiency in two ways. First, social 
capital significantly fosters cooperation between bureaucrats in implementing policies. 
Second, social capital increases bureaucrats’ capabilities to better manage the institutions 
that deliver public goods and services.73  
In non-democratic countries, some studies discover an informal mechanism that 
holds officials accountable.74 For example, Kellee Tsai discovers an “adaptive informal 
institution” for private business in China to influence government officials and shape 
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political reform in China.75 For another example, Lily Tsai’s study on Chinese villages 
find that officials’ care of their moral standing in their villages hold them accountable to 
villagers which results in better provision of public goods and services.76 In addition, 
studies on developing countries argue that state capacity is the key to deliver public 
services.77 Overall, the existing literature provides us rich knowledge on democratic 
institutions, civil society, state capacity, and informal institutions. This study tries to 
contribute to the literature by examining and comparing different types of bureaucratic 
institutions and tries to illustrate how development zone bureaucracy matters and makes a 
difference in delivering services.  
In terms of economic zones, cross-nationally and comparatively, there is a large 
literature and most studies focus on discussing effects of zones on economic development, 
either qualitatively78 or quantitatively,79 and find mixed effects of different favorable 																																																								
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policies on economic growth in various types of economic zones.80 In addition to 
studying policies, other studies find that the degree of isolation of zones81 and the 
intensity of industrial clusters82 also affect economic outcomes. In short, although we 
know a lot about if and how zones contribute to economic development, we know less 
about if development zones make a difference in delivering public services and social 
welfare. In addition, existing literature on development zones pays less attention to the 
bureaucratic structure of zones. Therefore, this chapter tries to link the literature on 
public services with the literature on development zones – examining development zones’ 
bureaucracy and trying to know if and how such bureaucracy matters in public services. 
This chapter also speaks to the recent growing body of literature on government 
responsiveness in non-democratic countries. Traditionally, studies focus on the role of 
social protests in pushing the authoritarian government to respond to citizens.83 Recently, 
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some studies examine the role of legislature and find mixed results.84 Truex’s study on 
China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) finds that NPC is more of a “rubber stamp” 
that benefits delegates’ personal economic interests.85 Meng and his co-authors conduct 
survey experiments in local China and find that local People’s Congress is a more 
effective channel for citizens conveying their opinions.86 In addition to legislature, some 
studies argue that Internet (and media in general) acts as another important channel.87 
This growing body of literature has provided us some knowledge of responsiveness in 
authoritarian regimes, but seems to have a couple of potential weaknesses. First, many 
studies do not directly assess responsiveness. Studies based on survey experiments only 
measure officials’ claimed willingness of responsiveness.88 Second, almost all studies 
focus on government’s responsiveness to individuals but none of them explores other 
important societal actors such as business. This chapter tries to contribute to this recent 
literature on authoritarian responsiveness in two ways. First, this chapter analyzes real 
																																																								
84 Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler, “Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an 
Authoritarian Parliament,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 482–502.; Melanie 
Manion, “Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in China,” The China Quarterly 
218 (2014): 311–38. 
85 Rory Truex, “The Returns to Office in a ‘Rubber Stamp’ Parliament,” American Political Science Review 
108, no. 2 (2014): 235–51. 
86 Tianguang Meng, Jennifer Pan, and Ping Yang, “Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation: 
Evidence From a Survey Experiment in China,” Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 4 (2017): 20. 
87 Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu, “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field 
Experiment in China,” American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2 (2016): 383–400.; Martin K. 
Dimitrov, “What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as a ‘Barometer of Public Opinion’ in 
Communist Bulgaria,” East European Politics and Societies 28, no. 2 (2014): 271–95.; Gary King, Jennifer 
Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences 
Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 326–43.; Gary King, 
Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “Reverse-Engineering Censorship in China: Randomized 
Experimentation and Participant Observation,” Science 345, no. 6199 (2014): 1–10.  
88 Except Heurlin’s very recent study which tests responsiveness in real policy cases. His book on social 
protests traces process of information transmitted by protestors into policymaking agendas. See Christopher 
Heurlin, Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
		
51 
policymaking process in development zones rather than opinions or perceptions of 
government officials. Second, this chapter examines government responsiveness to 
business. I would argue that evaluating government’s responsiveness to business, to some 
extent, is even more important because the rise and fall of firms affects the well-being of 
individuals a lot. 
 
2.3 Background Information on Development Zones in China 
The concept and the practice of development zones in China originated and 
developed from the policy experiment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).89 In 
November 1977, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of China, went to inspect 
Guangdong province where he discovered that there were still a great number of farmers 
who tried to escape (illegally migrate) to Hong Kong due to the shortage of food. Facing 
such situation, the central government sent out a team to Hong Kong and Macao to 
survey the economic development in these two places. The team then suggested to make 
two counties of Guangdong province, Bao’an (later called Shenzhen), close to Hong 
Kong, and Zhuhai, close to Macao, as “opening bases” (kaifang jidi).90 Deng praised the 
proposal and decided to “circle” some areas and make them “special zones”. In August 
1980, the National People’s Congress announced to establish four special economic 																																																								
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zones (i.e. Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen), and the economy of these places 
quickly took off. When Deng inspected Shenzhen in 1984, he was surprised by the 
“Shenzhen speed” about which he later said, “the construction speed of Shenzhen is very 
high; it only takes a few days to complete one floor and a building is completed within a 
number of days.”91 He then went back to Beijing and held a meeting with several other 
senior politicians on February 24, 1984. On that meeting, Deng praised the successful 
experiment of SEZs and he proposed a further opening. Deng remarked, “…besides the 
existing SEZs, we could further open up several other cities such as Dalian and 
Qingdao…, which shall not be called SEZs, but enjoy some favorable policies granted to 
SEZs.”92 
Following Deng’s remark, from March 26 to April 6, 1984, a number of 
municipal and provincial leaders were called to Beijing to discuss possible ways for 
further opening. The central government decided to open another 14 cities along the east 
coast of China by establishing 14 national-level Economic and Technological 
Development Zones (ETDZs).93 Table 2.3.1 below lists all the 14 development zones 
established after the 1984 meeting, with the Dalian Development Zone as the first one 
(established on September 25, 1984). From Table 2.3.1 we know that most of the 14 
development zones were not politically important cities (such as provincial capitals), 
which lowers the potential political risk if the experiment of development zone failed.  																																																								
91 Deng Xiaoping, “Banhao Jingji Tequ, Zengjia Duiwai Kaifang Chengshi (Do Better in Special Economic 
Zones and Increase Number of Opening Cities),” in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping), Vol. 3, (Beijing: Renmin Press 1993), 51-52. 
92 Ibid, 51-52.  
93 The Central Office of the Chinese Communist Party, “zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu 
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Conference),” Document No. 13, May 4, 1984.  
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Table 2.3.1 The First Wave of Development Zones in China (1984 – 1986) 
No. Name City Belonged Year of 
Approval 
Land (sq km) 
1 Dalian ETDZ Dalian 1984.09 20 
2 Qinhuangdao ETDZ Qinhuangdao 1984.10 6.9 
3 Yantai ETDZ Yantai 1984.10 10 
4 Qingdao ETDZ Qingdao 1984.10 12.5 
5 Ningbo ETDZ Ningbo 1984.10 29.6 
6 Zhanjiang ETDZ Zhanjiang 1984.11 9.2 
7 Tianjin ETDZ Tianjin 1984.12 33 
8 Lianyungang ETDZ Lianyungang 1984.12 3 
9 Nantong ETDZ Nantong 1984.12 24.29 
10 Guangzhou ETDZ Guangzhou 1984.12 38.58 
11 Fuzhou ETDZ Fuzhou 1985.01 10 
12 Minhang ETDZ Shanghai 1986.08 3.08 
13 Hongqiao ETDZ Shanghai 1986.08 0.65 
14 Caohejing ETDZ Shanghai 1988.06 13.3 
 
Development zones were granted favorable tax policies since November 1984. 
There were four major benefits for firms invested in development zones. First, foreign 
firms or joint ventures enjoy a much lower rate of 15% for enterprise income tax. Second, 
firms are not required to pay enterprise income tax until they started making profits and 
firms enjoy a full tax exemption for the first two years of making profits and a 50% 
deduction of tax for the third, fourth, and fifth year, which is known as the policy of 
mianer jiansan or liangmian sanjianban (“two-year full exemption and three-year half 
exemption”). Third, foreign firms do not need to pay customs tax when they repatriate 
their profits. Fourth, firms in development zones do not need to pay customs tax for 
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imported materials used for the purpose of production.94 In 1986, development zones 
were further granted favorable tax policies. If 70% of a firm’s total industrial output was 
for export purpose, the firm enjoys an even lower rate of 10% for enterprise income tax 
plus another three-year period of half exemption of tax (i.e. 5% for enterprise income tax 
for six years).95  
Starting from 1992, development zones entered a “golden period” of development. 
After Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour”, opening and reform was confirmed again and the 
central government decided to open up more cities, resulting in a second wave of 23 
development zones established. The second wave of development zones were further 
expanded to non-coastal cities such as Beijing and Shenyang. In 2000, the central 
government decided to expand development zones to Central and West China and 17 
more development zones were established. Since 1984, development zones achieved 
huge economic success. As we can calculate from Table 2, development zones’ GDP in 
2005 is nearly 60 times higher than that in 1991, and the industrial output is over 156 
times higher. In addition, within twenty years of time (1985 – 2005), FDI increased 310 
times and this number for export is almost 3,000.  
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Table 2.3.2 Major Economic Indicators of Development Zones (1985 – 2005) 
Year GDP 
(billions 
RMB) 
Industrial 
Output 
(billions 
RMB) 
Tax Revenue 
(billions 
RMB) 
FDI 
(millions 
USD) 
Export 
(millions 
USD) 
1985 0.91 - - 42 39 
1991 14.6 14.95 0.79 360 1,140 
1998 110.32 296.25 19.26 4,730 8,030 
2005 815.92 2337.69 121.93 13,020 113,800 
 
2.4 Empirical Strategy – A Natural Experiment Design 
This chapter conducts a natural experiment design – comparing the differences of 
bureaucratic institutions between Dalian Development Zone and its neighboring district, 
Jinzhou, before and after the central government’s policy of establishing development 
zones in 1984. There are two main reasons for selecting the case of Dalian Development 
Zone. First, the Dalian Development Zone was selected by the central government for 
establishing a development zone. Its neighbor district, Jinzhou, did not receive such 
central policy treatment. Such external shock imposed by the central government served 
as an exogenous factor that shapes development between the two localities (the 
development zone and the Jinzhou district) differently afterwards. In other words, the 
development zone itself did not self-select in the process of development. This provides a 
good opportunity for this chapter to compare these two places, especially the bureaucratic 
structures between these two districts, and to illustrate how that (different bureaucracies) 
makes the Dalian Development Zone stand out in public services and welfare provision.  
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Second, the case of Dalian Development Zone is a typical case, which allows a 
researcher to better explore potential causal mechanisms.96 Established in September 
1984, Dalian Development Zone was the first national development zone in China and it 
was set up as a “model” for other development zones. Since 1984, Dalian Development 
Zone received many senior-level official visits from both the central government and 
other provinces to learn how to set up a development zone. Figure 2.4 below shows the 
number and the trend of official visits to the Dalian Development Zone. Overall, the 
number of visits from provincial governments has a similar pattern with official visits by 
the central government. The total number of official visits had a sharp increase 
immediately after the establishment of Dalian Development Zone in 1984. For example, 
in March 1985, Vice Premier Tian Jiyun and 50 other central government officials visited 
the Dalian Development Zone. In October that year, Central Party Secretariat Wang 
Zhaoguo and 61 other senior party officials visited the development zone. The 1989 
Tiananmen Square Incident was a cutoff and it was not until October 1990 (General Party 
Secretary Jiang Zemin visited and confirmed the success of Dalian Development Zone) 
that there had been another wave of official visits from both the central and provincial 
governments to Dalian Development Zone. Following Jiang’s visit, several other senior 
politicians such as Peng Chong, Vice Chairman of National People’s Congress, Zhu 
Rongji, Vice Premier, Li Tieying, State Councilor, and so forth all went to the Dalian 
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Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294–308. 
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Development Zone.97 In addition to central visits, there were at least 91 provincial-level 
officials visited Dalian Development Zone from 1985 to 1991.98 Governors and 
Provincial Party Secretaries from Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Henan, Hainan, 
Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, and so forth had been to Dalian Development Zone to learn the 
Dalian experience.  
 
Figure 2.4: Number of Official Visits to Dalian Development Zone (1985 – 2005) 
 
2.4.1 The Establishment of Dalian Development Zone 
Dalian Development Zone is located in suburban Dalian, around 30 kilometers 
northeast from downtown Dalian. As mentioned in the above section, the central 
government held a meeting from March 28 to April 6, 1984 to discuss the possibility of a 
further opening up. Following that meeting, on July 19th, 1984, Song Ping, Director of 																																																								
97 Dalian Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu Zhi, 1984-2004 (Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone 
Gazetteer, 1984-2004), (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Press, 2006), 11-12. 
98 Ibid, 4-49. 
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State Planning Commission, the most powerful state organ in economic affairs, went to 
Dalian for a work inspection and tasked Dalian municipal government to submit a 
detailed report on the feasibility of establishing a development zone. After that, from 
August 12th to August 16th, three Vice Premiers, Wan Li, Gu Mu, and Li Peng, came to 
Dalian together for a further inspection. Vice Premier Gu Mu praised the planned 
location of the development zone, saying that “this location is well chosen!”99 One month 
later, on September 25th, the State Council officially ratified the establishment of the 
Dalian Development Zone, and the Dalian municipal government held a groundbreaking 
ceremony on October 15th, 1984. At the beginning, Dalian Development zone had only 
20 square kilometers of territory. Twenty years later, Dalian Development Zone has a 
territory of 387 square kilometers with population of 650,000. Administratively, the 
Dalian Development Zone is a de facto level of government (ju level, administrative level 
equivalent to a prefectural level government) that governs 7 street-level governments 
(jiedao) and 2 towns, each of them has departmental (chu) level administrative ranking. 
Economically, more than 5,000 multinational corporations, including over 60 Fortune 
Global 500, from over 70 countries have invested in the Dalian Development Zone, and 
formed several clusters of industries such as mechanical manufacturing, petrochemical, 
electronic information, and biomedical. In addition to economic development, social 
responsibility is another key task of the zone government, and the zone government is 
responsible for the development of social welfare including building schools, hospitals, 
public libraries, public theaters, public gardens, public facilities for physical exercises, 																																																								
99 Dalian Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu Zhi, 1984-2004 (Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone 
Gazetteer, 1984-2004), (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Press, 2006), 5. 
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etc. Since its foundation, the State Council clearly tasked the zone government to 
“establish comprehensive industrial districts and to build administration, living, and 
service districts.”100 In 1985, the following year, the zone government built an elementary 
and a middle school. Nowadays, the Dalian Development Zone has 11 
universities/colleges and 14 vocational colleges/schools, most of them are public schools 
funded by the government. Regarding medical resources, there are two major teaching 
hospitals (one is affiliated with China Medical University, one of the best in China, and 
the other is affiliated with Dalian Medical University, the best in Dalian) and 245 medical 
agencies. The zone government has also built many public facilities for residents’ social 
life including a world-class public theater (the best in Northeast China), a public library 
with a collection of over 1.3 million books and an average daily visit of 5,000 people, a 
large in-door physical exercise center with in-door swimming pool, badminton court, 
body building center, and 11 other facilities. In 2009, the zone government also built a 
new physical exercise garden with a 1,000-meter all-weather running track (synthetic 
track), an in-door badminton court, an in-door table tennis court, and a Tai Chi center. In 
1992, the Dalian Development Zone also built a national vacation resort, the Jinshitan 
resort, including one of the best beaches in China and the best golf club in Northeast 
China. Within 25 years, the Jinshitan national vacation resort has received over 60 
million tourists. 
 
																																																								
100 State Council, “guanyu dalianshi jinyibu duiwai kaifang he nengyuan jiaotong jianshe deng wenti de 
huiyi jiyao tongzhi (Announcement on Dalian’s Openning and Energy Transportation and Construction),” 
Document No. 131, September 25, 1984. 
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2.5 Comparing Bureaucratic Institutions  
As presented in the Introduction section, this chapter compares different 
bureaucratic institutions between the Dalian Development Zone and Jinzhou District. In 
particular, this chapter examines the unique administrative structure of Dalian 
Development Zone, including (1) the political ranking, (2) the role of tequban, and (3) 
the personnel. In Dalian Development Zone, a new form of government – administrative 
committee was created in 1984. The administrative committee has one director, two to 
four deputy directors, a director’s office, and a smaller number of bureaus. The 
administrative structure of the administrative committee is different from a typical district 
government in three major ways. First, the political ranking of development zone (ju 
level) is higher than a normal district (chu level). Second, the State Council has an Office 
of Special Economic Zones (tequban) that guides the work of development zones, which 
on one hand allows and protects zones to opening and on the other hand imposes a central 
inspection that prevents zones from being inefficient. Third, the administrative committee 
has more professional and capable bureaucrats. Comparing with a typical district 
government, the administrative committee has younger, better educated, and more 
professional personnel. Officials in development zones are also more open-minded, with 
reform and development oriented mindset (kaifa jingshen).  
The administrative committee also has much fewer bureaus/departments 
comparing with a typical district government. Usually, each bureau of the administrative 
committee integrates many functions and responsibilities of several traditional bureaus. 
More important, the administrative committee has many fewer regulations governing 
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business than a typical government does. Administrative approval process is shorter and 
faster in a development zone. The fewer and integrated bureaus have fewer bureaucratic 
wrangles and higher efficiency. In addition, the administrative committee is granted by 
the central government much more political and economic authority than a typical district 
government does. A remarkable feature of the Chinese nomenklatura system is its 
administrative ladder that does not grant much authority to district-level government in 
terms of project approvals (xiangmu shenpi). The administrative committee, however, 
does not need (or needs less) to go through the time consuming administrative process 
when it wants to attract foreign investment from a multinational corporation, for example. 
The higher autonomy of the administrative committee can shorten the time of multiple 
levels of administrative approval and thus can potentially lead to a more efficient 
government. A normal district-level government needs to go through much longer and 
more complicated process of administrative approval (such as waiting for municipal or 
provincial government’s response), while a development zone government, with greater 
autonomy in administrative approval, faces less difficulty with time-consuming processes. 
2.5.1 Political Ranking 
A key feature of the development zone leadership is that it has higher political 
ranking than a normal district does. Usually, a district leader’s political ranking is chu 
(equal to the county level) but the administrative committee leadership ranks ju (equal to 
prefectural/municipal level). In Dalian Development Zone, Director of Administrative 
Committee has a political ranking of ju level while Jinzhou district’s party secretary’s 
political ranking is chu, one level below that of the development zone. Another feature of 
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the Dalian Development Zone is that Director of Administrative Committee, starting 
from 1993, is also the party secretary of the development zone government. Usually, the 
party secretary and the administrative head are not the same person and there are often 
some tensions between party secretary and the head of administration on important 
decisions. The development zone, however, does not face any potential tension of that. 
The Director of Administrative Committee is the decision maker for both party or 
political affairs and economic or social affairs. Such integration of the two important 
positions enables Director of Administrative Committee greater authority of decision-
making as well as more efficiency of decision-making.  
The higher political ranking and concentration of authority of the Dalian 
Development Zone has two major effects. First, to some extent, it prevents interference 
from municipal bureaus, which have the same political ranking as the development zone 
government does. Political inspections in the Chinese political system can have both 
positive and negative effects. On the one hand, a political inspection can push the local 
government to implement certain policies effectively. However, on the other, endless 
political inspections can lead to over-interference and thus inefficiency of local 
government. In many cases, political inspections are also accompanied by corruption, as 
lower-level officials ply higher-ranking officials with gifts.101 Thus, the higher political 
ranking of the administrative committee can reduce interference from upper-level 
government. In the case of Jinzhou, however, the district head has a lower political 
ranking (chu level) and bureaus in Jinzhou district are even lower ranked (ke level) – two 																																																								
101 Ting Gong, “The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Evolving Trajectory and Embedded 
Dilemmas,” Crime, Law and Social Change 49, no. 2 (2008): 139–52.  
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levels below the political ranking of a municipal bureau in Dalian. Second, the higher 
political ranking means that development zones have greater autonomy within their 
territories over political and economic affairs and such greater autonomy enables the zone 
government to be more efficient in attracting investment and responding to societal needs, 
which will be discussed in details in the sections below. In the economic realm, the 
development zone is granted municipal-level or even provincial-level authority. For 
example, when it was established in 1984, the Dalian Development Zone was permitted 
to ratify foreign direct investment under USD 10 million. This authority was increased to 
USD 30 million in 1996,102 and in 2010, this number went up to USD 300 million.103 In 
Jinzhou, the district government has much less autonomy over economic and political 
affairs, and investment proposals (especially for large projects) in Jinzhou usually have to 
be sent to the municipal government for its approval, which results in a much longer time 
for approval (and sometimes results in corruption). 
Another interesting point worth noting here is that the higher political ranking of 
development zones suggests a different promotion track. In the case of Dalian, being 
appointed as Director of Development Zone implies a greater likelihood of being 
promoted to a higher position (either a more important position with same political 
ranking or a position with higher political ranking). For example, Zhang Shikun, Director 
																																																								
102 State Council, “guowuyuan guanyu kuoda neidisheng zizhiqu jihua danlieshi he guowuyuan youguan 
wenbu deng danwei xishou waishang zhijie touzi xiangmu shenpi quanxian de tongzhi (Announcement on 
Expanding Authority on Attracting Foreign Direct Investment in Inner-land Provinces, Self-Autonomous 
Regions, Deputy Provincial Cities and Other Departments under State Council),” Document No. 34, August 
22, 1996. 
103 Ministry of Commerce, “shangwubu guanyu xiafang waishang touzi shenpi quanxian youguan wenti de 
tongzhi (Announcement on Decentralizing Authority on Foreign Direct Investment),” Document No. 209, 
June 10, 2010.  
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of the Dalian Development Zone from 2008 to 2010, was promoted as member of the 
Standing Committee of Dalian Municipal Party Committee and Secretary of the 
Municipal Political and Legal Affairs Commission in 2011 and later promoted as Chief 
Secretary of the Municipal Government, both of which are important and powerful 
positions. By contrast, in Jinzhou, most of the political leaders are promoted locally and 
they usually retire (such as Yu Pihong and Ning Zhenbo) or get appointed to People’s 
Congress (such as Sun Peili and Wang Yonghai), the rubber stamp legislature, after their 
tenure.104 
 
2.5.2 Central Guidance and Inspection – the Tequban 
The Tequban (State Council’s Office of Special Economic Zones) was established 
in 1982. Gu Mu, Vice Premier of China who initiated the special economic zone in 
Shenzhen, led the work of tequban. In 1982, the tequban was called a “work group” 
(gongzuo zu) and in 1984 the State Council upgraded its administration to ministerial-
level and changed the name into “office” (bangongshi). After the Work Conference of 
Opening in Coastal Cities in 1984, the State Council decided to nominate Gu Mu to lead 
and inspect the work of opening and coordinate potential contradictions. The State 
Council also decided that “the power of the tequban should be strengthened.”105 The 
																																																								
104 Bo Xilai is a different story (a deviant case). Bo served as party secretary of Jinzhou from 1985 to 1988 
and was promoted to municipal government where he served as deputy mayor, mayor, and party secretary 
throughout the 1990s. In Bo’s case, he was promoted all the way from chu level to vice-state level 
(politburo member). Bo Xilai is son of Bo Yibo, an elder elite of CCP. 
105 Zhongban (Central Office), “zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu pizhuan yanhai bufen chengshi 
zuotanhui jiyao de tongzhi (Announcement on Circulating the Records of the Costal City Meeting),” 
Document No. 13, May 4, 1984. 
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major responsibility of the tequban is to guide opening, to conduct research on economic 
development strategies, to make policy proposals to the State Council, and to investigate 
policy implementation in opening cities and zones, etc.106 In the Chinese political system, 
there is a principle of duel-leadership (shuangchong lingdao). For example, a city’s 
bureau of environmental protection is under both the leadership of the municipal 
government and the guidance of Ministry of Environmental Protection. The horizontal 
relationship between the bureau of environmental protection and the municipal 
government is a leadership relationship (lingdao guanxi), and the vertical relationship 
between the bureau of environmental protection and Ministry of Environmental 
Protection is guidance relationship (zhidao guanxi) or professional relationship (yewu 
guanxi). In the case of national development zones, vertically, the State Council’s 
tequban has a guidance relationship with each national development zone. Such a vertical 
relationship, on the one hand, provides central guidance to the local work of development 
zones, protects zones, and allows them to do things (e.g. opening). On the other hand, and 
even more important, the relationship imposes a central surveillance and inspection of the 
implementations of national policies at the local level and prevents development zones 
from being inefficient.  
The tequban also holds national development zone conferences and organizes 
training classes for zone cadres. In terms of the zone conference, it is held annually, 
sometimes semi-annually, to provide a platform for development zones to share 
																																																								
106 Office of State Council, “guowuyuan tequ bangongshi zhineng peizhi neishe jigou he renyuan bianzhi 
fangan (Functions Organizations and Personnel of Special Economic Zone Office),” Document No. 63, 
May 16, 1994. 
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experiences and to function as a channel for development zones to report their problems 
and voice their policy preferences. In addition to holding conferences, the tequban also 
organizes training classes. In 1984, when Deng decided to expand special economic 
zones to other coastal cities in China, Deng said that “to do opening, … the key is that the 
cadres must be the clear-minded persons (mingbai ren) not muddled persons (hutu 
ren)….We must have a large number of professional cadres who specialize in 
international economics, trade, finance, law, and technology.”107 Deng then tasked the 
State Council (i.e. the tequban) to hold training classes and required cadres in opening 
cities to visit and learn from Shenzhen. Till the end of 1985, the tequban organized 
professional training classes for over 9,000 cadres in development zones and costal 
opening cities, and Gu Mu also proposed selecting younger cadres to receive half-year 
training in top universities of China.108 In the case of Dalian Development Zone, the first 
leadership and bureau heads of the zone government were also well trained. Upon the 
establishment of the Dalian Development Zone, both the Liaoning provincial government 
and Dalian municipal government selected young college graduates who had excellent 
academic records and served as student leaders in colleges to receive specific training to 
prepare them for establishing the development zone. These young college graduates were 
firstly sent to the young cadre training camp (qingganban), organized by Liaoning 
provincial organizational department, to receive political training, and then were sent to 
																																																								
107 Zhongban (Central Office), “zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu pizhuan yanhai bufen chengshi 
zuotanhui jiyao de tongzhi (Announcement on Circulating the Records of the Costal City Meeting),” 
Document No. 13, May 4, 1984. 
108 Gu Mu, “guanyu jingji tequ jianshe he yanhai shisige chengshi jinyibu kaifang gongzuo jinzhan 
qingkuang de baogao (Report on Opening in Special Economic Zones and Costal Cities),” January 7, 1985.  
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the economic and trade camp (jingmaoban), organized by the Dalian municipal 
government, to learn courses in economics, trade, and finance. 
 
2.5.3 Personnel 
Both the leadership and the bureaucrat team of the Dalian Development Zone are 
more professional and more capable than that in Jinzhou district. In terms of the 
leadership, Directors and Deputy Directors of the development zone are people who are 
more open-minded (with liberal ideology or developmental oriented ideology) and more 
professional. They have more willingness and are more capable in carrying out reforms. 
The first Director of Administrative Committee, Tang Qishun, for example, was such a 
person. Tang was First Deputy Mayor of Dalian (changwu fu shizhang), specializing in 
urban planning and municipal construction. Tang’s lieutenant, Zhou Haifei, was a 
specialist on economics and finance. Zhou graduated from China’s Central University of 
Finance and Economics and worked in People’s Bank of Dalian. Later he was promoted 
as deputy chief of Dalian’s Bureau of Finance.109 In June 1985, Zhou was appointed as 
deputy director of Dalian Development Zone. Tang and Zhou are typical examples of 
leadership in Dalian Development Zone – both of them have liberal ideologies; they 
believe in market economy and have a “spirit of development” (kaifa jingshen). More 
important, both of them have stronger professional skills – one in urban planning and the 
other in finance. In Jinzhou district, however, most district party secretary and district 
																																																								
109 Dalianshi caizhengju (Dalian Municipal Bureau of Finance), “1980-1985 Dalianshi caizheng dashiji 
(Major Events of Dalian Bureau of Finance, 1980-1985), March 28, 2003.  
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head are local residents of Jinzhou who have spent their whole career in Jinzhou. For 
example, Wang Yebin served as party secretary of Jinzhou from 1993 to 1997. Wang is a 
local Jinzhou resident who was born and grown up in Jinzhou. Wang’s whole career was 
also in Jinzhou who served in Bureau of Food before was promoted as party secretary. In 
the same period, the director of Dalian development zone was Gao Zi who was a member 
of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee before he came to Dalian and he was also the 
youngest provincial-level cadre in China (age of 37) at that time.  
In addition to leadership, bureaucrats of Dalian Development Zone are younger, 
better educated, and more professional. The Dalian development zone adopted “open 
recruitment” (gongkai zhaopin) process since its establishment in 1984.110  After being 
hired, bureaucrats would receive frequent training in improving specific skills such as 
English, Japanese, statistics, accounting, trade, etc.111 In return, bureaucrats in 
development zones enjoy a much higher salary (i.e. usually double or even more) than 
people who work in Jinzhou. A major component of a development zone bureaucrat’s 
salary is called developmental subsidy (kaifa buzhu), and a development zone cadre also 
has an attracting investment bonus (zhaoshang jiangjin), usually tens of thousands per 
year. The high amount of bonus attracts capable and professional people to join and stay 
in the development zone government. In the case of Jinzhou, it does not enjoy such 
privilege granted by the central government and it has much less ability to attract 
professional and educated people to join the government. In terms of the employment 																																																								
110 Dalian Kaifaqu Nianjian, 1984-1989 (Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone 
Yearbook, 1984-1989), (Beijing: China Zhuoyue Press, 1990), 96. 
111 Dalian Kaifaqu Nianjian, 1990-1992 (Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone 
Yearbook, 1990-1992), (Shenyang: Liaoning Keji Press, 1994), 177.  
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process, first, the employment information was announced publicly (at that time, most 
governments’ open positions were not publicly advertised). Second, an applicant must 
send his/her resume and there was at least one round of interviews. The applicant must 
also demonstrate his/her professional knowledge in a certain field. All hired bureaucrats 
must have at least a college degree. Take the Dalian Development Zone’s Bureau of 
Labor and Personnel Management (laorenju) as an example. One of the divisions (chu) of 
the bureau is the Arbitration Division that has 5 bureaucrats. All of them were college 
graduates in their 20s or early 30s. One of them graduated from Tsinghua University (a 
top university in China) and one of them was a lawyer for eight years before joining the 
Arbitration Division.  
In terms of age, Table 2.5.3 below shows the distribution of cadres’ age in the 
Dalian Development Zone. From Table 2.5.3, we can see that the majority of cadres in 
Dalian Development Zone are under the age of 35. In addition, the trend is that cadres are 
getting younger and younger. In 1989, 16% of cadres are under the age of 25 and this 
number goes up to 24.8% just three years later. By the end of 1992, 61.3% of cadres in 
Dalian Development Zone are under the age of 35, which makes the team indeed a young 
one.  
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Table 2.5.3. Age Distribution of Cadres in Dalian Development Zone (1984 – 1992) 
Age 1984 - 1989 1990 - 1992 
Under 25 16% 24.8% 
26 – 30  19% 21% 
31 – 35  21% 15.5% 
36 – 40  15% 16% 
41 – 45  10% 10% 
46 – 50  11% 7.4% 
51 – 60 8% 5.3% 
 
In the case of Jinzhou, however, the Jinzhou district government has many more 
bureaucrats than the development zone government, and most of the bureaucrats in 
Jinzhou are poorly educated and older. For example, in 1987, only 21.7% of bureaucrats 
in Jinzhou have secondary degrees (including vocational training degree) and more than 
70% of the bureaucrats had only elementary or middle school degree of education. Till 
1995, there were still nearly 20% of bureaucrats who did not receive a high school or 
above level of education in Jinzhou district government. In addition to the lower 
education level of bureaucrats in Jinzhou, their age is much older than bureaucrats in the 
development zone. In 1987, 48.1% of bureaucrats were over 40 years old, and this 
number went up to 68.3% in 2005.112 
Another feature of development zone personnel is that street-level bureaucrats are 
more professionally managed than party-controlled. In the Dalian Development Zone, the 																																																								
112 Dalian Jinzhou quzhi, 1986-2005 (Dalian Jinzhou District Gazetteer, 1986-2005), (Shenyang: Liaohai 
Press, 2016), 361. 
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Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security (used to be known as the Bureau of 
Labor and Personnel Management, laorenju) has a division (chu) called Personnel 
Placement Division (diaopei chu). For all the bureaucrats with ranking below chu level 
(i.e. keyuan, fuke, zhengke), the hiring process is handled by the Personnel Placement 
Division but not the Party’s organization department. The Personnel Placement Division 
decides whom to hire without approvals from the organization department. In the Dalian 
Development Zone, organization department is only responsible for promoting cadres 
who are at the chu level and evaluating cadres of ju level, but the majority of bureaucrat 
team (or the civil servant team) is more professionally managed by the Bureau of Labor 
and Personnel Management, not the Party system. 
 
2.6 Implications for Public Services and Welfare 
From the above discussion, we can see that the bureaucratic structure of 
administrative committee tends to be more efficient than a traditional district government 
because of the unique structure of the administrative committee. In January 1995, the 
Dalian Development Zone proposed a strategy of “optimizing soft environment, re-create 
new advantages” (youhua ruan huanjing, zaizao xin youshi) for the development of the 
zone.113 The administrative committee proposed to make the development zone as the 
best zone in offering medical service, education, vocational training and unemployment 
																																																								
113 Gao Zi, “qiangzhua jiyu zaizao youshi cujin dalian kaifaqu chixu kuaisu jiankang fazhan (Seize 
Opportunity Create New Advantages Foster Sustainable Fast Healthy Development in Dalian Development 
Zone),” January 20, 1995.  
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insurance for employees.114 Guided by this proposal, the development zone experienced a 
lot of changes in the following year. For example, a public library, archival center, 
vocational training center, and medical emergency center were built, and 1,283 
technicians as well as over 1,000 college graduates started working in the development 
zone.115 In 2001, the administrative committee proposed to “build up the third 
environment” of the development zone. The administrative committee explained that the 
“first environment” is a “hard environment,” referring to infrastructure; the second 
environment is a “soft environment” that includes quality of public services; and the 
“third environment” means a “human environment” (renwen huanjing) which refers to 
modern social value and development of culture, education, and human capital. Director 
Zhou Haifei further articulated that we should “create a social cultural atmosphere that is 
based on modern social value and rule of law.”116 In the same year, the administrative 
committee abolished 48 items of administrative fees and later the Dalian Development 
Zone became the first local government without any kind of administrative fees charged 
to firms in Liaoning province.117  
In terms of fiscal expenditure on social welfare, the Dalian Development Zone is 
a newly established region of government with a much younger population, and there are 																																																								
114 Dalian kaifaqu guanweihui (Dalian Development Zone Administrative Committee), “guanyu yinfa 
dalian kaifaqu dangwei guanweihui gongzuo huiyi wenjian de tongzhi (Announcement on Printing 
Conference Documents of Dalian Development Zone),” Document No.1, January 24, 1996. 
115 Dalian kaifaqu guanweihui (Dalian Development Zone Administrative Committee), “maixiang xingaodu 
chuangzao xinyeji nuli jianshe quanguo zuihao de kaifaqu (Reach New High Altitude Create New 
Achievements Construct the Best Development Zone in China),” Document No.1, January 21, 1997. 
116 Dalian kaifaqu guanweihui (Dalian Development Zone Administrative Committee), “wei kaifaqu 
xinshiji de dafazhan dianding jianshi jichu (Building Foundations for the Great Development of Dalian 
Development Zone in the New Century),” Document No.4, March 25, 2001. 
117 Dalian Development Zone Office of the Administrative Committee, “bawo jiyu kaituo chuangxin nuli 
jianshe quanguo zuijia touziqu (Seize Opportunity Develop Innovation Create the Best Investment Zone in 
China),” Document No. 3, February 9, 2002.  
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two features of welfare expenditure in the Dalian Development Zone. First, the 
percentage of fiscal expenditure on social security is less than that in Jinzhou, a much 
older district with many more retired and aged population. However, the development 
zone, facing many foreign firms and private business established factories in the zone, 
expands coverage of pension to not only insiders (i.e. state-owned enterprises) but also 
outsiders (i.e. foreign and private firms).118 By the end of 2002, 100% of the working 
population in Dalian Development Zone is covered by the pension program, including 
state-owned, foreign, private, and self-employed, while Jinzhou’s pension coverage was 
mainly targeted at insiders.119 Second, in terms of education, the Dalian Development 
Zone’s initial expenditure was lower than that in Jinzhou, but the growth rate is much 
higher. Since year of 1985, the Dalian Development Zone keeps an average annual 
growth rate of over 10% in education expenditure, with an even higher growth rate of 
over 35% since 2002.120  
The bureaucratic structure of the development zone can lead to better public 
services and welfare through two possible mechanisms: (1) it responds to societal needs 
more quickly and effectively, and (2) it has less bureaucratism. To further illustrate how 
the development zone can do a better job in improving public services and welfare, the 
following conducts in-depth analysis on two cases – the case of Mold Industrial Park and 																																																								
118 Dalian Development Zone Bureau of Labor and Personnel Management, “guanyu zhuanfa guanyu jianli 
tongyi de qiye zhigong jiben yanglao baoxian zhidu de jige wenti de chuli yijian de tongzhi 
(Announcement on Establishing A Unified Pension Program for Enterprise Employees),” Document No. 6, 
cited from Dalian Kaifaqu Zhi (Dalian Development Zone Gazatteer), (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Press, 
2006), 397-399. 
119 Dalian Kaifaqu Zhi (Dalian Development Zone Gazatteer), (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Press, 2006), 
289; Dalianshi Jinzhouqu Zhi (Dalian Jinzhou District Gazatteer), (Shenyang: Liaohai Press, 2016), 238. 
120 Dalian Kaifaqu Zhi (Dalian Development Zone Gazatteer), (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Press, 2006), 
295-299. 
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the case of One-Stop Service. In particular, the Mold Industrial Park case seeks to show 
how the development zone responds quickly and effectively to the needs of business in 
building the Mold Industrial Park and then nurturing human capital for the industrial park. 
The second case – one-stop service – aims to present how such reform reduces 
bureaucratism and leads to better public services. 
 
2.6.1 The Case of Mold Industrial Park 
The administrative committee of Dalian Development Zone holds formal 
meetings with firms in the zone twice a year. The director of the administrative 
committee attends this semi-annual meeting every time and the main purpose is to offer a 
channel for firms to convey their concerns, difficulties, and opinions to the government. 
In meetings in 2001 and 2002, many firms in the development zone kept expressing the 
reality of increasing production cost due to the high cost of importing molds either from 
other regions or from international market. A research team (led by Office of Policy and 
Research) was then formed and went to several firms (such as Fuji Electric, Nidec, 
General Electric, Omron, Cannon, etc.) talking with senior managers or representatives of 
firms in the development zone. The research team confirmed the firms’ concern – the 
lack of moldmakers in the development zone, especially moldmakers of stamping die, 
casting mold, and injection mold. Mold industry is the foundation for all kinds of 
industries; “molds are used to produce a wide variety of plastic, metal, rubber, glass, and 
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mineral products.”121 Some depicts the mold industry as the “indispensable mother tool 
for the production of industrial goods.”122 For example, one of the most important 
reasons for Japanese industrial products to reach high quality is that the mold industry of 
Japan supplies high-precision mold to product manufactures.123 Representatives from 
Toshiba Dalian reported that they needed to import nearly 100% of all plastic parts and 
stamping parts from international market in order to manufacture televisions, which 
imposed a very high cost on their products. Around year of 2002, there were only 30 
mold firms in Dalian Development Zone and most of these mold firms were poorly 
equipped, lack of advanced technologies, and also faced a serious shortage of experts on 
molds.  
In 2003, the administrative committee decided to build a new Mold Industrial 
Park with 50,000 square meters of land. The zone government constructed 50 standard 
factory buildings in the Mold Industrial park and then rented them to 50 firms. The 
government granted several favorable policies for mold firms. Regarding the rent, for 
example, a mold firm would get one year rent free if the mold firm signed a contract of 
five years with the government, and if the contract is for ten years, then the firm gets two 
years’ rent for free. The Park was filled up with 50 mold firms within two years. The 
government then decided to expand the Park for an additional land of 100,000 square 
																																																								
121 United States International Trade Commission, Tools, Dies, and Industrial Molds: Competitive 
Conditions in the United States and Selected Foreign Markets, USITC Publication 3556, October 2002, 1-
2.  
122 Toshiyuki Baba, “Development Model of the Die and Mold Industry in Asia : A Comparative Analysis 
of Japan and Republic of Korea,” Journal of International Economic Studies, no. 21 (2007): 126. 
123 Toshiyuki Baba, “Development Model of the Die and Mold Industry in Asia: A Comparative Analysis 
of Japan and Republic of Korea,” Journal of International Economic Studies, no. 21 (2007): 127-135. 
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meters. At the same time, the government provided construction subsidies to those firms 
that prefer to design and build their own specific factories.  
With more and more mold builders established in the zone, many of them faced a 
serious shortage of technicians and experts. These mold firms then went to the Office of 
Mold in the Mold Industrial Park and sought help from the government. A solution of 
“cooperation between universities and firms” (xiaoqi hezuo) was initiated by the Mold 
Industrial Park and starting from year of 2005, the Mold Industrial Park and Bureau of 
Education offered 30 million yuan each year to help universities to purchase equipment. 
In 2010, the Mold Industrial Park and Bureau of Education funded Dalian University of 
Technology (a top research institution in China) to edit a series of textbooks. Two years 
later, four textbooks (Mold Manufacturing Craft, Die Casting Mold Design, Plastic Inject 
Mold Design, and Stamping Die Design) were published and used by seven universities 
and colleges in Dalian.124  
The development zone government also funds and subsidizes universities and 
colleges in Dalian to nurture experts in mold. The government also acts as a mediator 
between manufacturing firms and universities to foster the cooperation between them. 
For example, since 2006, Dalian Polytechnic University offers two new majors related 
with mold industry for undergraduate studies, one was the Major of Mold Design & 
Manufacturing in the College of Mechanical Engineering and Automation and the other 
was Major of Polymer Materials (Mold Track) in the College of Chemical and Materials. 
																																																								
124 The seven universities and colleges include Dalian University of Technology, Dalian Polytechnic 
University, Dalian Jiaotong University, Dalian Vocational Technical College, Dalian Development Zone 
Vocational School, and Dalian Light Industry School. 
		
77 
The Mold Industrial Park helps this university to set up internship programs with mold 
firms in the development zone. In 2008, 65 undergraduate students were enrolled in Mold 
Design & Manufacturing and 62 of them got their jobs in the Mold Industrial Park upon 
graduation in 2012.125 Table 2.6.1 below shows statistics of students enrolled in mold 
majors at Dalian Polytech University. As we can see, from 2006 to 2015, Dalian 
Polytechnic University has 2,064 college graduates with mold majors. In addition to 
Dalian Polytechnic University, Dalian Jiaotong University has trained over 600 college 
graduates and more than 200 graduate students (including PhDs) in material process 
related mold majors from 2007 to 2017,126 and Dalian Light Industry School sets up 
internship programs with 36 moldmakers in the Mold Industrial Park.127  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
125 Dalian mojuyuan bangongshi (Office of Dalian Mold Industrial Park), “2012nian dalian gongye daxue 
moju zhuanye jiuye mingdan (Employed Students’ Name List of Mold Majors of Dalian Polytech 
University in 2010),” 2012. 
126 Dalian mojuyuan bangongshi (Office of Dalian Mold Industrial Park), “dalian jiaotong daxue moju 
peixun zhongxin jianjie (Brief Introduction to Dalian Jiaotong University Mold Training Center).”  
127 Dalian mojuyuan bangongshi (Office of Dalian Mold Industrial Park), “dalianshi qinggong xuexiao 
moju zhizao jishu zhuanye jianjie (Brief Introduction to Dalian Light Industry School Major of Mold 
Manufacturing Technology).” 
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Table 2.6.1 Number of Students Enrolled in Mold Majors, Dalian Polytech University (2006 – 2015) 
Year Mold Design & Manufacturing Polymer Materials (Mold 
Track) 
2006 62 16 
2007 64 19 
2008 65 50 
2009 74 63 
2010 142 75 
2011 180 87 
2012 221 92 
2013 158 85 
2014 185 103 
2015 209 114 
 
By 2015, over 500 moldmakers established their factories in the Mold Industrial 
Park. These moldmakers greatly improve the capacity to provide local support for other 
industrial firms in Dalian Development Zone. Take Cannon Dalian as an example. 
Cannon invested its factory in Dalian in September 1989, specializing in manufacturing 
office equipment such as laser printer and cartridges. Prior to 2003, only 5% of the 
needed parts could be purchased within Dalian and Cannon had to import most of the 
needed parts from international market or other regions in China. Over a decade later, 
however, more than 96% of the parts needed by Cannon can be purchased directly within 
the Mold Industrial Park in the development zone of Dalian. 
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2.6.2 The Case of One-Stop Service 
One-stop service was originally targeted to reduce steps needed to start a business 
as well as help business to get administrative approvals quickly. Prior to this, starting a 
business needed to go through a longer process. A firm was not allowed to submit 
documents to all bureaus simultaneously; it has to wait for one bureau’s approval and 
then when it got back the documents it would submit them to another bureau and wait for 
approval. Such a process is time consuming and also highly corrupted. In 1995, Dalian 
Development Zone established an “instant-respond office” (mashangban) that aimed to 
help entrepreneurs to start businesses. However, the “instant-respond office” is more of 
an ad hoc mechanism – how to prevent problems of corruption from happening (or 
reduce difficulties of starting a business) is still a difficult task. In August 2000, the 
administrative committee held a meeting with several key leaders of the development 
zone, discussing ways to break through the administrative barriers (i.e. bureaucratic 
wrangles, administrative omission, and corruption) and to achieve efficient services to 
business. Later Director Zhou Haifei held three more meetings with firms in the 
development zone and collected their feedback. On October 15, the administrative 
committee proposed a new slogan of administration – “multiple bureaus working in one 
office” (duoge bumen yige chuangkou bangong) – and established a small leadership 
group of administrative approval reform. The small group was headed by Director Zhou 
and run by Li Ying, head of the disciplinary inspection committee (jiwei), and Chen 
Zeguo, later who became the first director of the one-stop service agency. The small 
group went to each bureau to hold meetings to know (1) how many administrative 
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approvals in total existed in bureaus of the development zone, and (2) how many days 
needed to get each approval. After a month of visiting, investigating, and negotiating, the 
small group had a clear idea about the administrative process of each bureau. The small 
group then set up upper limit of time needed for each administrative approval. In 
December 2001, Administrative Service Center, the one-stop service agency, was 
established.  
The Administrative Service Center has four advantages. First, a firm can get 
nearly all the administrative approvals needed in one office. Only two years after the 
establishment of this center, 202 items of administrative business can be done within this 
single office (including 75 administrative approvals).128 Second, to start a business, a firm 
only needs to submit one copy of the required documents to the Administrative Service 
Center and then each bureau has access to the documents, which greatly saves time for 
firms. For example, in March 2003, Ruan Yiwei, a senior manager of Hong Kong Grand 
Tech, praised the Center that “it only took me one day to accomplish all the approvals 
required to start a branch in Dalian Development Zone; it’s unbelievable!” Due to this 
pleasant experience, the following day, Ruan decided to add another investment of USD 
200,000 to the Dalian project.129 Third, the Center makes very clear guidance for firms – 
what documents needed, how long it takes, etc. For example, in 2010, the Center made 
																																																								
128 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “2004nian 
gongzuo huibao (Work Report of 2004),” September 7, 2004. 
129 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “chuangxin 
fuwu tixi dazao youliang huanjing tuidong kaifaqu zhaoshang yinzi gongzuo quanmian kaizhan (Create 
New Service System Create Better Environment Foster Dalian Development Zone’s Work of Attracting 
Investment),” November 19, 2004. 
		
81 
large posters and hung them on walls to show the process of starting business.130 Four, 
with all bureaucrats sitting in one large office with clear windows, it reduces corruption a 
lot. The Center also imposes regulations to bureaucrats’ working behaviors. For example, 
bureaucrats are prohibited from reading newspapers (which is quite normal in a 
traditional bureaucracy in China), playing on-line games (another rising phenomena in 
Chinese governments), or do anything that is unrelated with work.131  
The Administrative Service Center also has regular meetings with firms in the 
development zone and has developed various mechanisms to respond to needs of 
business. In 2003, the Center held two major meetings with more than 30 firms in the 
development zone.132 The main purpose of such meetings is to get feedback from firms 
on the one-stop service work as well as their expectations for the Center’s future work. 
For example, in meetings in 2005 and 2006 many firms wanted to have more services on-
line. Starting from 2008, the Administrative Service Center offered an on-line platform 
that allowed some administrative business to be done on-line (including administrative 
inquiry, forms downloading, submitting applications, and on-line complaining).133 In 
																																																								
130 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “tuozhan 
fuwu kongjian chuangxin fuwu shouduan nuli kaichuang xingzheng fuwu gongzuo xinjumian 
(Development Service Create New Ways of Service Open New Area of Administrative Service Work),” 
June 12, 2010. 
131 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “zhenghe 
xingzheng ziyuan jiaqiang wangluo jianshe quanmian tisheng kaifaqu xingzheng fuwu nengli he shuiping 
(Integrate Administrative Resource Strengthen On-line Service Comprehensively Promote Quality of 
Administrative Service of Dalian Development Zone),” January 9, 2009. 
132 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “chuangxin 
fuwu tixi dazao youliang huanjing tuidong kaifaqu zhaoshang yinzi gongzuo quanmian kaizhan (Create 
New Service System Create Better Environment Foster Dalian Development Zone’s Work of Attracting 
Investment),” November 19, 2004. 
133 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “zhenghe 
xingzheng ziyuan jiaqiang wangluo jianshe quanmian tisheng kaifaqu xingzheng fuwu nengli he shuiping 
(Integrate Administrative Resource Strengthen On-line Service Comprehensively Promote Quality of 
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2010, the Center received 27 thank-you letters and 11 banners (jinqi) from firms.134 Till 
2015, firms or citizens can make appointments on-line for 219 items of administration 
among which 24 items (10.59%) can be fully done on-line.135 Two year later, by 
November 2017, the rate of on-line administrative approvals increased to 24.5%.136 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Development zones are mostly studied by economists who discuss and assess the 
effectiveness of favorable policies granted to zones on economic development, including 
stimulating growth, attracting investment, increasing employment, and so forth. However, 
little attention is paid to the political institutions of development zones. This chapter 
studies the bureaucratic institutions of development zones and seeks to explore if and 
how such bureaucratic institutions promote better public services and welfare provision. 
In particular, this chapter examines the case of China and studies the first national 
development zone in China – the Dalian Development Zone. This chapter focuses on 
three aspects of bureaucratic institutions of Dalian Development Zone – political ranking, 
central connection, and personnel. Overall, this chapter finds that bureaucratic institutions 
of development zones are indeed different from a traditional or typical district 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Administrative Service of Dalian Development Zone),” January 9, 2009.  
134 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “tuozhan 
fuwu kongjian chuangxin fuwu shouduan nuli kaichuang xingzheng fuwu gongzuo xinjumian 
(Development Service Create New Ways of Service Open New Area of Administrative Service Work),” 
June 12, 2010. 
135 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “2015nian 
gongzuo zongjie (Work Summary of 2015),” December, 2015. 
136 Xingzheng fuwu zhongxin (Administrative Service Center of Dalian Development Zone), “xingzheng 
fuwu zhongxin 2017nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2018nian gongzuo dasuan (Work Summary of 2017 and Work 
Plan of 2018 of Administrative Service Center),” November 9, 2017. 
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government. Specifically, first, the political ranking of development zones is higher. This 
higher political ranking enables development zones to do things efficiently and grants 
zones much more autonomy in terms of economic and social affairs. Second, 
development zones have connections with the central government. Such central 
connection permits and protects zones to be different and prevents zones from being 
inefficient. Third, the bureaucrat team of development zones are much younger, better 
educated, and more professional than a traditional district government. Zone cadres tend 
to have pro-market liberal ideology and are more capable in carrying out reforms.  
Empirically, this chapter compares Dalian Development Zone with its 
neighboring district – Jinzhou. In 1984, the central government imposed an exogenous 
policy on these two places, turning one place into a new area with a new form of 
government (i.e. administrative committee) and the other place remains the old way. 
Such an external policy shock provides a good opportunity to witness and compare 
differences between these two zones before and after the policy shock of 1984. Basically, 
this chapter finds that the two zones have had very different bureaucratic institutions. In 
the Dalian Development Zone, the administrative committee has fewer but more capable 
bureaucrats and the government is more efficient than that of Jinzhou district. Then this 
chapter further examines two cases (i.e. the Mold Industrial Park case and the One-stop 
Service case) in the Dalian Development Zone to illustrate how bureaucratic institutions 
lead to a better welfare provision and public services. In a word, the two case studies find 
that development zone bureaucracy tends to have less bureaucratism and be more 
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responsiveness to societal needs, which leads to better public services and welfare 
provision.  
One caveat for the study of development zone bureaucracy is the issue of 
generalizability. First, an ideal goal is to have both in-depth qualitative study (such as the 
comparison between Dalian Development Zone and Jinzhou District) and a large-N 
statistical analysis. However, there is lack of district-level data for cross-district large-N 
tests. Statistical yearbooks only have city-level data. Some cities have both traditional 
districts and development zones and it seems thus far impossible to tease out 
development zones from traditional districts. Second, in different regions of China, 
numerous zones with numerous formats have been established in many levels of 
governments (e.g. national, provincial, municipal, county, and town) in China. However, 
not all zones have homogenous bureaucratic institutions. Some zones (e.g. tariff-free 
zone, high-tech zone) may not be a level of government; political and social affairs 
remain in the hand of municipal government. Some development zones are annexed by 
municipal government or are replaced by other forms of zones. These are interesting 
phenomenon and puzzles but this chapter does not seek to answer all of these questions in 
one paper. This chapter tries to build up the internal validity and advocates for a careful 
generalization on the study of zones in China.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Social Policy Priorities: Politicians’ Background and Cities’ Growth Strategies 
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Abstract 
Why do some cities in China prioritize social policies on human capital 
development while others put more resources in social security policies? Very recent 
literature on European welfare state tries to explain welfare reform by examining national 
growth strategies in different European countries. This chapter engages in this literature 
and tries to contribute from two points. First, do growth strategies matter in social 
policymaking in non-democratic countries such as China? Second, in addition to 
production regimes, what are some political factors that determine growth strategies? 
This chapter argues that key politicians’ background (i.e. mayors’ work experience and 
political connections) shapes their scope on strategies of growth (i.e. intensive vs. 
extensive) which further affects social policy priorities (i.e. human capital vs. social 
security). Empirically, this chapter employs the most similar systems design on two cities 
in China – city of Shijiazhuang and city of Fushun – which share many similarities in 
economic structure, historical legacy, geography, and demography, but have very distinct 
social policy outcomes. This chapter traces two cities’ mayors’ background and illustrate 
how different strategies of growth were adopted by mayors in these two cities. Then, this 
chapter explores how different growth strategies shape distinct social policy outcomes.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Policies of social welfare are well studied in OECD countries but our 
understanding of the origins, development, and/or reform of social policies in developing 
countries is relatively preliminary and limited.137 This may be somewhat understandable 
due to the relatively low level of public investment in health, education, and social 
security in developing countries. However, in recent decades, many developing countries 
(e.g. China, South Africa, Bolivia, Ukraine, etc.) have experienced remarkable social 
policy changes.138 For instance, China has witnessed tremendous improvement of social 
welfare, such as the expansion of population covered by various welfare programs139, the 
reduction of inequality among different groups (e.g. urban vs. rural residents)140, and the 
improvement of human capital of the society.141 Chapter One explains why there has 
been an expansion of social welfare in China. Specifically, Chapter One illustrates a 
bottom-up mechanism in the process of welfare expansion in China since the late 1990s; 
it finds that on average cities with large firms (both domestic and foreign invested) is 
more likely to have better provision of welfare than cities without large firms (or less 
impact from large firms). Chapter Two discusses effects of different political institutions 
																																																								
137 For a literature review, see Isabela Mares and Matthew E Carnes, “Social Policy in Developing 
Countries,” Annual Review of Political Science 12, no. 1 (2009): 93–113.  
138 Christine Weigand and Margaret Grosh, “Levels and Patterns of Safety Net Spending in Developing and 
Transition Countries,” SP Discussion Paper No. 0817 (The World Bank, June 2008). 
139 For example, the Urban Residence Social Pension Program covers people who are over 16 but are not in 
schools and not in employment. This program together with the Urban Employee Social Security Program 
in principal covers 100% of all urban population.  
140 Rural residents who participate in the New Rural Social Pension Program is now integrated with urban 
residents who participate in the Urban Residence Social Pension Program. The integration aims at reducing 
inequality between urban and rural residence, and this is especially beneficial to the 300 million migrant 
workers.  
141 Here human capital improvement refers to both central and local governments’ policies to attract 
technical experts, as well as fiscal input in health, education, and technology.  
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(i.e. development zone bureaucracy vs. more traditional district bureaucracy) on public 
services and welfare. Building on these two chapters, this chapter tries to dig more deeply 
into the policy process of welfare provision. In particular, this chapter seeks to explain 
another interesting conundrum: in developmental phases with similar influence from 
firms (i.e. domestic or foreign, much or little) and similar arrangements of bureaucratic 
institutions (i.e. municipal bureaucracy), why do some cities (such as Shijiazhuang) 
prioritize social policies on human capital development while some other cities (such as 
Fushun) focus more on social security improvement? Does the nature of key politicians 
(i.e. mayor) of a city make any difference in shaping the distinct social policy priorities? 
If so, how?  
Empirically, this chapter employs the most similar systems design to compare two 
cities – Shijiazhuang and Fushun. Both cities experience similar influence from firms (i.e. 
both economies were dominated by state-owned enterprises with little influence of 
foreign investment) and both cities had similar bureaucratic institutions (i.e. the same 
municipal bureaucracy). In addition, both cities faced similar pressure from economic 
transitions and sustainable development in late 1990s and early 21st century. However, 
the city of Shijiazhuang turned to a development trajectory that focuses on productivity 
and its social policy prioritizes human capital development. The city of Fushun, in 
contrast, turned to a development path of heavy public investment and output 
maximization, and the social policy of Fushun focuses on human security improvement. 
How can we explain such an empirical puzzle? What role did the mayors play in this 
process?  
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Existing literature on the development of the Chinese welfare state provides us 
with little insight into these questions, largely because of the lack of comparison between 
different kinds of social policies.142 The very recent literature on European welfare state 
tries to explain social welfare reform by examining national growth strategies. In 
particular, several studies address how variations of national production regimes result in 
different kinds of welfare reforms in Europe.143 This chapter tries to engage in this debate 
and seeks to explore how growth strategies contribute to the distinct social policy 
priorities in different parts of China.  
I argue that cities’ different policy priorities are shaped by cities’ different growth 
strategies which are determined by key politicians’ personal background (e.g. work 
experience). To elaborate, first, a mayor of a city plays a critical role in shaping a city’s 
growth strategy. In particular, a mayor’s work experience shapes both his/her view 
towards strategies of developing a city, either an intensive strategy that focuses on the 
quality of growth (e.g. innovation, high value-added production, and industrial upgrade), 
or an extensive strategy that favors the quantity of growth (e.g. building mega projects 
through public funding). If a politician has lots of experience in economic affairs, the 
politician is more familiar with dealing economic problems and is more willing to take 
potential risks of in-depth investment. Thus, the politician is more likely to choose an 
intensive strategy and he/she is more capable to deal with potential problems of economic 
development. However, if a politician’s past career involves a lot with political work 																																																								
142 Most students focus on either education, health, or social security but few studies conduct comparison 
between different kinds of social policies such as human capital vs. social security policies. For a more 
detailed discussion, see the literature review section below.  
143 Anke Hassel and Bruno Palier, “National Growth Strategies and Welfare State Reform,” Working Paper, 
2015. 
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(such as organizational work, party construction work, ideological work, and so forth), 
the politician has less knowledge in economic development and is more likely to adopt 
the extensive strategy, a much safer choice, that focuses on government investment in 
mega projects. Second, a key politician’s work experience also determines the political 
and economic resources that he/she can draw upon to achieve the specific growth strategy. 
The political connections a politician built through his/her career affects the resources 
he/she brings to his/her position. Third, different growth strategies (intensive vs. 
extensive) then result in different social policy priorities. An intensive strategy of 
development leads to industrial policies that focus more on productivity and such focus 
drives the government to prioritize human capital development – such as policies to 
improve labor skills, to attract technical experts, and to improve public services of the 
city. In contrast, an extensive growth strategy would result in heavy investment on mega 
projects supported by the government, which leads the government to pay more attention 
on the protection of labor (i.e. pension, unemployment insurance) rather than the skills of 
labor.  
Empirically, when conducting case studies on Shijiazhuang and Fushun, I mainly 
focus on the role of mayors rather than municipal party secretaries. I did not on purpose 
select to focus on mayor. Rather, it is the case exploring process that suggests mayors 
play a more important role than party secretaries in initiating and implementing the 
growth strategies of a city. This is the main reason of this chapter to focus on the role of 
mayor rather than the role of party secretary. Party secretaries, at least in the two cases 
this chapter analyzed, involve more with political work such as party construction and 
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ideological work (e.g. studying the “Three Represents”). Existing studies also suggest 
that mayors are likely to be rewarded (i.e. promotion) by welfare work but party 
secretaries are not.144 In addition, in the case of Fushun, before Mayor Wang Daping 
proposed the strategy of building Fushun into a petrochemical city, Party Secretary Zhou 
Yinxiao faced the same problem (e.g. low productivity of Fushu’s state-owned 
enterprises, liability, etc.), but he did not come up with a clear strategy of re-development. 
In the case of Shijiazhuang, Wu Zhenhua was party secretary from 2001 to 2006, the 
critical period that Mayor Zang proposed the idea of pharmaceutical capital. Wu served 
in Hebei’s youth league in the 1980s and worked as director of Hebei’s administration of 
sports in early 1990s, suggesting that he is likely to be a cadre with more political work 
experience but knows little about economic work. Nevertheless, I am not arguing that 
party secretary does not matter at all in a city’s economic development. In both Fushun 
and Shijiazhuang, party secretaries, although not initiating growth strategies, permitted 
and worked together with mayors on implementing policies. 
 
3.2 Growth Strategy and Social Policy: A Literature Review 
The existing literature on the development of the Chinese welfare state provides 
us with little insight into these questions, largely because of the lack of comparison 
between different kinds of social policies. Most studies focus on only one kind of social 
policy (either health145, education146, or social security147) but few studies conduct 
																																																								
144 Cai Zuo, “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China,” The China Quarterly 
224 (2015): 955–84. 
145 Jane Duckett, “Challenging the Economic Reform Paradigm: Policy and Politics in the Early 1980s’ 
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comparisons between different kinds of social policies (such as human capital investment 
vs. social security improvement).  
A very recent literature on social policy in European countries compares different 
social policy regimes in different countries and tends to understand the development and 
reform of social policies by examining national growth strategies in different countries.148 
The EU 2020 strategy, for example, targets “smart, sustainable and inclusive” growth and 
requires welfare state reforms.149 Several pioneering studies try to identify national 
growth strategies of different countries in Europe. National production regimes are 
demonstrated to be crucial in identifying growth strategies. For example, in Hassal and 																																																																																																																																																																					
Collapse of the Rural Co-Operative Medical System,” The China Quarterly 205 (2011): 80–95.; Jane 
Duckett, “Bureaucratic Institutions and Interests in the Making of China’s Social Policy,” Public 
Administration Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2003): 210–35.; William C. Hsiao, “The Political Economy of Chinese 
Health Reform,” Health Economics, Policy, and Law 2, no. 3 (2007): 241–49.; Tony Saich, Providing 
Public Goods in Transitional China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).; Joan Kaufman, Arthur 
Kleinman, and Tony Saich, eds., AIDS and Social Policy in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2006).  
146 Xiaobo Lü and Mingxin Liu, “Public Goods with Private Benefits: Understanding Local Governments’ 
Incentives in Education Provision in China” (Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, 
Chicago, IL, 2013).; Xiaobo Lü, “Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform 
in China,” American Political Science Review 108, no. 2 (2014): 423–37.; Tingjin Lin, The Politics of 
Financing Education in China. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).; Andrew B Kipnis, Governing 
Educational Desire: Culture, Politics, and Schooling in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). 
147 Mark W. Frazier, “China’s Pension Reform and Its Discontents,” The China Journal 51 (2004): 97–
114.; Mark W. Frazier, Socialist Insecurity: Pensions and the Politics of Uneven Development in China 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).; Jennifer Pan, “Buying Inertia: Preempting Social Disorder With 
Selective Welfare Provision in Urban China.” (Harvard University, 2015).; William Hurst, The Chinese 
Worker after Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).; Dorothy J. Solinger and Yiyang 
Hu, “Welfare, Wealth and Poverty in Urban China: The Dibao and Its Differential Disbursement,” The 
China Quarterly 211 (2012): 741–64. 
148 Lucio Baccaro and Jonas Pontusson, “Rethinking Comparative Political Economy: The Growth Model 
Perspective,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 175–207.; David Hope and David Soskice, “Growth 
Models, Varieties of Capitalism, and Macroeconomics,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 209–26.; 
Cathie Jo Martin, “Economic Prosperity Is in High Demand,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 227–35.; 
Michael J. Piore, “Varieties of Capitalism Theory: Its Considerable Limits,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 
(2016): 237–41.; Wolfgang Streeck, “Varieties of Varieties: ‘VoC’ and the Growth Models,” Politics & 
Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 243–47. 
149 “Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth” (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2010). 
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Palier’s paper, they argue that national production regimes determine national growth 
strategies that future shape welfare state reforms,150 although they admit that other factors 
such as political institutions also play a critical role.151 Different from the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) approach that categorizes market economies into either liberal market 
economy or coordinated market economy,152 the growth strategy literature argues that 
varieties of models exist in capitalist countries and one can identify growth models from 
different angles.153 For example, Baccaro and Pontusson attempt to build a more 
applicable analytical framework based on the Keynesian model and the Kaleckian model, 
which can better capture the difference within the coordinated market economies. In 
particular, they categorize growth models into export-led growth and consumption-led 
growth. And for consumption-led growth, it can be further divided as public Keynesian 
growth model that emphasizes on government intervention154 and private Keynesian 
growth model that relies on the stimulation of household consumption.155 As Baccro and 
Pontusson show in their paper, in the case of United Kingdom, it is household 
consumption-led growth while in the case of Germany, the growth model is export-led 																																																								
150 Anke Hassel and Bruno Palier, “National Growth Strategies and Welfare State Reform,” Working Paper, 
2015. 
151 See for example, Torben Iversen and David Soskice, “Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of 
the Nineteenth Century,” World Politics 61, no. 3 (2009): 438–86. 
152 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
153 Georg Picot, Politics of Segmentation: Party Competition and Social Protection in Europe (London: 
Routledge, 2014).; Wolfgang Streeck, “Varieties of Varieties: ‘VoC’ and the Growth Models,” Politics & 
Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 243–47. 
154 Cathie Jo Martin, “Economic Prosperity Is in High Demand,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 227–
35.; Lucio Baccaro and Jonas Pontusson, “Rethinking Comparative Political Economy: The Growth Model 
Perspective,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 175–207. 
155 See Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
The private Keynesian model is also called “commercial Keynesian”, see Robert M Collins, The Business 
Response to Keynes, 1929-1964 (New York; Guildford (G.B.): Columbia University Press, 1981).; Cathie 
Jo Martin, Shifting the Burden: The Struggle over Growth and Corporate Taxation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). 
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growth. Besides, in mixed economies such as Sweden, the growth model is both export-
led and household consumption-led growth, while in Italy, it experienced slow growth.156 
Such classification is better than the VoC approach as it differentiates different growth 
models within the coordinated market economies, such as Germany and Sweden.  
Building on these studies, Martin’s recent paper brings our attention to key actors 
in the process of welfare state reform.157 In particular, she explores key producers in 
different countries and illustrates how preferences of key producers and the political 
coalitions among them shape national policy outcomes regarding models of growth. 
Martin offers a sophisticated classification on producers’ interests by three key 
characteristics: (1) industrial sector (manufacturing or service), (2) targeted markets 
(domestic or international), (3) levels of skills (high-skill or low-skill), and size of public 
sector (large or small). Martin argues that producers with different characteristics have 
different preferences on social policy reform.158 For example, the export-led 
manufacturing model of Germany tends to focus more on the improvement of sectoral 
skills via development of vocational training programs and active labor market 
policies.159 Based on these four dimensions, Martin’s study further classifies producers 
																																																								
156 Lucio Baccaro and Jonas Pontusson, “Rethinking Comparative Political Economy: The Growth Model 
Perspective,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 175–207. 
157 Cathie Jo Martin, “Economic Prosperity Is in High Demand,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 227–
35. 
158 Cathie Jo Martin, “Economic Prosperity Is in High Demand,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 227–
35.; Cathie Jo Martin, “Nature or Nurture? Sources of Firm Preference for National Health Reform,” 
American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 898–913.; Cathie Jo Martin, Stuck in Neutral Business 
and the Politics of Human Capital Investment Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
159 Cathie Jo Martin, “Reinventing Welfare Regimes Employers and the Implementation of Active Social 
Policy,” World Politics 57, no. 1 (2004): 39–69.; Marius R Busemeyer and Christine Trampusch, eds., The 
Political Economy of Collective Skill Formation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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into six different groups and illustrates different interests among different producers’ 
groups.160  
This very recent literature on national growth strategies provides us with a better 
understanding on the development and reform of welfare state in Europe, but we do not 
know if theories generated from European cases apply to social policies in emerging 
market economies or in countries without formal democratic institutions. This chapter 
tries to engage in this literature by examining the case of China. China as a whole country 
can be categorized as export-led growth but a careful analysis on sub-national level of 
entities may find that different growth models exist. For example, export-led 
manufacturing constitutes a large part of the growth in city of Dongguan but it seems that 
Shanghai’s development relies more on the service sector. Even within the export-led 
growth model, some cities (such as Wenzhou and Yiwu) compete on price while some 
other cities compete on quality (such as Shenzhen and Tianjin). In addition, existing 
studies focus more on societal actors in explaining production regimes and growth 
strategies. This chapter tries to analyze key political actors (i.e. mayor of a city) and seeks 
to know how key politicians’ backgrounds shape growth strategies that further influences 
social policy outcomes.  
In addition to the literature on European welfare state and growth models, this 
chapter also speaks to literature in public administration on mayoral leadership. There 
have been discussions on the role of mayors in urban development. Previous studies of 																																																								
160 The six groups are: (1) export-oriented manufacturing, (2) domestic-oriented manufacturing with low 
skills, (3) domestic services in private sector, (4) domestic services in public sector, (5) service sector with 
high skills for private domestic markets, and (6) service sector with high skills for international markets. 
See Cathie Jo Martin, “Economic Prosperity Is in High Demand,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (2016): 227–
35. 
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American mayors identify the role of mayor as either “broker” or “crusader” in the sense 
that the mayor’s job in a city’s development is more of a hub in coordinating various 
actors’ preferences, rather than an effective leader.161 Some scholars later find an 
emergence of leadership that is a “facilitator who promotes positive interaction and a 
high level of communication among officials in city government.”162 Recent studies focus 
on the discussion of strong leadership in facilitating economic development, or reacting 
to crisis.163 In the case of the United States, cities’ leadership are in two universes – one 
dominated by relative strong mayors in mayoral form cities and the other operated by city 
manager council in which mayors’ roles are relatively limited.164 Studies have identified 
several factors that impact the effectiveness of leadership in cities of the United States, 
including size of cities, gender of mayors, strength of civic organizations, and so forth.165 
This chapter tries to contribute to the mayoral leadership literature by applying and 
assessing theories generated from democratic countries to non-democracies such as China 
where mayors are not elected by the public. In addition, this chapter also traces mayors’ 
prior experience their political connections and contributes to our knowledge how mayors’ 																																																								
161 Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City: The Politics of Urban Problems and Policy Making 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), 14. 
162 James H. Svara, “Effective Mayoral Leadership in Council-manager Cities: Reassessing the Facilitative 
Model,” National Civic Review 92, no. 2 (2003): 157. 
163 Stephen J. McGovern, “Mayoral Leadership and Economic Development Policy: The Case of Ed 
Rendell’s Philadelphia,” Policy & Politics 25, no. 2 (1997): 153–72.; Wouter Jan Verheul and Linze 
Schaap, “Strong Leaders? The Challenges and Pitfalls in Mayoral Leadership,” Public Administration 88, 
no. 2 (2010): 439–54. 
164 James H. Svara, “Mayoral Leadership in One Universe of American Urban Politics: Are There Lessons 
for (And from) the Other?,” Public Administration Review 66, no. 5 (2006): 767–74. 
165 Alice H. Eagly and Mary C. Johannesen-Schmidt, “The Leadership Styles of Women and Men,” Journal 
of Social Issues 57, no. 4 (2002): 781–97.; Alice H. Eagly and Blair T. Johnson, “Gender and Leadership 
Style: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 2 (1990): 233–56.; Alice H. Eagly, Mary C. 
Johannesen-Schmidt, and Marloes L. Van Engen, “Transformational, Transactional, and Laissez-Faire 
Leadership Styles: A Meta-Analysis Comparing Women and Men,” Psychological Bulletin 129, no. 4 
(2003): 569–91. 
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career paths shape their cities’ strategies of development as well as business-government 
relations.  
In the literature on Chinese political leadership, major attention is given to explain 
the promotion of politicians through two major competing theories – the factionalism 
model166 and the performance model.167 The factionalism model basically argues that 
cadres are promoted based on political networks while the performance model argues that 
cadres are rewarded if they achieve political tasks given by upper level governments. 
Existing studies tend to treat sub-state politicians (such as mayors or governors) as purely 
“agents” without any personalities or personal preferences. This study challenges this 
view by tracing political careers of mayors through in-depth case studies and shows how 
a politician’s past work experience shapes his/her scope towards development. I would 
argue that a municipal politician in China not only cares about political tasks assigned by 
upper level government but also has a personal preference regarding the development of 
his/her cities, and such preference is determined by both of the past work experience and 
the political connections he/she built. Second, this study argues that politicians are not 
																																																								
166 Andrew J. Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” The China Quarterly, no. 53 (1973): 34–
66.; John P. Burns, “Introduction,” in The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System : A 
Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979-1984, ed. John P. Burns (Amonk, NY; 
London: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), ix–xliii.; Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics,” The China Journal, no. 
34 (1995): 1–34.; Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxin Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist 
Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” American Political Science 
Review 106, no. 01 (2012): 166–87. 
167 Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian, and Chenggang Xu, “Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form,” The 
Review of Economic Studies 67, no. 2 (2000): 359–78.; Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent 
Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly 173 
(2003): 35–52.; Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The 
Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 9 (2005): 1743–62.; 
Chenggang Xu, “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 49, no. 4 (2011): 1076–1151. 
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just “office seekers”168; they also care about economic development as well as people’s 
living standard. Moreover, this chapter explores the origins of different models of growth, 
rather than treating these as “given.” 
 
3.3 Politicians’ Background and Growth Strategies: A Theoretical Argument 
In democracies, political parties or politicians have greater incentives to respond 
to the public to make or adjust growth strategies, due to several different mechanisms, 
including political elections,169 civil society engagement,170 and preferences of 
insiders.171 In an authoritarian regime such as China, politicians are less constrained by 
elections and the making of growth strategies vary across cities according to key 
politicians’ (i.e. mayor) view and attitude towards the role of government and the role of 
business in the process of economic development. Such views are largely influenced by 
politicians’ background including work experience and the resources the politician can 
draw upon.  
																																																								
168 Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxin Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining 
the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 
01 (2012): 166–87. 
169 Timothy Besley and Anne Case, “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? 
Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 3 (1995): 769–
98.; David T Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black 
Majority Districts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).; Christian R Grose, Congress in Black 
and White Race and Representation in Washington and at Home (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011).  
170 Robert D Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1994).; Sidney Verba, 
Henry E Brady, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics 
(Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
171 David Rueda, “Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social 
Democratic Parties,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 61–74.; Daniel M. Butler and 
David E. Broockman, “Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment on 
State Legislators,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (2011): 463–77. 
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To elaborate, first, a municipal politician with experience in firms or positions 
dealing with government-business relations is more likely to admit the key role of 
business in the economic development. In addition, work experience in development 
related affairs also enhances a politician’s understanding of economic development 
including problems of the economy and potential solutions to them. Such kind of 
politicians are more likely to nurture micro-level development of firms and thus make 
growth strategies that emphasize innovation and industrial upgrade. I call this kind of 
growth strategy intensive strategy, which focuses on the quality of growth and aims at 
strengthening the dominant industry’s capability of innovation and producing high value-
added products. The practice of an intensive strategy involves close cooperation between 
mayor’s office and bureau of technology, commission of economy and information, and 
so forth. This strategy of growth would accompany with a series of industrial policies that 
encouraging innovation and industrial upgrade, which in turn result in social policies 
focusing on human capital development.  
Contrarily, if a municipal politician has less experience in economic related 
positions and more experience of political work (such as organizational or propaganda 
department in the case of China), that politician is less likely to have a strong and deep 
understanding of economic development as well as the problems facing the economy. As 
a result, such a politician would be more likely to adopt an extensive strategy that 
emphasizes on quantity rather than quality of growth and focuses on government-led 
investment rather than improving firms’ productivity. The extensive growth strategy 
would be more likely to result in heavy investment in mega projects but less investment 
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on innovation. This strategy has dominated China’s growth and is viewed by many 
politicians as a “safer” policy choice. It usually takes a much longer time for an intensive 
strategy that cultivating in-depth investment (e.g. human capital) to have a significant and 
explicit effect on economic growth, and thus it involves higher risk and cost for 
politicians to choose it. Mayors with less background of dealing economic affairs are thus 
more likely to choose the “safer” one (i.e. extensive strategy). Mayors adopting such 
strategy are more likely to implement funding allocation decisions through agents such as 
Commission of Development and Reform, Bureau of Finance, and state-owned banks. 
The goal is to build mega projects in a short period of time that would increase industrial 
output immediately. It relies heavily on short-term government investment rather than 
long-term nurturing of human capital. Social policy priorities would be more likely to be 
given in social security such as pension and work injury insurance but not human capital 
development such as innovation and skills of labor.  
A politician’s work experience not only shapes his/her scope towards 
development strategies but also affects the political connections and resources that he/she 
can draw upon to achieve his/her strategies of development. For example, a municipal 
politician who has stronger political network with provincial or central level of 
governments is likely to have more political resources than a politician without strong 
network with upper level government.  
Although key politicians play a critical role in making growth strategies and 
influencing social policy priorities, one caveat is that a mayor, for example, cannot totally 
ignore the existing industrial structure of a city. A city with dominant industry of 
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petrochemical, for example, is much less likely to see a mayor came in and decided to 
develop, for example, the semiconductor industry. In other words, although a mayor’s 
background shapes his/her preferences of growth strategies, the mayor still has to be 
realistic not only due to the reason of adjustment cost but also the concern of support 
from existing economic elites in the city. 
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy: A Most Similar Systems Design 
To test my theory, this chapter adopts the most similar systems design as the 
empirical strategy.172 In particular, I compare two cities in China –Shijiazhuang in Hebei 
province and Fushun in Liaoning province. There are several reasons for me to choose 
these two cases. First, the outcome of interest is different. Shijiazhuang and Fushun have 
very distinct social policy priorities – Shijiazhuang focuses more on human capital 
development while Fushun prioritizes social security improvement. Second, these two 
cities share many similarities across background conditions such as geography, 
demography, history, and economic endowment. Such background similarities enable me 
to control for variables that might confound the outcome variable – social policy priority. 
It is worth noting that both of the two cities have similar political arrangements of 																																																								
172 John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,” The American Political Science 
Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 341–54.; John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices 
(Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017).; Jason Seawright and John Gerring, 
“Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” 
Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294–308.; Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the 
Comparative Method,” The American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682–93.; Arend Lijphart, 
“The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research,” Comparative Political Studies 8, no. 2 (1975): 
158–77.; Theodore W. Meckstroth, “‘Most Different Systems’ and ‘Most Similar Systems’: A Study in the 
Logic of Comparative Inquiry,” Comparative Political Studies 8, no. 2 (1975): 132–57.; Theda Skocpol 
and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 22, no. 2 (1980): 174–97. 
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municipal bureaucracy, and both of them have little influence from foreign investment. 
Third, however, the two cases differ on the key independent variable (key politicians’ 
background) as well as on the outcome of interest. In addition, another reason for 
choosing these two cities to conduct case studies is that neither Shijiazhuang nor Fushun 
is a highly developed city, so it is possible to tease out the potential confounder of levels 
of development.173 A highly developed city (such as Shenzhen) might naturally result in a 
focus on human capital development as the industrial structure of the city upgraded. By 
choosing less developed cities for the case study, I can tease out the natural increase of 
the fiscal input in human capital development. In addition, less developed cities face 
fiscal constrain to develop both human capital and social security simultaneously. In 
other words, it is different from the Nordic model that embraces both social security and 
human capital investment. Such fiscal constrain makes the study even more interesting – 
in exploring the reasons why similar cities facing similar problems of development 
results in different models of growth and distinct social policy priorities. 
My empirical evidence is based on data collected from first hand sources in 
Chinese, including local gazetteers (difangzhi), local newspapers, yearbooks, and so forth. 
For example, in the Fushun case, I collected information from History of Liaoning 
Provincial Organization Department (1923 – 1987), Dashiqiao Gazetteers (1840 – 2000), 
Fushun Gazetteers (1986 – 2005), Dashiqiao Daily, Fushun Daily, and Fushun year 
																																																								
173 Bruce J Dickson et al., “Public Goods and Regime Support in Urban China,” The China Quarterly 228 
(2016): 859–80.; Rati Ram, “Wagner’s Hypothesis in Time-Series and Cross-Section Perspectives: 
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194–204.; Harold L Wilensky, Rich Democracies Political Economy, Public Policy, and Performance 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
		
103 
books from 2000 to 2014. In addition, Fushun municipal government documents and 
mayors’ speeches are also collected and used in my empirical analysis. 
 
3.4.1 Similarities between Shijiazhuang and Fushun 
Shijiazhuang and Fushun are two cities with many similarities. First and foremost, 
the two cities share a similar level of economic development. For example, the average 
GDP per capita from 2001-2012 in Shijiazhuang is 24,921 yuan and the average GDP per 
capita of Fushun is 27,506 yuan. In the year of 2001, GDP per capita was 12,157 yuan for 
Shijiazhuang and 11,357 yuan for Fushun. Such highly similar level of economic 
development enables me to control this critical variable as constant when exploring the 
determinations of different policy patterns in these two cities. Second, both of the two 
cities located in north China and share similar culture. Shijiazhuang (38.04 N) is a city in 
Hebei Province and Fushun (41.52 N) is located in Liaoning Province. Such geographical 
similarity makes it possible to tease out potential threat of historical, cultural, or 
traditional impact on human capital. For example, city of Shaoxing in Zhejiang province, 
South China also has similar level of economic development with Shijiazhuang and 
Fushun. However, if I compare Shaoxing with Fushun, for example, it is hard to tease out 
the millennium historical impact on Shaoxing’s education focus because Shaoxing (and 
also the whole Yangtze Delta Region) is well-known for its education tradition and the 
fame of its policy advisors (shiye).174 Third, both of my two cases enjoy a very strong 																																																								
174 Take late Qing Dynasty as an example. Zeng Guoquan, Zhang Zhidong, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, 
and Ding Baozhen all had a Shaoxing shiye. In Ming Dynasty, Shaoxing had 560 jinshi in total and this 
number was 744 in Qing Dynasty. See Xinen He, “Jinxiandai Zhengyaomen Shenbian de Shaoxing Shiye 
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legacy of socialist central planning in Mao’s China (1949-76). The city of Shijiazhuang 
was an important place for several big projects during the First Five-year-plan (1953-57), 
such as thermal power plant, cotton mill, and a pharmaceutical factory. In the Second 
Five-year-plan, Shijiazhuang also built an important iron and steel factory. Similar to 
Shijiazhuang, the city of Fushun also served as an important city during the socialist era. 
The central plans put several big projects in Fushun, including the Fushun petroleum 
factory, petrochemical factory, iron and steel factory, aluminum factory, and woolen mill, 
etc. The socialist legacy may have an impact on a city’s priority on social security. Thus, 
if I choose a city with weak socialist legacy, such as Wenzhou in Zhejiang province or 
Sanming in Fujian province, it is hard to tease out the potential impact of socialist 
planning on cities’ policy priorities in market era (since 1978). Fifth, both cities had 
similar economic structure and faced similar economic and social problems. Till the late 
1990s, the dominant industry of Shijiazhuang was pharmaceutics while Fushun’s pillar 
industry was petrochemical. Both industries were dominated by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs, such as North China Pharmaceutical Company in Shijiazhuang and Fushun 
Petrochemical Company in Fushun) which faced similar problems (such as low-value 
added products and high liability) and thus needed reform in both cases. In addition, both 
industries were labor-intensive industries and both the pharmaceutical and the 
petrochemical industries needed human capital investment for further development. 
However, only Shijiazhuang invested more in human capital while Fushun’s social policy 
focused more on the improvement of social security.  																																																																																																																																																																					
(Key Politicians’ Shaoxing Policy Advisors in Modern China),” Wenshi Jinghua (Literature and History 
Essence), no. 3 (2006): 55–61. 
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The following Table 3.4.1 summarizes similarities between City of Shijiazhuang and City 
of Fushun.  
Table 3.4.1 Similarities between City of Shijiazhuang and City of Fushun 
	
 
																																																								
175 The “156 Projects” were built in 1950s with the assistance from the Soviet Union and these 156 projects 
became the foundation of China’s industry. 56 cities in total were selected by the central government and 
those cities have a stronger legacy of socialism than other cities without those projects in the post-socialist 
era since 1978. For more information on the 156 projects, see: Zhikai Dong and Ronggang Liu, Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Yu 156 Xiang Gongcheng (Chinese Communist Party and the 156 Projects) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Dangshi Press, 2015).; Zhikai Dong and Jiang Wu, Xinzhongguo Gongye de Dianjishi: 156xiang 
Jianshe Yanjiu (Foundation of People’s Republic of China’s Industry: A Study on the 156 Projects) 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong Economic Press, 2004).; Yimin He and Mingchang Zhou, “156xiang Gongcheng 
Yu Xinzhongguo Gongye Chengshi Fazhan, 1949-1957 (The 156 Projects and China’s Industrial Cities’ 
Development, 1949-1957),” Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu (Contemporary China History Studies), no. 2 
(2007): 70–77.; Xi Chen, “156 Xiang Gongcheng He Zhongguo Gongye de Xiandaihua (The 156 Projects 
and China’s Industrial Modernization),” Dang de Wenxian (Party’s Document), no. 5 (1999): 28–34. 
 City of Shijiazhuang City of Fushun 
Geography 38.04 N, 114.28 E 41.52 N, 123.55 E 
Climate Temperate Monsoon Temperate Monsoon 
Land 469 sq km urban 684 sq km urban 
Population (2000) 1.95 million urban 1.62 million urban 
Ethnicity Han majority Han majority 
Natural Resources 59 minerals detected, 20 
minerals developed such 
as coal, gold, and mica 
52 minerals detected, 26 
minerals developed such 
as coal, gold, and copper 
Major Natural Resources Petroleum and Natural gas  Coal and Iron ore 
GDP per capita (2001) 12,157 yuan 11,357 yuan 
GDP per capita (2015) 48,7017 yuan 61,183 yuan 
Industrial Structure 
(Agriculture, Industry, 
Service, % of GDP) 
14: 47: 39 8: 60: 32 
Unemployment (2001) 18,000 27,000 
Distance to nearest 
international port 
430 km to Tianjin 400 km to Dalian 
Socialist Legacy Strong Strong 
The “156 Projects”175 5 8 
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3.4.2 Distinct Priorities of Social Policies in Shijiazhuang and Fushun 
Although Shijiazhuang and Fushun have many similarities, they have very 
distinct patterns of social policies, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, 
the municipal government of Shijiazhuang allocates much more fiscal resources in 
education and technology innovation while the Fushun government prioritizes its public 
expenditure on social security programs. This chapter measures education expenditure 
and social security expenditure as a percentage of the government’s total fiscal 
expenditure because such an indicator measures the allocation of government’s limited 
fiscal resources on different items, which reflects the policy priority of government. In 
Shijiazhuang, the average percentage of education spending as a total of public 
expenditure from 2001 to 2012 is 20.47% while the average percentage of social security 
is 6.67%. Thus, the ratio of education to social security of Shijiazhuang is 3.07 
(20.47/6.67), which implies that the Shijiazhuang municipal government sets a policy 
preference on human capital investment. By contrast, in Fushun this ratio is 0.44 
indicating that Fushun government prioritizes its public expenditure on social security 
such as pension, unemployment insurance, and work injury insurance, rather than on 
education. In addition to the quantitative difference on social spending, Shijiazhuang and 
Fushun have qualitative difference in terms of social policy priorities. In Shijiazhuang, 
the municipal government published a series of policies to attract “talents” (rencai), to 
encourage firms’ innovation through favorable policies, and to improve the overall 
quality of public services. For example, Shijiazhuang has specific favorable policies on 
post-doctoral researchers and experts with overseas background, which includes subsidies 
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of living and grants for research. As of 2015, Shijiazhuang has 3 national-level post-
doctoral research centers, 9 China Science Academy Fellow centers, 4 national-level 
industrial technology innovation associations, and 9 provincial-level incubators for high-
tech firms.176 The municipal government of Fushun, however, prioritized social security 
rather than human capital development. For example, Fushun was among the first wave 
of Chinese cities that established individual accounts in addition to the social pool for 
employees’ pension. In addition, Fushun also was a pioneer city that includes not only 
SOE employees but also employees in private firms, foreign firms, and self-employed 
people in the unemployment insurance.177 Thus, empirically, how can we explain the 
distinct policy outcomes between Shijiazhuang and Fushun? Facing similar problems 
(low value added, high liability as mentioned above) and similar necessity for industrial 
upgrade in both cities, why did Shijiazhuang turn to a path of intensive development that 
resulted in intensive knowledge input while Fushun chose an extensive model of growth 
and ended up with its priority on labor protection? 
 
3.5 The Case of Shijiazhuang 
Shijiazhuang is a city located in Hebei Province, North China. During the Planned 
Economy Era (1949-78), Shijiazhuang was one of the most important cities in the central 
plans. In the First Five-year-plan (1953-57), for example, Shijiazhuang was one of the 
four “national textile bases” (guojia fangzhi jidi). In early 1950s, central plans set up five 																																																								
176 “Qiangzhan Jingjinji Xietong Fazhan Gaodi (Conquering the Highland of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei’s 
Coordinating Development),” Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), August 3, 2016.  
177 Fushunshi Difangzhi Bangongshi (Fushun Municipal Office of Gazetteer), Fushun Shizhi, 1986-2005 
(Fushun City Gazetteer, 1986-2005), (Shenyang: Liaoning Minzu Press, 2015), 283-291. 
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mega projects in Shijiazhuang, including Shijiazhuang Thermal Power Plant, 
Shijiazhuang Starch Factory, Shijiazhuang Antibiotic Factory, Shijiazhuang Cotton Mill, 
and Shijiazhuang Glassworks. These projects served as the foundation of Shijiazhuang’s 
industrial development. Through the late 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry was the 
“first pillar industry of Shijiazhuang’s economy.”178 In 2000, the industrial output of 
Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical industry reached 16 billion yuan, 20.5% of the total 
industrial output of Shijiazhuang. Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical industry was well 
known for its production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs),179 such as 
antibiotics and Vitamin C. In addition, among all pharmaceutical firms in China, there 
were five giants with annual sales revenue above 3 billion yuan and Shijizhuang had two 
of them – the North China Pharmaceutical Group Corporation (Huayao) and the 
Shijiazhuang Pharmaceutical Corporation (Shiyao). Huayao is developed from the 1953 
built Shijiazhuang Antibiotic Factory, Shijiazhuang Starch Factory, and Shijiazhuang 
Glassworks. By the end of 1958, Huayao successfully produced the first strain of 
penicillin, the XP-58-01, which was the first time China had produced antibiotics 
indigenously.180 Nowadays, Huayao has over 20,000 employees with total assets of over 
18 billion yuan. Another giant of Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical industry is Shiyao. 
Shiyao was reorganized in 1997 by merging the Hebei Pharmaceutical Factory, 																																																								
178 Shijiazhuang Renmin Zhengfu (Shijiazhuang Municipal Government), “Shijiazhuang Yaodu Jianshe 
Zongti Guihua (A General Plan on Shijiazhuang’s Pharmaceutical Capital),” March 30, 2002. 
179 API is defined as “any substance or combination of substances used in a finished pharmaceutical 
production (FPP), intended to furnish pharmacological activity or to otherwise have direct effect in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, or to have direct effect in restoring, 
correcting or modifying physiological functions in human beings.” See “Definition of Active 
Pharmaceutical Ingredient,” Technical Report Series No. 961 (World Health Organization, July 2011), 3.  
180 “Gongheguo Yiyao Zhangzi Danshengji (Birth History of China’s Pharmaceutical Elder Son),” Hebei 
Ribao (Hebei Daily), December 3, 2014.  
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Shijiazhuang No.1 Pharmaceutical Factory, Shijiazhuang No.2 Pharmaceutical Factory, 
and Shijiazhuang No. 4 Pharmaceutical Factory with total employees of 19,000 and total 
assets of 24 billion yuan. Both Huayao and Shiyao are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and till the late 1990s both firms were labor-intensive with low value added products.  
At the dawn of the 21st century, as with many other cities with a strong socialist 
legacy, Shijiazhuang faced serious of problems such as SOE reform, unemployment, and 
sustainable economic development. Both Huayao and Shiyao were notorious for their 
pollution and consumption of resources (i.e. water and electricity) but low value added 
products (i.e. APIs). Shijiazhuang’s economy relied heavily on the contribution of the 
low profit margin SOEs.  
In December 2000, Mr. Zang Shengye was appointed as the acting mayor of 
Shijiazhuang and two months later he became mayor of Shijiazhuang. The new mayor 
brought a new growth strategy to the old industrial city; he wanted to build the city into 
the “pharmaceutical capital” (yaodu) of China. There were several other cities in China 
that specializes in pharmaceutical industry but Shijiazhuang wanted to be the “leader.” 
This concept was firstly proposed by Mayor Zang on a municipal work conference of 
Shijiazhuang in mid-2001. By the end of that year, under the guidance of Mayor Zang, 
the municipal government outlined a draft plan on how to develop the “pharmaceutical 
capital.” This concept led to more frequent and intensive interactions between several 
large pharmaceutical firms (both SOEs and private firms) and the municipal government. 
Why did Mayor Zang propose the idea of a pharmaceutical capital? How does such idea 
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affect the business-government relations in Shijiazhuang and how did it ultimately shape 
the municipal government’s policy preference into human capital investment? 
Prior to be appointed as mayor of Shijiazhuang, Mr. Zang had a very long career 
in Jilin Province, Northeast China. In 1970, Zang started his career as a worker in 
Hunjiang Bearing Factory where he later became the General Manager of the factory due 
to his intelligence and hard work. In 1986, Zang was promoted as Deputy Chief of the 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) Department, Jilin Provincial Government. 
Before Zang came to lead the Department of TVEs, Jilin’s TVEs were not in a good 
shape. In 1985, for example, the total TVEs’ industrial output of Jilin province was just 
the same as the TVEs’ output of one county (Wuxi) in Jiangsu Province.181 During 
Zang’s term, TVEs in Jilin enjoyed a rapid development. Zang was an open-minded 
person and spent quite amount of time in reaching out to TVEs. One place that caught 
Zang’s attention was Hongzui Village in Pingxi Township, 20 kilometers from downtown 
Siping City. In 1986, Lu Zhimin, the best known TVE entrepreneur in Hongzui village, 
decided to build a brewery but he found out that he needed 38 official seals (gongzhang) 
in total to start the construction of his factory!182 It was very hard for Lu to get every 
single official seal due to bureaucracy and corruption. Lu finally lost his patience after he 
got 8 seals and he decided to build the brewery without an official certification. However, 
he later realized that without all the 38 official seals it was impossible for him to sell his 
																																																								
181 Feng Lianju, “Jilin Sheng Gaige Kaifang Lishi Kaocha Jiqi Jingyan Yanjiu (Historical Analysis and 
Study on the Opening and Reform in Jilin Province)” (Changchun: Zhonggong jilin shengwei dangxiao 
(Jilin Provincial Party School), February 2003). 
182 “Jinri Shenzhou Diyitun (The Best Village in China),” Jilin Ribao (Jinlin Daily), July 7, 2008.  
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beer. Lu’s story caught Mr. Zang’s attention and Zang decided to help this ambitious 
entrepreneur.  
Later Lu was invited to attend a work conference on TVEs in the provincial 
government. Lu described his “hard time” at the conference and Zang also highlighted 
problems he discovered in his speech.183 Lu’s case caught a great deal of attention from 
Governor Gao Dezhan who then tasked Zang to conduct further investigations and submit 
a final report.184 Later that year Jilin provincial government published Regulations on 
Development of TVEs and amended it in the year of 1988, requiring local governments 
to release the burden of TVEs and forbidding the illegal fund raising activities of local 
governments.185 With Zang’s efforts, Lu’s brewery was officially recognized, and it 
established a joint venture with Shenyang Brewery, the oldest brewer (founded in 1936) 
in Northeast China. Nowadays Lu’s brewery is one of the largest breweries of draught 
beer production in China. During Zang’s term, the total industrial output of TVEs in Jilin 
reached 10.9 billion yuan, for the first time in Jilin’s history. As of 1991, total industrial 
output achieved 16.6 billion yuan and 468,000 households in Jilin were lifted out of 
poverty because of their participations in TVEs.186  
																																																								
183 “Nongmin Qiyejia Nanyan Kuzhong: Laizi Hongzui Nonggongshang Lianhe Gongsi de Husheng 
(Difficulties of Township and Village Entrepreneurs: A Call From Hongzui Farmer-worker United 
Company),” Jilin Ribao (Jilin Daily), September 22, 1986.  
184 “Wei Hongzui Shixian Xinkuayue Zhuli (Assist for Hongzui’s New Achievement),” Siping Ribao 
(Siping Daily), May 16, 2014.  
185 Jinlin Provincial Government, “Guanyu Dali Fazhan Xiangzhen Qiye Ruogan Wenti de Guiding 
(Regulations on Certain Problems Regarding the Development of Township and Village Enterprises),” 
Document No. 46, 1986; Jilin Provincial Government, “Guanyu Dali Fazhan Xiangzhen Qiye Ruogan 
Wenti de Buchong Guiding (Amendments on the Regulations on Certain Problems Regarding the 
Development of Township and Village Enterprises),” Document No. 12, 1988.  
186 Jilinsheng Tongjiju bian (Jilin Provincial Bureau of Statistics), Jilin Wushi Nian (Fifty Years of Jilin) 
(Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1999), 136. 
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Due to Zang’s excellent work, he was appointed mayor of Siping in 1992. A 
major achievement of Zang in city of Siping was his strategy of indigenous development. 
Similar to other cities in Northeast China, Siping’s economy is dominated by state-owned 
enterprises.187 Mayor Zang discovered that almost all major industries of Siping were 
either “designed” or “assigned” by the central government back to the early 1950s but 
few projects were in accordance with Siping’s factor endowments.188 For example, 
Siping did not have any iron and steel producer but mechanical machinery equipment 
constituted a large part of Siping’s industry. Such a situation was fine during the era of 
the planned economy, but the production costs increased rapidly since market reforms 
were introduced. After a careful analysis, Mayor Zang decided to develop the 
pharmaceutical industry with a special focus on Chinese medicine. Siping has a long 
history of pharmaceutical production back to 1958 when the Siping Pharmaceutical 
Factory was built. In addition, Siping is rich in Chinese medicine resources with 293 
kinds of herbs demonstrated as useful in Chinese medicine.189 During Mayor Zang’s 
tenure, the average GDP growth rate of Siping reached 10%, higher than that of Jilin 
Province as a whole. In addition, Siping’s GDP per capita also tripled in only eight years 
(from 1990 to 1998), the fastest development era in Siping’s history. Moreover, Siping 
																																																								
187 There are four dominant SOEs in Siping including Siping United Chemical Factory, Siping Blower 
Works, Siping Special Automobile Works, and Siping Pharmaceutical Factory. 
188 Yang Zhihua and Sun Wenyuan, “Danxin Yipian Ying Siping: Ji Yuan Jilinsheng Siping Shiwei Shuji 
Zang Shengye (Whole Heart on Siping: Record of Former Party Secretary Zang Shengye of Siping City 
Jilin Province),” Zuojia (Writers), no. 3 (1999): 107-110. 
189 Siping Municipal Government, “Siping Shi Yiyao Chanye Yuanqu Zhongdian Hezuo Xiangmu (Key 
Projects of Siping Pharmaceutical Industrial Park),” October 22, 2015.  
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government’s fiscal revenue tripled and the growth rate of fiscal revenue is much higher 
than the average growth rate of Jilin Province.190  
The eight years’ work experience in Siping served as a very important period of 
Zang’s political career and contributed to his idea of “pharmaceutical capital” when he 
was appointed as mayor of Shijiazhuang in 2001. Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical industry 
has a very long history back to the early 1950s. Till late 1990s, Shijiazhuang’s production 
of APIs consisted 12% of the whole nation’s APIs production, ranking just behind 
Shanghai. Shiyao is China’s largest production base for 7-aminocephalosporanic acid (7-
ACA), the core chemical structure for the synthesis of cephalosporin antibiotics and 
intermediates.191 Mayor Zang then came up with an idea of building Shijiazhuang into a 
“pharmaceutical capital.” In March 2002, the municipal government held a two-day 
hearing to discuss the plan. This two-day hearing was probably the largest hearing on 
industrial development ever held in Shijiazhuang’s history. All major politicians and 
bureaucrats of Shijiazhuang municipal government attended the hearing. The municipal 
government also invited CEOs from Huayao, Shiyao, and several other large 
pharmaceutical firms of Shijiazhuang. In addition, 53 experts were invited to attend the 
hearing, including university professors, government-affiliated as well as independent 
think tanks, and high-ranking officials of central and provincial governments.  
																																																								
190 Data calculated from Siping Tongji Nianjian 2000 (Siping Statistical Yearbook 2000), (Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2000) and Jilin Tongji Nianjian 2000 (Jilin Statistical Yearbook 2000), (Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2000).  
191 “Keji he Rencai shi Zhongguo Zhiyaoye de Shengming: Fang Shijiazhuang Shizhang Zang Shengye 
(Technology and Talents is the Key to China’s Pharmaceutical Industry: Interview on Mayor Zang Shengye 
of Shijiazhuang),” Xinhuashe (Xinhua News), April 2, 2004. 
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The two-day hearing discussed a wide range of issues regarding the plan of the 
“pharmaceutical capital” with special focus on market economy, business-government 
relations, and the role of business. Zhong Dajun, Director of Beijing Dajun Economic 
Observation Research Center, an independent think tank, stated the importance of state-
business relations. He suggested that the municipal government should put more 
emphasis on the role of business, especially large firms like Huayao and Shiyao. The 
government should abandon the “planned economy mindset” – the traditional way of 
giving administrative orders to business. Chen Dewu, a senior researcher at the Chinese 
Academy of Medical Sciences, expressed similar views. Chen argued that the municipal 
government of Shijiazhuang should be very clear about what firms need and suggested 
that the Pharmaceutical Capital Plan should add content regarding the role of business 
and how the government would assist the development of pharmaceutical firms. Another 
issue widely discussed during the meeting was the development of key firms such as 
Huayao and Shiyao. Many experts expressed their views about upgrading Shijiazhuang’s 
pharmaceutical industry from producing only low value-added APIs to more high value-
added medicines. Chen Dewu pointed out that if Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical industry 
continued its old way on producing Penicillin, a water shortage would become a serious 
problem. Gu Chengming, a senior manager of Xi’an Janssen Pharmaceutical, argued that 
building pharmaceutical capital of China requires Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical firms to 
be more profitable and competitive. Gu compared Huayao with Xi’an Janssen in 
particular. He pointed out that Huayao had over 20,000 employees with only 100 million 
yuan profits. By contrast, Xi’an Janssen had only 1,000 employees but the average annual 
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profit was 500 million yuan. Mayor Zang delivered a concluding speech at the end of the 
meeting, in which he fully acknowledged problems pointed out by participants and 
promised that suggestions would be taken into serious considerations.  
After the hearing, the municipal government held several rounds of meetings to 
discuss the draft plan based on experts’ suggestions. Mayor Zang tasked the Commission 
on Development and Reform to survey pharmaceutical firms. The Commission on 
Development and Reform launched a task force to study the pharmaceutical industry of 
Shijiazhuang. It also sent bureaucrats to firms to collect opinions, difficulties, and 
suggestions. To facilitate the idea of pharmaceutical capital, Mayor Zang further decided 
to make specific industrial policies for Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical industry. After 
over a year’s survey, research, and discussion, Shijiazhuang published its first official 
policy document on pharmaceutical development in 2004, the Shijiazhuang Industrial 
Policy on Pharmaceutical Industry (Shijiazhuang yiyao chanye fazhan zhengce). The 
Policy made very detailed plan on how to develop pharmaceutical industry and more 
important, it pointed out where the money goes. For example, banks were encouraged to 
make loans to high-tech firms or R&D projects and were regulated to loan less on 
resource-oriented or highly polluted programs. According to the policy document, any 
bank that violated such rules would be investigated and key persons would be 
punished.192 Such policy document not only sent a signal to the market of the flow of 
capital but also compelled the micro-level strategy adjustment of firms. For example, 
Huayao was a labor-intensive, resource-oriented firm with low-value added products of 																																																								
192 There is no private bank in China. Most banks are state-owned, and even the so-called “commercial 
banks” are heavily influenced by government activities. 
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APIs. Huayao had a very hard time at the beginning stage after the Policy document came 
out. Because of the lack of capital input, Huayao’s production decreased in 2004 and 
2005, resulting in an average net loss of 200 million yuan in these two years.193 To alter 
this situation, Huayao adjusted its development strategy and started to put more resources 
into R&D to develop new high-value added products. However, Huayao soon discovered 
that it was hard to hire medical researchers. Although Shijiazhuang had many higher 
education institutions, few were research institutions specializing in medicine and 
pharmacy. Moreover, because of the rigid SOE hiring mechanism, Huayao could not 
offer a competitive salary to experts or retain these experts in the firm. Comparing with 
Huayao, Shiyao was in a slightly better situation. In late 2004, one of Shiyao’s companies, 
NBP, successfully developed a new drug product, DI-3-butylphthalide, for curing 
cerebral infarction. However, the production of Vitamin C still consisted most of 
Shiyao’s production. And similar as Huayao, Shiyao also discovered that the company 
lacked of technicians, experts, and researchers.  
Facing these difficulties, both firms seek help from the municipal government. In 
the case of Shiyao, for example, the Chairman of the Board, Cai Dongchen, played a 
critical role. Cai was a national representative of the National People’s Congress from 
1998 to 2013. In the context of China, one of the privileges of a People’s Congress 
Representative is the right to submit policy proposals at annual meetings. Usually, a 
representative submits a policy proposal regarding problems or difficulties the 
																																																								
193 “Huabei Zhiyao 2004 nian Niandu baogao (Annual Report of North China Pharmaceutical Group 
2004),” April 23, 2005; “Huabei Zhiyao 2005 nian Niandu baogao (Annual Report of North China 
Pharmaceutical Group 2005),” April 19, 2006. 
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representative faced or noticed. In 2005, Cai Dongchen made a policy proposal to call for 
more support on medical innovation. He pointed out that most of the pharmaceutical 
firms lack innovation. In pharmaceutical industry, it usually takes eight to ten years to 
innovate a new drug and most pharmaceutical firms in China cannot afford such a high 
level of investment as well as risk and thus Cai called for support from the 
government.194 Cai’s proposal was then copied to Ministry of Science and Technology 
and later the Ministry of Science and Technology formed a formal response document to 
Cai’s proposal. In that document, the Ministry of Science and Technology committed a 
“further fiscal and technological input on the innovation of new medicines,” and “will 
establish detailed policies that helps pharmaceutical firms’ research activities.”195 In June 
2006, the municipal government published a Platform of Science and Technology for the 
Pharmaceutical Capital Plan (Shijiazhuang yaodu jianshe keji xingdong gangyao).196 The 
platform pointed out that a common problem faced by Shijiazhuang’s pharmaceutical 
industry is the lack of technological innovation, lack of technical experts, and lack of 
R&D. The platform required several municipal bureaus, such as Bureau of Science and 
Technology, Bureau of Human Resources, and Bureau of Education, to help major 
pharmaceutical firms to build eight research centers by 2010. According to the platform, 
government should increase its fiscal allocation in education and R&D. In addition, the 
																																																								
194 “Cai Dongchen Daibiao: Zhichi Zhongda Chuangxin Yaowu Yanfa (Representative Cai Dongchen: 
Advocating for Support on Pharmaceutical Innovation),” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), March 10, 2005.  
195 Guo ke fa yi ban zi (Ministry of Technology of China), “Dui Shijie Quanguo Renda Sici Huiyi Di 2855, 
3346, 4096 hao Jianyi de Dafu (Reply to the No. 2855, No. 3346, No. 4096 Policy Suggestions of the 
Fourth Session of the Tenth National Congress),” Document No. 163, 2006.  
196 Shijiazhuang Municipal Government, “Guanyu Yinfa Shijiazhuang Yaodu Jianshe Keji Xingdong 
Gangyao de Tongzhi (Announcement on The Acting Plan of Technology for Shijiazhuang’s Pharmaceutical 
Capital),” Document No. 25, June 20, 2006.  
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Platform encouraged the development and innovation activities from both SOEs (i.e. 
Shiyao and Huayao) and influential private firms such as Yiling Pharmaceutical 
Company which was founded in 1992 by Wu Yiling, a doctor in Chinese medicine. 
Yiling is a company specializing in Chinese medicine and its main product is 
Shensongyangxin Capsule, a medication for cardiac arrhythmia. The Platform called for 
strengthening research on new Chinese medications and used “high- and new 
technologies” to improve traditional Chinese medicine. In the Platform, it stated that the 
government should assist key firms in attracting experts.  
To better assist firms’ innovation, the Shijiazhuang municipal government for the 
first time officially take cadres’ work performance on science and technology into the 
cadre evaluation system in 2008. In Chinese governments, there are basically two kinds 
of cadre evaluations. One is to a department or a district/county, and the other is the 
evaluation to an individual cadre. The first type of evaluation is usually carried out by the 
Cadre Evaluations Office, led by a deputy mayor. The second type of evaluation is 
carried out by the Organization Department. Results are reported to these two offices and 
used as evidence for cadres’ promotion, at least in theory. Thus, as an individual cadre, 
he/she has more incentives to focus his/her work on promoting technological 
development. As a district government, the evaluation of district-level government also 
encourages the government to put more emphasis on technological development. The 
Chinese political system is a mobilization system – each bureau/department of a district 
government is responsible for achieving the priority task given by the district government, 
no matter what a bureau is professional of. In terms of individual cadre’s evaluation, in 
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Shijiazhuang, the evaluation is basically categorized as “highly competent,” “competent,” 
“basically competent,” and “incompetent.” If a cadre’s evaluation result falls into “highly 
competent” or “competent,” then that cadre is qualified for a potential chance of 
promotion. If a cadre received “competent” for three consecutive years, then that cadre 
will be considered as a “favorable candidate” for a potential promotion. In contrast, if a 
cadre’s evaluation result is “basically competent,” that cadre is not allowed to be 
promoted for the next following year. If a cadre receives an evaluation of “not competent,” 
he/she faces risk of being demoted or even ordered to resign.197  
The 2008 amended cadre evaluation system of Shijiazhuang has very detailed 
requirements on cadres’ work of science and technology. For example, it requires that for 
each sub-municipal government (such as district government), the growth rate of fiscal 
expenditure on R&D must exceed the growth rate of fiscal revenue.198 The new rule 
posed an incentive on bureaucrats to allocate more resources on technology innovation. 
For example, after Dr. Wu (CEO of Yiling Pharmaceutical Company) was nominated as 
a Member of Chinese Academy of Engineering (yuanshi), he proposed an idea of 
building an Academy Fellows Work Station (yuanshi gongzuo zhan) in 2010. Dr. Wu’s 
proposal received great attention and positive feedback from the government. The 
municipal government decided to offer a fiscal support of 460 million yuan and an 																																																								
197 “Shijiazhuang: Keji Touru Naru Ganbu Kaohe (Shijiazhuang: Technology Innovation Included in Cadre 
Evaluation), Xinhua Meiri Dianxun (Xinhua Daily Telegraph), April 8, 2008; Shijiazhuang Municipal 
Department of Organization, “Shijiazhuang Shizhi Bumen Lingdao Banzi he Ganbu Kaohe Banfa (Shixing) 
(Draft Regulations on Cadre Evaluation of Shijiazhuang Municipal Level Bureaus),” 2008.; “Shijiazhuang 
Gaijin Lingdao Ganbu Kaohe Banfa Zhuzhong Zonghe Kaoping (Changes of Shijiazhuang’s Cadre 
Evaluation Focusing on Comprehensive Performance),” Shijiazhuang Ribao (Shijiazhuang Daily), 
November 8, 2013.  
198 “Shijiazhuang: Keji Touru Naru Ganbu Kaohe (Shijiazhuang: Technology Innovation Included in Cadre 
Evaluation), Xinhua Meiri Dianxun (Xinhua Daily Telegraph), April 8, 2008.  
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allocation of 37,000 square meters of land for the construction of the Yiling 
Pharmaceutical Academy Fellows Center.199 
In the following year, another key firm, Shiyao, also established a research lab 
with government funding of 200 million yuan and government’s permission of 41,000 
square meters of land for a low price. With the new research lab, Shiyao built a research 
team of 400 researchers who have doctoral degrees.200 In 2012, Shiyao was awarded as 
China’s Top 10 Innovative Pharmaceutical Firms201 and the following year Shiyao 
became a Top 20 public listed pharmaceutical firm.202 In 2014, Shiyao’s well-known 
product, Butylphthalide Soft Capsules, a medicine for curing cerebral ischemic stroke, 
was the only medical product that received the China Industry Award, the highest honor 
of manufacturing once every three years.203 By the end of 2014, Shiyao was no longer 
relied on the production of APIs. The ratio of sales revenue from APIs and innovative 
drugs upgraded from 3:7 to 7: 3 and nearly 95% of firm’s profits came from innovative 
drugs.204 
																																																								
199 “Shijiazhuang Yiling Yaoye Yuanshi Gongzuozhan Chengli (Shijiazhuang Established the Yiling 
Pharmaceutical Academy Fellows Work Station),” Keji Ribao (Technology Daily), October 19, 2010; 
“Shijiazhuang Kaijian Shengwu YIyao Yuanshi Gongzuozhan (Shijiazhuang Built Biomedical Academy 
Fellows Work Station),” Zhongguo Kexue Bao (China Science Daily), April 27, 2012.  
200 “Shiyao Xinxing Yaowu Zhiji yu Fuliao Guojia Zhongdian Shiyanshi Qiyong (The Opening of A 
National Key Lab: The Shijiazhuang New Type of Pharmaceutical Preparations and Accessories Lab),” 
Hebei Ribao (Hebei Daily), November 23, 2011.  
201 “Shiyao Jituan Ruxuan Shida Zhongguo Zuiju Chuangxinli Yaoqi (Shijiazhuang Pharmaceutical Group 
Has Been Selected to Top 10 Innovated Pharmaceutical Firms in China),” Shijiazhuang Xinwen 
(Shijiazhuang News), August 16, 2012.  
202 “2013 Zhongguo Zuiju Jingzhengli Yiyao Shangshi Gongsi 20qiang Jiexiao (The Top 20 Competitive 
Public Listed Firms in Pharmaceutical Industry in China 2013),” Zhongguo Xinwen (China News), August 
12, 2013.  
203 “Enbipu Zhaoqu Zhongguo Gongye Dajiang (Butylphthalide Won the China Industry Award),” 
Shijiazhuang Xinwen (Shijiazhuang News), May 20, 2014.  
204 “2014 Shiyao Jituan Nishi Tuwei (Shijiazhuang Pharmaceutical Group Breaks Out in 2014),” Zhongguo 
Jingji Zhoukan (China Economic Weekly), March 23, 2015.  
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One thing worth noting is that these research labs and centers not only benefited 
the large pharmaceutical firms (such as Shiyao and Yiling) but also improved the overall 
level of human capital, which also benefited startup firms. Lang Hengyuan, for instance, 
a post-doctoral fellow with over 40 patents in medicine and biology at the University of 
Florida, decided to come back to Shijiazhuang to start his business. According to Lang, 
Shijiazhuang was totally different from his childhood memory. He was surprised that the 
government charged him zero yuan for three years’ rental of office, and the government 
did renovation for his office. Moreover, the government generously offered household 
certificates to all of the 40 technicians hired by Lang.205 Lang’s firm was just one 
example and there were hundreds of other startup firms in Shijiazhuang that similarly 
benefited from the improvement of human capital. In 2015, Shijiazhuang introduced 
Regulations on the Management of Post-doctoral Research Centers (Boshihou Keyan 
Gongzuozhan Guanli Zhidu), Favorable Policies on Attracting High-end Experts (Yinjin 
Gaoduan Rencai Fuchi Zhengce), and Regulations on the Use of Special Funds for 
Experts (Rencai Zhuanxiang Zijin Shiyong Banfa). These policies have detailed 
instructions on “incubating” start-up high-tech firms. For example, the Favorable Policies 
on Attracting High-end Experts lists a series of detailed policies on subsidizing experts. 
First, experts are assessed and categorized into China Academy Fellows (yuanshi), the 
“1000 plan”206, the “100 plan”207, and provincial-level excellent experts, etc. Then, the 																																																								
205 “Guiguo Boshi Shijiazhuang Chuangyeji: Haozhengce Daigei Jishu Renyuan Qiangda Dongli (Report 
on Overseas Ph.D.s Coming back to Shijiazhuang: Good Policy Brings Strong Motivations for Talents),” 
Shijiazhuang Ribao (Shijiazhuang Daily), June 18, 2015.  
206 The “1000 Plan” is a national recruitment program for innovative talents who are granted the title of 
“national distinguished experts” and are provided with very high level of working and living conditions. 
This program was launched by Central Organization Department in 2008.  
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municipal government of Shijiazhuang gives each expert a start-up funding for his/her 
research (from 30,000 to 500,000 yuan) according to his/her ranking. Moreover, several 
other policies are available for experts to get more benefits from the government. For 
example, according to the Ten Measures for Supporting Firms’ Technology Innovation 
(Zhichi Qiye Keji Chuangxin Shitiao Cuoshi), a national-level research center is rewarded 
5 million yuan and a provincial-level research center receives 1 million yuan of research 
funding.208 Till now, Shijiazhuang has three national-level post-doctoral research centers, 
nine China Academy Fellows centers, four national-level industrial technology 
innovation leagues, and nine provincial-level high-tech incubators. Moreover, the quality 
of public service has also been improved. In December 2015, Shijiazhuang established a 
new Administrative Approval Bureau. The new bureau incorporates previous nine 
bureaus’ 151 items of administrative approvals and turns the 21 needed seals into only 
one, greatly improving the efficiency of administration and feasibility of high-tech 
startups.209  
 
3.6 The Case of Fushun 
Similar to Shijiazhuang, the city of Fushun also has a long history of serving as an 
important city in the planned economy era. From 1949 to 1954, Fushun was under the 
direct administration of the central government. Among the 156 mega projects built in the 																																																																																																																																																																					
207 Similar to the “1000 plan,” “the 100 Plan” is a national recruitment program for global experts in fields 
related with science and technology. It was launched by the China Science Academy in 1994.  
208 “Shijiazhuang: Keji Chuangxin Jifa Zhuanxing Shengji Xindongneng (Shijiazhuang: Techonological 
Innovation Boots Transfer and Upgrade of Industries),” Shijiazhuang Ribao (Shijiazhuang Daily), June 21, 
2016. 
209 “Shijiazhuang Gaoxin Jishu Chanye Wenjian Shengji (Steady Improvement of Shijiazhuang’s High-tech 
Industry),” Shijiazhuang Ribao (Shijiazhuang Daily), August 26, 2016. 
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1950s, Fushun had eight projects which served as the foundation of Fushun’s industry.210 
Up until late 1990s, petrochemical was the primary pillar industry of Fushun’s economy. 
In addition, Fushun’s economy also relies on large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such 
as the Fushun Petrochemical Company, Fushun Aluminum Factory, and Fushun New 
Iron and Steel Company. In 2000, state-owned enterprises accounted for more than 50% 
of Fushun’s economy and over 62% of employees worked in the public sector.211   
However, unlike Shijiazhuang which prioritizes human capital development, 
Fushun’s municipal government allocates greater fiscal resources to social security 
programs such as pension, unemployment insurance, and work injury insurance, etc. As 
shown in above sections, from 2001 to 2012, the average fiscal expenditure on education 
is less than half of that on social security.  
As discussed above, in 2001, Shijiazhuang had its new Mayor Zang Shengye who 
later proposed the idea of creating a pharmaceutical capital and decided to form an 
intensive strategy for economic growth. Such strategy of growth brought intensive 
interactions between the municipal government and pharmaceutical firms and resulted in 
a social policy focus of human capital. In the case of Fushun, it had a new mayor named 
Wang Daping in November 2001. In the following year, Mayor Wang introduced an idea 
of “petrochemical city” and wanted to develop Fushun as the Petrochemical City of 
North China. Given the fact that both Mayor Zang’s proposal of pharmaceutical capital 
and Mayor Wang’s idea of petrochemical city requires intensive input in human capital, 																																																								
210 The eight projects are Fushun Aluminum Factory, Fushun Power Plant, Fushun Magnesium Factory, 
Fushun Second Petroleum Factory, Fushun Xilutian Colliery, Fushun Longfeng Colliery, Fushun Laohutai 
Colliery, and Fushun Shengli Colliery.  
211 “Fushun Jingji Jiegou Tiaozheng de Qushi yu Duice (Trend and Policies on the Adjustment of Economic 
Structure of Fushun),” Fushun Caizheng yu Kuaiji (Fushun Finance and Accounting), no.5 (2002). 
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the question is, why did Shijiazhuang achieve it but Fushun did not? What happened in 
Fushun? In particular, what are Mayor Wang’s work and education background? How 
does it affect his priority on social security rather than human capital?  
Wang Daping graduated from Gansu University of Technology in 1982, with an 
engineering degree majoring in turbo machinery. He started his career as Assistant 
Engineer at Tianjin Research Institute of Electric Science but soon he was nominated as 
Director of Party Office (dangban zhuren) of the research institute. After three years of 
excellent work on party affairs, in 1985, Wang was promoted to the Liaoning Provincial 
Organization Department. During his eight years in the provincial organization 
department, Wang also served as a secretary for deputy provincial party secretary of 
Liaoning. In 1993, Wang was promoted as deputy party secretary of Dashiqiao City, 
where he later became the mayor.212 Wang Daping enjoyed a high reputation in 
Dashiqiao as someone who was just, fair, and really served the people of Dashiqiao. 
Largely because of his work experience in the organization department, Wang Daping 
was very serious in the promotion of bureaucrats when he served as Mayor of Dashiqiao. 
For example, he initiated and insisted the principle that all appointments of cadres should 
																																																								
212 It is likely that Wang worked as a secretary for Sun Qi, First Deputy Party Secretary of Liaoning. It is 
not proved but likely that Wang’s promotion to Dashiqiao was due to Sun Qi’s help. First, in the same year 
as Wang was appointed as Deputy Party Secretary of Dashiqiao, Sun Qi went to Dashiqiao for a two day 
“work inspection.” Second, within the same month when Wang was officially elected as Mayor of 
Dashiqiao, Sun Qi did another “work inspection” to Dashiqiao. Third, during Wang’s term, Sun Qi had four 
official visits to Dashiqiao, more frequent than any other provincial level politicians in Liaoning. See 
Dashiqiao Shizhi Bianzuan Banggongshi (Dashiqiao Office of Gazetteer), Dashiqiao Zhi, 1840-2000 
(Dashiqiao Gazetteer, 1840-2000), (Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Press, 2006), 40-46. Sun Qi joined the CCP in 
1949 and had his whole career in Liaoning. Sun Qi was Deputy Governor of Liaoning from 1983 – 1985 
and was later promoted and served as First Deputy Party Secretary of Liaoning from 1985 to 1993. He was 
also in charge of the Party Discipline Committee from 1990 – 1993. Starting from 1993 to his retirement in 
2001, Sun Qi served as Chairman of People’s Political Consultative Conference of Liaoning. 
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be based on tests (fanjin bikao).213 In addition, Wang also tried to improve 
professionalism of street-level bureaucrats. From 1996 to 2000, Dashiqiao government 
recruited 99 bureaucrats with college degrees and appointed them to different 
towns/townships of Dashiqiao.214 Overall, Dashiqiao used to have a bad reputation for 
corruption in Liaoning but not during Wang Daping’s term.  
Another major work that Wang achieved in Dashiqiao was to improve people’s 
living standard and help the poor. Right after Wang was promoted as the acting mayor of 
Dashiqiao, he decided to establish a program called the “warm project” (wennuan 
gongcheng), which was targeted at the unemployed and those who experienced work 
injuries. A committee was also established under the Dashiqiao government to manage 
funding.215 In the following two years, Dashiqiao government established a social 
security fund specifically for rural residents and it also expanded the pension program to 
cover employees in private firms, which was among the first wave of Chinese cities 
nationwide that included rural residents and non-SOEs employees into the coverage of 
social security.216 In 1998, tasked by Wang and funded by the government, Dashiqiao’s 
Disability Association built a comprehensive treatment center for disabled people 
including medical treatment, physical therapy and consulting psychology, which was 
																																																								
213 Dashiqiao Shizhi Bianzuan Banggongshi (Dashiqiao Office of Gazetteer), Dashiqiao Zhi, 1840-2000 
(Dashiqiao Gazetteer, 1840-2000), (Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Press, 2006), 484. 
214 Ibid, 485.  
215 Government of Dashiqiao, “Guanyu Jianshe Dashiqiao shi zhigong wennuan gongcheng de baogao 
(Report on the Establishment of Warm Project of Dashiqiao),” August 17, 1995.  
216 Government of Dashiqiao, “Guanyu Jaiqiang Nongcun Yanglao Baoxian Jijin Guanli de Tongzhi 
(Bulletin on Strengthening the Management of Rural Pension Fund),” January 3, 1996.; Government of 
Dashiqiao, “Dashiqiao chengshi qiye zhigong yanglao baoxian zanshi guiding (Regulations on Pension of 
Employees of Enterprises in Dashiqiao),” April 8, 1997.  
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very rare in China at that time.217 In the same year, the government listed poverty relief 
and aid to the disabled into the government’s work plan. Mayor Wang initiated and 
headed a small work group in this effort and 650 households benefited from this 
program.218 
The eight years’ work experience in Dashiqiao also served as a very important 
step for Wang’s later work in the city of Fushun. However, different from Mayor Zang 
who emphasizes more on the role of firms in the economy, Mayor Wang prefers to rely 
on the active role of the government in fostering economic development. Moreover, 
Mayor Wang cares more about ordinary people’s living standard than the long-term 
cultivation of technology innovation. In November 2001, Wang Daping was promoted to 
Fushun. He first acted as deputy mayor and soon he was appointed as mayor of the city. 
Fushun was an old city with a very long history of coal mining back to 1901 when the 
Qing Dynasty started mining the Xilutian Colliery, the largest coal mine in Asia.219 
However, by the late 1990s, Fushun’s major coalmines faced the problem of being dried 
up and the coal industry accounted for less than 3% of Fushun’s GDP. Petrochemicals 
became the first pillar industry of Fushun’s economy (over 60% of Fushun’s GDP). In 
																																																								
217 Dashiqiao Shizhi Bianzuan Banggongshi (Dashiqiao Office of Gazetteer), Dashiqiao Zhi, 1840-2000 
(Dashiqiao Gazetteer, 1840-2000), (Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Press, 2006), 516. 
218 Ibid, 515.  
219 Xilutian Colliery was firstly developed by the Qing in 1901; the Qing Court issued official license to 
Wang Chengyao, a local gentry of Fushun. However, in the following year, a Russian funded firm became 
the largest shareholder of the Xilutian Colliery. After the Russian-Japanese war, Japan took over the 
colliery in 1905. Over 30 years, Japan exploited over 86 million tons of thermal coal and over 78 million 
tons of oil shale Bonanza. Starting from 1949, China restored its sovereignty over the colliery.  
		
127 
September 2002, Mayor Wang proposed the idea of developing Fushun into the 
“Petrochemical City of North China.”220  
Two months later, Mayor Wang invited a dozen of experts to discuss the 
development of Fushun. However, different from Shijiazhuang’s two-day hearings, 
Fushun’s meeting did not emphasize the role of business. Instead, Mayor Wang relied 
more on the role of government in economic development. In addition, the main goal of 
the November hearing was to prove that Mayor Wang’s idea of “petrochemical city” was 
correct rather than challenging it or denying it. Mayor Wang’s strategy was to rely on 
government investment to build several mega projects to create the petrochemical city. 
By the end of 2002, Fushun municipal government officially confirmed the working 
principle – “mega projects as the central goal” and made this principle as the core 
guidance of Fushun’s economic growth.221 Liu Qiang, CEO of the Fushun Petrochemical 
Company (the dominant SOE in Fushun), then proposed to build two mega projects, the 
1000 tons petroleum refining project and the 100 tons ethylene project.222 In 2003, the 
municipal government of Fushun decided to spend 1.5 billion yuan as the initial funding 
for the plan of petrochemical city.223 With sufficient government funding and loans from 
state-owned banks, Fushun’s economy was on a path of extensive growth (i.e. expanding 
																																																								
220 Fushun Difangzhi Bangongshi (Fushun Local Gazetteer Office), Fushun Nianjian, 2003 (Fushun 
Yearbook, 2003), (Shenyang: Liaoning Minzu Press, 2004), 124-125. 
221 Fushun Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Fushunshi Shiyiwu Guding Zichan Touzi 
Zhuanxiang Guihua (Specific Plan on Fushun’s Fixed Assets Investment for the Eleventh Five-year-plan),” 
January 10, 2007. 
222 “Fushun cong Meidu dao Shihuacheng de Zhuanbian (Fushun: From Capital of Coal to Petrochemical 
City),” Zhongguo Caijing Baodao (China Financial Reporting), November 12, 2002. 
223 “Fushun shiwuyi Dazao Beifang Shihuacheng (Fushun Spends 1.5 Billion to Create Petrochemical City 
of North China),” Liaoshen Wanbao (Liaoshen Evening News), February 20, 2003.  
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productivity through these two mega projects) rather than an intensive path of growth 
(such as incubating long-term innovation as in the case of Shijiazhuang).  
In addition to these mega projects launched by the Fushun Petrochemical 
Company, Mayor Wang cared more about employees’ welfare and the living standard of 
the poor than attracting experts or upgrading industries (as what was done by Mayor 
Zang in the case of Shijiazhuang). During Wang’s term, he enlarged the population 
covered by the Minimum Living Guarantee (dibao) program from 70,000 to 170,000 in 
Fushun. In addition, Mayor Wang focused on the rebuilding of shanty areas (penghuqu 
gaizao) for suburban residents. For example, from 2003 to 2004, Fushun municipal 
government built new houses for more than 2,400 households who lived in shanty areas. 
Mayor Wang’s Fushun was in sharp contrast with Mayor Zang’s Shijiazhuang. In the 
case of Shijiazhuang, it was not until the year of 2013 that the municipal government 
made a clear plan to rebuild shanty areas. It was not because Fushun had a more urgent 
need than Shijiazhuang did. On the contrary, Shijiazhuang was in a worse situation with 
over 63,000 households living in shanty areas.224  
In late 2004, Mayor Wang left Fushun and Liu Qiang, CEO of the Fushun 
Petrochemical Company, was promoted as the new mayor. During Mayor Wang’s term in 
Fushun, the municipal government spent less than 70 million yuan on technology 
innovation but spent more than 4 billion yuan on social security programs including 
social security for the employed, social relief for disabled, minimum living guarantee for 
																																																								
224 “Tisheng Chengshi Gongneng Gaishan Jumin Juzhu Tiaojian (Improve Functions of City and Improve 
Residents’ Living Condition),” Shijiazhuang Ribao (Shijiazhuang Daily), May 5, 2014. 
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the poor, and welfare housing for shanty area residents.225 The new Mayor Liu did not 
alter the former Mayor Wang’s extensive strategy of development and he even argued 
that mega projects are “lifesaving projects” (jiuming xiangmu) of Fushun’s economy.226 
In Fushun’s 11th Five-year-plan (2006-2010), Mayor Liu planned to invest 27 billion 
yuan in the petrochemical industry.227 Indeed, Mayor Liu tried to mobilize all possible 
fiscal and political resources to ensure the productivity of mega projects, which in turn 
resulted in a continuing priority of Fushun’s social policies on social security rather than 
human capital. Before Liu Qiang became the mayor, his whole career was in Fushun’s 
SOEs. After graduating from Dalian University of Technology, Liu became a technician 
at Fushun Ethylene Factory where later he was promoted as the head of the factory. In 
1998, Fushun Ethylene Factory and several other companies were merged into Fushun 
Petrochemical Company. Liu was appointed as deputy general manager and later he 
became the CEO of the Fushun Petrochemical Company. Liu’s career path is very 
different from former Mayor Wang’s; Liu lacks experience of managing a city’s overall 
development. In addition, it seems that Liu’s career path makes him overemphasize on 
the key role of his firm – the Fushun Petrochemical Company – in Fushun’s economic 
development and Mayor Liu did not have a clear long-term plan for nurturing the human 
capital of Fushun. 
 																																																								
225  Fushun Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Fushunshi Caizheng Shiyiwu Fazhan 
Guihua (The Eleventh Five-year-plan in Finance of Fushun Municipality),” January 10, 2007.  
226 “Liu Qiang jiu Fushun Shihua Gongsi Dayixi Xiangmu Xianchang Bangong (Work Inspection of 
Fushun Petrochemical’s Mega Ethylene Project by Liu Qiang),” Fushun Ribao (Fushun Daily), April 16, 
2008. 
227 Fushun Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Fushunshi Caizheng Shiyiwu Fazhan 
Guihua (The Eleventh Five-year-plan in Finance of Fushun Municipality),” January 10, 2007.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
Social policies in authoritarian regimes are less studied and we know less on the 
causes of a city’s priority of its social policy. Why do some cities prioritize their 
resources on the development of human capital while other cities focus more on social 
security policies and protection of labor?  
This chapter joins the very recent literature on growth strategies and social policy 
reform in European countries. In particular, this chapter tries to explore how a city’s 
growth strategy affects the city’s social policy priority. Basically, this chapter finds that a 
city with an intensive strategy of growth focuses more on innovation, productivity and 
industrial upgrade, while a city with an extensive growth strategy relies mostly on 
government investment on mega projects that focus on quantity rather than quality of 
growth. These two distinct growth strategies lead to different social policy outcomes. An 
intensive strategy results in social policies that promote human capital of a city, including 
skills of labor, and capabilities of innovation. In contrast, an extensive growth strategy 
leads to a social policy priority of the protection of labor such as pension and 
unemployment insurance.  
In the light of this statement, understanding formation of growth strategies is a 
key to understand social policy priorities. This study tries to examine the role of key 
municipal politicians in shaping cities’ growth strategies. In particular, I argue that a 
mayor of a city plays a critical role in determining the city’s strategy of growth. A 
mayor’s background contributes to his/her understanding of economic development and 
the role of government in this process, and his/her the attitude towards business. I 
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contend that work experience is important in shaping a mayor’s mindset on development 
as well as the political relations a mayor develops. In addition, the political relations a 
mayor develops through his/her career also affects the political and economic resources 
that a mayor can draw upon to achieve his/her proposed growth strategy.  
To test the theory, this chapter conducts the most similar systems design on two 
cities of China – city of Shijiazhuang and city of Fushun – that share many similarities in 
terms of economic, social, historical, demographic, and geographic variables but have 
distinct social policy outcomes – Shijiazhuang focuses more on human capital but Fushun 
prioritizes on social security. I first discover that both cities experienced a “critical 
juncture” in early 2000, with one city proposed to build a “pharmaceutical capital” and 
the other proposed to become a “petrochemical city.” I then compare each mayor’s work 
experience in these two cities to illustrate how a mayor’s background affects his/her idea 
of development, and how different development strategies lead to distinct social policy 
outcomes. This chapter contributes to our understanding of key politicians’ role in 
affecting social policy outcomes.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Robustness Check – Alternative Dependent Variables 
In Chapter One, I use a municipal government’s public expenditure on social 
welfare as percentage of its GDP as a measurement of social welfare provision. To test 
the robustness of Chapter One’s results, I adopt two alternative measurements of social 
welfare. The first alternative measurement is social welfare expenditure relative to a 
government’s total fiscal revenue, which measures how much portion of a government’s 
budget spends on welfare and indicates the level of willingness of government to do so. 
The second alternative measurement is social welfare per capita. This measurement 
reflects the level of social welfare of a city; if the per capita social welfare is higher, it 
means that level of social welfare of that city is higher. The following Table A1 displays 
results of these two alternative dependent variables. As we can see, all results remain 
robust as what I find in Table 1.6.1.  
Table A1. Alternative Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 WELFARE 
% of Fiscal 
Resource 
WELFARE 
% of Fiscal 
Resource 
WELFARE 
per capita 
WELFARE 
per capita 
L.Large Firm 3.135*** 6.198*** 365.1*** 114.5** 
 (0.229) (1.500) (72.47) (45.99) 
L.Foreign Firm 0.300* 0.434** 24.89*** 19.81*** 
 (0.176) (0.184) (7.028) (7.532) 
Covariates  YES  YES 
City FE YES YES YES YES 
Lagged DV             YES  YES 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
           YES            YES            YES YES 
N 1970 1894 1971 1895 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 2. Robustness Check – Alternative Independent Variables 
I adopt different measurements of my independent variables to test the robustness 
of my results. For the first independent variable, I further restrict the criteria for large 
firm. In the context of China, the criteria above large firm is called “super large firm” and 
I use logarithm industrial output of super large firms as a robustness check. In terms of 
the second independent variable, I use trade openness as an alternative measurement of 
FDI. Openness is measured by logarithm of a city’s total amount of export. The Table A2 
below summarizes the results of welfare provision by using alternative measurements of 
independent variables. All my main findings in Table 1.6.1 hold here. 
Table A2. Alternative Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 WELFARE 
% of GDP 
WELFARE 
% of GDP 
WELFARE 
% of GDP 
L.Super Large Firm 0.357*** 0.156*** 0.178*** 
 (0.0848) (0.0481) (0.0362) 
L. Openness 0.576*** 0.234*** 0.267*** 
 (0.118) (0.0659) (0.0932) 
Covariates                       YES           YES 
City FE YES YES YES 
Lagged DV   YES 
Robust Std. Err. YES YES YES 
N 871 834 519 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 3. Robustness Check – Models without Lagged IVs 
To further check the robustness of my models presented in Table 1.6.1, I do not 
include lagged form of my independent variables. To elaborate, I use a cityi’s logarithm 
of large firm’s industrial output at yeart to measure large firm power, rather than using 
cityi’s logarithm of large firms’ industrial output at yeart-1 to measure it. I adopt exactly 
the same method to operate the second independent variable, foreign firm power, which 
is a cityi’s logarithm of foreign direct investment at yeart rather than yeart-1. Table A3 
below summarizes the result which remains robust. 
 
Table A3. Models without Lagged IVs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 WELFARE 
% of GDP 
WELFARE 
% of GDP 
WELFARE 
% of GDP 
Large Firmi,t 1.342*** 0.597*** 0.677*** 
 (0.0503) (0.123) (0.135) 
Foreign Firmi,t 0.241*** 0.176*** 0.0667* 
 (0.0369) (0.0371) (0.0382) 
Covariates                            YES                 YES 
City FE YES YES YES 
Lagged DV                    YES 
Robust Std. Err. YES YES                  YES 
N 2634 2576 2269 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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